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I. | Substantive International Law - First Part |
1. | THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW |
1.3. | Estoppel and Acquiescence |
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Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria
Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 275
[pp. 303-304] 57. Turning to the second branch of the objection, the
Court will examine whether the conditions laid down in its jurisprudence for an
estoppel to exist are present in the instant case.
An estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declarations Cameroon had
consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary
dispute submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues alone. It would further be
necessary that, by relying an such an attitude, Nigeria had changed position to
its own detriment or had suffered some prejudice (North Sea Continental
Shelf Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 26, para. 30; Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 118, para. 63).
These conditions are not fulfilled in this case. Indeed, as pointed out in
paragraph 56 above, Cameroon did not attribute an exclusive character to the
negotiations conducted with Nigeria, nor, as far as it appears, did Nigeria.
Furthermore, Nigeria does not show that it has changed its position to its
detriment or that it has sustained prejudice in that it could otherwise have
sought a solution to the border problems existing between the two States by
having recourse to other procedures, but was precluded from doing so by reliance
on the positions allegedly taken by Cameroon.
58. Finally, the Court has not been persuaded that Nigeria has been
prejudiced as a result of Cameroon's having instituted proceedings before the
Court instead of pursuing negotiations which, moreover, were dead-locked when
the Application was filed.
59. This being so, in bringing proceedings before the Court, Cameroon did
not disregard the legal rules relied on by Nigeria in support of its second
objection. Consequently, Nigeria is not justified in relying on the principle of
good faith and the rule pacta sunt servanda, both of which relate only
to the fulfilment of existing obligations. The second branch of Nigeria's
objection is not accepted.