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| I. | Substantive International Law - First Part |
| 4. | SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW |
| 4.2. | States |
| 4.2.7. | Immunity of States |
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Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Belgium)
Judgment of 14 February
2002
[pp. 20-22 ] 51. The Court would observe at the outset that in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal. For the purposes of the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that fall for the Court to consider.
52. A certain number of treaty instruments were cited by the Parties in this regard. These included, first, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, which states in its preamble that the purpose of diplomatic privileges and immunities is “to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States”. It provides in Article 32 that only the sending State may waive such immunity. On these points, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which both the Congo and Belgium are parties, reflects customary international law. The same applies to the corresponding provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to which the Congo and Belgium are also parties.
The Congo and Belgium further cite the New York Convention on Special Missions of 8 December 1969, to which they are not, however, parties. They recall that under Article 21, paragraph 2, of that Convention:
“The Head of the Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other persons of high rank, when they take part in a special mission of the sending State, shall enjoy in the receiving State or in a third State, in addition to what is granted by the present Convention, the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by international law.”
These conventions provide useful guidance on certain aspects of the question of immunities. They do not, however, contain any provision specifically defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It is consequently on the basis of customary international law that the Court must decide the questions relating to the immunities of such Ministers raised in the present case.
53. In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. He or she is in charge of his or her Government’s diplomatic activities and generally acts as its representative in international negotiations and intergovernmental meetings. Ambassadors and other diplomatic agents carry out their duties under his or her authority. His or her acts may bind the State represented, and there is a presumption that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by virtue of that office, has full powers to act on behalf of the State (see, e.g., Art. 7, para. 2 (a), of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). In the performance of these functions, he or she is frequently required to travel internationally, and thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the need should arise. He or she must also be in constant communication with the Government, and with its diplomatic missions around the world, and be capable at any time of communicating with representatives of other States. The Court further observes that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for the conduct of his or her State’s relations with all other States, occupies a position such that, like the Head of State or the Head of Government, he or she is recognized under international law as representative of the State solely by virtue of his or her office. He or she does not have to present letters of credence: to the contrary, it is generally the Minister who determines the authority to be conferred upon diplomatic agents and countersigns their letters of credence. Finally, it is to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that chargés d’affaires are accredited.
54. The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties.
55. In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an “official” capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a “private capacity”, or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office. The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those official functions are equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the time of arrest, present in the territory of the arresting State on an “official” visit or a “private” visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an “official” capacity or a “private” capacity. Furthermore, even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.
[pp. 23-26] 56. The Court will now address Belgium’s argument that immunities accorded to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs can in no case protect them where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. In support of this position, Belgium refers in its Counter-Memorial to various legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, to examples from national legislation, and to the jurisprudence of national and international courts.
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58. The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.
The Court has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or criminal responsibility of persons having an official capacity contained in the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, and which are specifically applicable to the latter (see Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 27). It finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to conclude that any such an exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts.
Finally, none of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, or of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, cited by Belgium deal with the question of the immunities of incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs before national courts where they are accused of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court accordingly notes that those decisions are in no way at variance with the findings it has reached above.
In view of the foregoing, the Court accordingly cannot accept Belgium’s argument in this regard.
59. It should further be noted that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these conventions.
60. The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.
61. Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.
First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries’ courts in accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law.
Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.
Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the future International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention. The latter’s Statute expressly provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that “[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person”.
[pp. 27-30] 67. The Court will first recall that the “international arrest warrant in absentia”, issued on 11 April 2000 by an investigating judge of the Brussels Tribunal de première instance, is directed against Mr. Yerodia, stating that he is “currently Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, having his business address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kinshasa”. The warrant states that Mr. Yerodia is charged with being “the perpetrator or co-perpetrator” of:
"Crimes under international law constituting
grave breaches causing harm by act or omission to persons
and property protected by the Conventions signed at
Geneva on 12 August 1949 and by Additional Protocols
I and II to those Conventions (Article 1, paragraph
3, of the Law of 16 June 1993, as amended by the Law
of 10 February 1999 concerning the punishment of serious
violations of international humanitarian law).
Crimes against humanity (Article 1, paragraph
2, of the Law of 16 June 1993, as amended by the Law
of 10 February 1999 concerning the punishment of serious
violations of international humanitarian law).”
The warrant refers to “various speeches inciting racial hatred” and to “particularly virulent remarks” allegedly made by Mr. Yerodia during “public addresses reported by the media” on 4 August and 27 August 1998. It adds:
“These speeches allegedly had the effect of inciting the population to attack Tutsi residents of Kinshasa: there were dragnet searches, manhunts (the Tutsi enemy) and lynchings.
The speeches inciting racial hatred thus are said to have resulted in several hundred deaths, the internment of Tutsis, summary executions, arbitrary arrests and unfair trials.”
68. The warrant further states that “the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs currently held by the accused does not entail immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement”. The investigating judge does, however, observe in the warrant that “the rule concerning the absence of immunity under humanitarian law would appear ... to require some qualification in respect of immunity from enforcement” and explains as follows:
“Pursuant to the general principle of fairness in judicial proceedings, immunity from enforcement must, in our view, be accorded to all State representatives welcomed as such onto the territory of Belgium (on ‘official visits’). Welcoming such foreign dignitaries as official representatives of sovereign States involves not only relations between individuals but also relations between States. This implies that such welcome includes an undertaking by the host State and its various components to refrain from taking any coercive measures against its guest and the invitation cannot become a pretext for ensnaring the individual concerned in what would then have to be labelled a trap. In the contrary case, failure to respect this undertaking could give rise to the host State’s international responsibility.”
69. The arrest warrant concludes with the following order:
“We instruct and order all bailiffs and agents of public authority who may be so required to execute this arrest warrant and to conduct the accused to the detention centre in Forest;
We order the warden of the prison to receive the accused and to keep him (her) in custody in the detention centre pursuant to this arrest warrant;
We require all those exercising public authority to whom this warrant shall be shown to lend all assistance in executing it.”
70. The Court notes that the issuance, as such, of the disputed arrest warrant represents an act by the Belgian judicial authorities intended to enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The fact that the warrant is enforceable is clearly apparent from the order given to “all bailiffs and agents of public authority ... to execute this arrest warrant” (see paragraph 69 above) and from the assertion in the warrant that “the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs currently held by the accused does not entail immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement”. The Court notes that the warrant did admittedly make an exception for the case of an official visit by Mr. Yerodia to Belgium, and that Mr. Yerodia never suffered arrest in Belgium. The Court is bound, however, to find that, given the nature and purpose of the warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed as the Congo’s incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordingly concludes that the issue of the warrant constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by him under international law.
71. The Court also notes that Belgium admits that the purpose of the international circulation of the disputed arrest warrant was “to establish a legal basis for the arrest of Mr. Yerodia ... abroad and his subsequent extradition to Belgium”. The Respondent maintains, however, that the enforcement of the warrant in third States was “dependent on some further preliminary steps having been taken” and that, given the “inchoate” quality of the warrant as regards third States, there was no “infringe[ment of] the sovereignty of the [Congo]”. It further points out that no Interpol Red Notice was requested until 12 September 2001, when Mr. Yerodia no longer held ministerial office.
The Court cannot subscribe to this view. As in the case of the warrant’s issue, its international circulation from June 2000 by the Belgian authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively infringed Mr. Yerodia’s immunity as the Congo’s incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo’s conduct of its international relations. Since Mr. Yerodia was called upon in that capacity to undertake travel in the performance of his duties, the mere international circulation of the warrant, even in the absence of “further steps” by Belgium, could have resulted, in particular, in his arrest while abroad. The Court observes in this respect that Belgium itself cites information to the effect that Mr. Yerodia, “on applying for a visa to go to two countries, [apparently] learned that he ran the risk of being arrested as a result of the arrest warrant issued against him by Belgium”, adding that “[t]his, moreover, is what the [Congo] ... hints when it writes that the arrest warrant ‘sometimes forced Minister Yerodia to travel by roundabout routes’”. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the circulation of the warrant, whether or not it significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia’s diplomatic activity, constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by him under international law.
[p. 35 S.O. Guillaume] 1. [A] court’s jurisdiction is a question which it must decide before considering the immunity of those before it. In other words, there can only be immunity from jurisdiction where there is jurisdiction. Moreover, this is an important and controversial issue, clarification of which would have been in the interest of all States, including Belgium in particular.
[p. 60 S.O. Koroma] 5. Although immunity is predicated upon jurisdiction - whether national or international - it must be emphasized that the concepts are not the same. Jurisdiction relates to the power of a State to affect the rights of a person or persons by legislative, executive or judicial means, whereas immunity represents the independence and the exemption from the jurisdiction or competence of the courts and tribunals of a foreign State and is an essential characteristic of a State. Accordingly, jurisdiction and immunity must be in conformity with international law. It is not, however, that immunity represents freedom from legal liability as such, but rather that it represents exemption from legal process. The Court was therefore justified that in this case, in its legal enquiry, it took as its point of departure one of the issues directly relevant to the case for determination, namely whether international law permits an exemption from immunity of an incumbent Foreign Minister and whether the arrest warrant issued against the Foreign Minister violates international law, and came to the conclusion that international law does not permit such exemption from immunity.
[p. 64 J.S.O. Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal] 3. ... “Immunity” is the common shorthand phrase for “immunity from jurisdiction”. If there is no jurisdiction en principe, then the question of an immunity from a jurisdiction which would otherwise exist simply does not arise. The Court, in passing over the question of jurisdiction, has given the impression that “immunity” is a free-standing topic of international law. It is not. “Immunity” and “jurisdiction” are inextricably linked. Whether there is “immunity” in any given instance will depend not only upon the status of Mr. Yerodia but also upon what type of jurisdiction, and on what basis, the Belgian authorities were seeking to assert it.
4. While the notion of “immunity” depends, conceptually, upon a pre-existing jurisdiction, there is a distinct corpus of law that applies to each. What can be cited to support an argument about the one is not always relevant to an understanding of the other. In bypassing the issue of jurisdiction the Court has encouraged a regrettable current tendency (which the oral and written pleadings in this case have not wholly avoided) to conflate the two issues.
5. Only if it is fully appreciated that there are two distinct norms of international law in play (albeit that the one - immunity - can arise only if the other - jurisdiction - exists) can the larger picture be seen. One of the challenges of present-day international law is to provide for stability of international relations and effective international intercourse while at the same time guaranteeing respect for human rights. The difficult task that international law today faces is to provide that stability in international relations by a means other than the impunity of those responsible for major human rights violations. This challenge is reflected in the present dispute and the Court should surely be engaged in this task, even as it fulfils its function of resolving a dispute that has arisen before it. But through choosing to look at half the story - immunity - it is not in a position to do so.
[pp. 80-81 J.S.O. Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal] 59. If, as we believe to be the case, a State may choose to exercise a universal criminal jurisdiction in absentia, it must also ensure that certain safeguards are in place. They are absolutely essential to prevent abuse and to ensure that the rejection of impunity does not jeopardize stable relations between States.
No exercise of criminal jurisdiction may occur which fails to respect the inviolability or infringes the immunities of the person concerned. We return below to certain aspects of this facet, but will say at this juncture that commencing an investigation on the basis of which an arrest warrant may later be issued does not of itself violate those principles. The function served by the international law of immunities does not require that States fail to keep themselves informed.
A State contemplating bringing criminal charges based on universal jurisdiction must first offer to the national State of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned. The Court makes reference to these elements in the context of this case at paragraph 16 of its Judgment.
Further, such charges may only be laid by a prosecutor or juge d’instruction who acts in full independence, without links to or control by the government of that State. Moreover, the desired equilibrium between the battle against impunity and the promotion of good inter-State relations will only be maintained if there are some special circumstances that do require the exercise of an international criminal jurisdiction and if this has been brought to the attention of the prosecutor or juge d’instruction. For example, persons related to the victims of the case will have requested the commencement of legal proceedings.
[pp. 84-85 J.S.O. Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal] 71. As to the matter of immunity, although we agree in general with what has been said in the Court’s Judgment with regard to the specific issue put before it, we nevertheless feel that the approach chosen by the Court has to a certain extent transformed the character of the case before it. By focusing exclusively on the immunity issue, while at the same time bypassing the question of jurisdiction, the impression is created that immunity has value per se, whereas in reality it is an exception to a normative rule which would otherwise apply. It reflects, therefore, an interest which in certain circumstances prevails over an otherwise predominant interest, it is an exception to a jurisdiction which normally can be exercised and it can only be invoked when the latter exists. It represents an interest of its own that must always be balanced, however, against the interest of that norm to which it is an exception.
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74. The increasing recognition of the importance of ensuring that the perpetrators of serious international crimes do not go unpunished has had its impact on the immunities which high State dignitaries enjoyed under traditional customary law. Now it is generally recognized that in the case of such crimes, which are often committed by high officials who make use of the power invested in the State, immunity is never substantive and thus cannot exculpate the offender from personal criminal responsibility. It has also given rise to a tendency, in the case of international crimes, to grant procedural immunity from jurisdiction only for as long as the suspected State official is in office.
75. These trends reflect a balancing of interests. On the one scale, we find the interest of the community of mankind to prevent and stop impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes against its members; on the other, there is the interest of the community of States to allow them to act freely on the inter-State level without unwarranted interference. A balance therefore must be struck between two sets of functions which are both valued by the international community. Reflecting these concerns, what is regarded as a permissible jurisdiction and what is regarded as the law on immunity are in constant evolution. The weights on the two scales are not set for all perpetuity. Moreover, a trend is discernible that in a world which increasingly rejects impunity for the most repugnant offences, the attribution of responsibility and accountability is becoming firmer, the possibility for the assertion of jurisdiction wider and the availability of immunity as a shield more limited. The law of privileges and immunities, however, retains its importance since immunities are granted to high State officials to guarantee the proper functioning of the network of mutual inter-State relations, which is of paramount importance for a well-ordered and harmonious international system.
[pp. 86-89 J.S.O. Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal] 79. We wish to point out, however, that the frequently expressed conviction of the international community that perpetrators of grave and inhuman international crimes should not go unpunished does not ipso facto mean that immunities are unavailable whenever impunity would be the outcome. The nature of such crimes and the circumstances under which they are committed, usually by making use of the State apparatus, makes it less than easy to find a convincing argument for shielding the alleged perpetrator by granting him or her immunity from criminal process. But immunities serve other purposes which have their own intrinsic value and to which we referred in paragraph 77 above. International law seeks the accommodation of this value with the fight against impunity, and not the triumph of one norm over the other. A State may exercise the criminal jurisdiction which it has under international law, but in doing so it is subject to other legal obligations, whether they pertain to the non-exercise of power in the territory of another State or to the required respect for the law of diplomatic relations or, as in the present case, to the procedural immunities of State officials. In view of the worldwide aversion to these crimes, such immunities have to be recognized with restraint, in particular when there is reason to believe that crimes have been committed which have been universally condemned in international conventions. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse carefully the immunities which under customary international law are due to high State officials and, in particular, to Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
80. Under traditional customary law the Head of State was seen as personifying the sovereign State. The immunity to which he was entitled was therefore predicated on status, just like the State he or she symbolised. Whereas State practice in this regard is extremely scarce, the immunities to which other high State officials (like Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs) are entitled have generally been considered in the literature as merely functional. (Cf. Arthur Watts, “The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers”, Recueil des Cours 1994-III, Vol. 247, pp. 102-103.)
81. We have found no basis for the argument that Ministers of Foreign Affairs are entitled to the same immunities as Heads of State. In this respect, it should be pointed out that paragraph 3.2 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property of 1991, which contained a saving clause for the privileges and immunities of Heads of State, failed to include a similar provision for those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (or Heads of Government). In its commentary, the ILC, stated that mentioning the privileges and immunities of Ministers for Foreign Affairs would raise the issues of the basis and the extent of their jurisdictional immunity. In the opinion of the ILC these immunities were clearly not identical to those of Heads of State.
82. The Institut de droit international took a similar position in 2001 with regard to Foreign Ministers. Its resolution on the Immunity of Heads of State, based on a thorough report on all relevant State practice, states expressly that these “shall enjoy, in criminal matters, immunity from jurisdiction before the courts of a foreign State for any crime he or she may have committed, regardless of its gravity”. But the Institut, which in this resolution did assimilate the position of Head of Government to that of Head of State, carefully avoided doing the same with regard to the Foreign Minister.
83. We agree, therefore, with the Court that the purpose of the immunities attaching to Ministers for Foreign Affairs under customary international law is to ensure the free performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States (Judgment, para. 53). During their term of office, they must therefore be able to travel freely whenever the need to do so arises. There is broad agreement in the literature that a Minister for Foreign Affairs is entitled to full immunity during official visits in the exercise of his function. This was also recognized by the Belgian investigating judge in the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000. The Foreign Minister must also be immune whenever and wherever engaged in the functions required by his office and when in transit therefor.
84. Whether he is also entitled to immunities during private travels and what is the scope of any such immunities, is far less clear. Certainly, he or she may not be subjected to measures which would prevent effective performance of the functions of a Foreign Minister. Detention or arrest would constitute such a measure and must therefore be considered an infringement of the inviolability and immunity from criminal process to which a Foreign Minister is entitled. The arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 was directly enforceable in Belgium and would have obliged the police authorities to arrest Mr. Yerodia had he visited that country for non-official reasons. The very issuance of the warrant therefore must be considered to constitute an infringement on the inviolability to which Mr. Yerodia was entitled as long as he held the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo.
85. Nonetheless, that immunity prevails only as long as the Minister is in office and continues to shield him or her after that time only for “official” acts. It is now increasingly claimed in the literature (see e.g., Andrea Bianchi “Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights”, 46 Austrian Journal of Public and International Law (1994), pp. 227-228) that serious international crimes cannot be regarded as official acts because they are neither normal State functions nor functions that a State alone (in contrast to an individual) can perform: (Goff, J. (as he then was) and Lord Wilberforce articulated this test in the case of 1° Congreso del Partido (1978) QB 500 at 528 and (1983) AC 244 at 268, respectively). This view is underscored by the increasing realization that State-related motives are not the proper test for determining what constitutes public State acts. The same view is gradually also finding expression in State practice, as evidenced in judicial decisions and opinions. (For an early example, see the judgment of the Israel Supreme Court in the Eichmann case; Supreme Court, 29 May 1962, 36 International Law Reports, p. 312.) See also the speeches of Lords Hutton and Phillips of Worth Matravers in R v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, ex parte Pinochet (“Pinochet III”); and of Lords Steyn and Nicholls of Birkenhead in “Pinochet I”, as well as the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam in the Bouterse case (Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 20 November 2000, para. 4.2.)
[p. 91 S.O. Rezek] 2. No immunity is absolute, in any legal order. An immunity must necessarily exist within a particular context, and no subject of law can enjoy immunity in the abstract. Thus, an immunity might be available before one national court but not before another. Similarly, an immunity might be effective in respect of domestic courts but not of an international one. Within a given legal order, an immunity might be relied upon in relation to criminal proceedings but not to civil proceedings, or vis-à-vis an ordinary court but not a special tribunal.
3. The question of jurisdiction thus inevitably precedes that of immunity. Moreover, the two issues were debated at length by the Parties both in their written pleadings and in oral argument. The fact that the Congo confined itself in its final susbmissions to asking the Court to render a decision based on its former Minister’s immunity vis-à-vis the Belgian domestic court does not justify the Court’s disregard of an inescapable premise underlying consideration of the issue of immunity. Here, the point is not to follow the order in which the issues were submitted to the Court for consideration but rather to respect the order which a strictly logical approach requires. Otherwise, we are impelled towards a situation where the Court is deciding whether or not there would be immunity in the event that the Belgian courts were to have jurisdiction...
[pp. 96-99 D.O. Al-Khasawneh] 4. A Minister for Foreign Affairs is entitled to immunity from enforcement when on official mission for the unhindered conduct of diplomacy would suffer if the case was otherwise, but the opening of criminal investigations against him can hardly be said by any objective criteria to constitute interference with the conduct of diplomacy. A faint-hearted or ultra-sensitive Minister may restrict his private travels or feel discomfort but this is a subjective element that must be discarded. The warrant issued against Mr. Yerodia goes further than a mere opening of investigation and may arguably be seen as an enforcement measure but it contained express language to the effect that it was not to be enforced if Mr. Yerodia was on Belgian territory on an official mission. In fact press reports - not cited in the Memorials or the oral pleadings - suggest that he had paid a visit to Belgium after the issuance of the warrant and no steps were taken to enforce it. Significantly also the circulation of the international arrest warrant was not accompanied by a Red Notice requiring third States to take steps to enforce it (which only took place after Mr. Yerodia had left office) and had those States acted they would be doing so at their own risk. A breach of an obligation presupposes the existence of an obligation and in the absence of any evidence to suggest a Foreign Minister is entitled to absolute immunity, I cannot see why the Kingdom of Belgium, when we have regard to the terms of the warrant and the lack of an Interpol Red Notice was in breach of its obligations owed to the Democratic Republic of Congo.
5. A more fundamental question is whether high State officials are entitled to benefit from immunity even when they are accused of having committed exceptionally grave crimes recognized as such by the international community. In other words, should immunity become de facto impunity for criminal conduct as long as it was in pursuance of State policy? The Judgment sought to circumvent this morally embarrassing issue by recourse to an existing but artificially drawn distinction between immunity as a substantive defence on the one hand and immunity as a procedural defence on the other. The artificiality of this distinction can be gleaned from the ILC commentary to Article 7 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which states: “The absence of any procedural immunity with respect to prosecution or punishment in appropriate judicial proceedings” - and it should not be forgotten that the draft was intended to apply to national or international courts - is an essential corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity or defence. It would be paradoxical to prevent an individual from invoking his official position to avoid responsibility for a crime only to permit him to invoke this same consideration to avoid the consequences of this responsibility.”
6. Having drawn this distinction, the Judgment then went on to postulate four cases where, in an attempt at proving that immunity and impunity are not synonymous, a Minister, and by analogy a high-ranking official, would be held personally accountable for:
(a) Prosecution in his/her home State;
(b) Prosecution in other States if his/her immunity had been waived;
(c) After he/she leaves office except for official acts committed while in office;
(d) Prosecution before an international court.
This paragraph (Judgment, para. 61) is more notable for the things it does not say than for the things it does: As far as prosecution at home and waiver are concerned, clearly the problem arises when they do not take place. With regard to former high-ranking officials the question of impunity remains with regard to official acts, the fact that most grave crimes are definitionally State acts makes this more than a theoretical lacuna. Lastly with regard to existing international courts their jurisdiction ratione materiae is limited to the two cases of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the future international court’s jurisdiction is limited ratione temporis by non-retroactivity as well as by the fact that primary responsibility for prosecution remains with States. The Judgment cannot dispose of the problem of impunity by referral to a prospective international criminal court or existing ones.
7. The effective combating of grave crimes has arguably assumed a jus cogens character reflecting recognition by the international community of the vital community interests and values it seeks to protect and enhance. Therefore when this hierarchically higher norm comes into conflict with the rules on immunity, it should prevail. Even if we are to speak in terms of reconciliation of the two sets of rules, this would suggest to me a much more restrictive interpretation of the immunities of high-ranking officials than the Judgment portrays. Incidentally, such a restrictive approach would be much more in consonance with the now firmly-established move towards a restrictive concept of State immunity, a move that has removed the bar regarding the submission of States to jurisdiction of other States often expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. It is difficult to see why States would accept that their conduct with regard to important areas of their development be open to foreign judicial proceedings but not the criminal conduct of their officials.
8. In conclusion, this Judgment is predicated
on two faulty premises.
(a) That a Foreign Minister enjoys
absolute immunity from both jurisdiction and enforcement
of foreign States as opposed to only functional immunity
from enforcement when on official mission, a preposition
which is neither supported by precedent, opinio
juris, legal logic or the writings of publicists.
(b) That as international law stands
today, there are no exceptions to the immunity of high-ranking
State officials even when they are accused of grave
crimes. While, admittedly, the readiness of States
and municipal courts to admit of exceptions is still
at a very nebulous stage of development, the situation
is much more fluid than the Judgment suggests. I believe
that the move towards greater personal accountability
represents a higher norm than the rules on immunity
and should prevail over the latter. In consequence,
I am unable to join the majority view.
[p. 151 D.O. Van den Wyngaert] 23. ... [T]he International Court of Justice, by deciding that incumbent Foreign Ministers enjoy full immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction (Judgment, para. 54), has reached a conclusion which has no basis in positive international law. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court should have satisfied itself of the existence of usus and opinio juris. There is neither State practice nor opinio juris establishing an international custom to this effect. There is no treaty on the subject and there is no legal opinion in favour of this proposition. The Court’s conclusion is reached without regard to the general tendency toward the restriction of immunity of the State officials (including even Heads of State), not only in the field of private and commercial law where the par in parem principle has become more and more restricted and deprived of its mystique, but also in the field of criminal law, when there are allegations of serious international crimes. Belgium may have acted contrary to international comity, but has not infringed international law. The Judgment is therefore based on flawed reasoning.
[pp. 157-159 D.O. Van den Wyngaert] 29. The distinction between jurisdictional immunity and criminal responsibility of course exists in all legal systems in the world, but is not an argument in support of the proposition that incumbent Foreign Ministers cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of other States when they are suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity. There are a host of sources, including the 1948 Genocide Convention1 , the 1996 International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind2, the Statutes of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals3 and the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court4. All these sources confirm the proposition contained in the Principle 3 of the Nuremberg principles5 which states: “The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law”.
30. The Congo argued that these sources only address substantive immunities, not procedural immunities and that therefore they offer no exception to the principle that incumbent Foreign Ministers are immune from the jurisdiction of other States. Although some authorities seem to support this view6, most authorities do not mention the distinction at all and even reject it.
31. Principle 3 of the Nuremberg principles (and the subsequent codifications of this principle), in addition to addressing the issue of (procedural or substantive) immunities, deals with the attribution of criminal acts to individuals. International crimes are indeed not committed by abstract entities, but by individuals who, in many cases, may act on behalf of the State7.
Sir Arthur Watts very pertinently writes:
“States are artificial legal persons: they can only act through the institutions and agencies of the State, which means, ultimately, through its officials and other individuals acting on behalf of the State. For international conduct which is so serious as to be tainted with criminality to be regarded as attributable only to the impersonal State and not to the individuals who ordered or perpetrated it is both unrealistic and offensive to common notions of justice.”8
At the heart of Principle 3 is the debate about individual versus State responsibility, not the discussion about the procedural or substantive nature of the protection for government officials. This can only mean that, where international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity are concerned, immunity cannot block investigations or prosecutions to such crimes, regardless of whether such proceedings are brought before national or before international courts. Article 7 of the International Law Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind9, which is intended to apply to both national and international criminal courts, only confirms this interpretation. In its Commentary to this Article, the International Law Commission states:
“The absence of any procedural immunity with respect to prosecution or punishment in appropriate judicial proceedings is an essential corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity or defence. It would be paradoxical to prevent an individual from invoking his official position to avoid responsibility for a crime only to permit him to invoke this same consideration to avoid the consequences of this responsibility.”10
33. In adopting the view that the non-impunity clauses in the relevant international instruments only address substantive, not procedural immunities, the International Court of Justice has adopted a purely doctrinal proposition, which is not based on customary or conventional international law or on national practice and which is not supported by a substantial part of legal doctrine. It is particularly unfortunate that the International Court of Justice adopts this position without giving reasons.
[pp. 159-163 D.O. Van den Wyngaert] 34. I now turn to the Court’s proposition that immunities protecting an incumbent Foreign Minister under international law are not a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances, which the Court enumerates. The Court mentions four cases where an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs can, despite his immunities under customary international law, be prosecuted: (1) he can be prosecuted in his own country; (2) he can be prosecuted in other States if the State whom he represents waives immunity; (3) he can be prosecuted after he ceases being a Minister for Foreign Affairs; and (4) he can be prosecuted before an international court (Judgment, para. 61).
In theory, the Court may be right: immunity and impunity are not synonymous and the two concepts should therefore not be conflated. In practice, however, immunity leads to de facto impunity. All four cases mentioned by the Court are highly hypothetical.
35. Prosecution in the first two cases presupposes a willingness of the State which appointed the person as a Foreign Minister to investigate and prosecute allegations against him domestically or to lift immunity in order to allow another State to do the same.
This, however, is the core of the problem of impunity: where national authorities are not willing or able to investigate or prosecute, the crime goes unpunished. And this is precisely what happened in the case of Mr. Yerodia. The Congo accused Belgium of exercising universal jurisdiction in absentia against an incumbent Foreign Minister, but it had itself omitted to exercise its jurisdiction in presentia in the case of Mr. Yerodia, thus infringing the Geneva Conventions and not complying with a host of United Nations resolutions to this effect11.
The third case mentioned by the Court in support of its proposition that immunity does not necessarily lead to impunity is where the person has ceased to be a Foreign Minister (Judgment, para. 61, “Thirdly”). In that case, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. The Court adds that the lifting of full immunity, in this case, is only for “acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office”. For acts committed during that period of office, immunity is only lifted “for acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity”. Whether war crimes and crimes against humanity fall into this category the Court does not say12.
It is highly regrettable that the International Court of Justice has not, like the House of Lords in the Pinochet case, qualified this statement13. It could and indeed should have added that war crimes and crimes against humanity can never fall into this category. Some crimes under international law (e.g., certain acts of genocide and of aggression) can, for practical purposes, only be committed with the means and mechanisms of a State and as part of a State policy. They cannot, from that perspective, be anything other than “official” acts. Immunity should never apply to crimes under international law, neither before international courts nor national courts. I am in full agreement with the statement of Lord Steyn in the first Pinochet case, where he observed that:
“It follows that when Hitler ordered the ‘final solution’ his act must be regarded as an official act deriving from the exercise of his functions as Head of State. That is where the reasoning of the Divisional Court inexorably leads.”14
The International Court of Justice should have made it clearer that its Judgment can never lead to this conclusion and that such acts can never be covered by immunity.
37. The fourth case of “non-impunity” envisaged by the Court is that incumbent or former Foreign Ministers can be prosecuted before “certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction” (Judgment, para. 61, “Fourthly”). The Court grossly overestimates the role an international criminal court can play in cases where the State on whose territory the crimes were committed or whose national is suspected of the crime are not willing to prosecute. The current ad hoc international criminal tribunals would only have jurisdiction over incumbent Foreign Ministers accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in so far as the charges would emerge from a situation for which they are competent, i.e., the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the conflict in Rwanda.
The jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court, set up by the Rome Statute, is moreover conditioned by the principle of complementarity: primary responsibility for adjudicating war crimes and crimes against humanity lies with the States. The International Criminal Court will only be able to act if States which have jurisdiction are unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out investigation or prosecution (Art. 17 ).
And even where such willingness exists, the International Criminal Court, like the ad hoc international tribunals, will not be able to deal with all crimes that come under its jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court will not have the capacity for that, and there will always be a need for States to investigate and prosecute core crimes15. These States include, but are not limited to, national and territorial States. Especially in the case of sham trials, there will still be a need for third States to investigate and prosecute16.
Not all international crimes will be justiciable before the permanent International Criminal Court. It will only be competent to try cases arising from criminal behaviour occurring after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. In addition, there is uncertainty as to whether certain acts of international terrorism or certain gross human rights violations in non-international armed conflicts would come under the jurisdiction of the Court. Professor Tomuschat has rightly observed that it would be a “fatal mistake” to assert that, in the absence of an international criminal court having jurisdiction, Heads of State and Foreign Ministers suspected of such crimes would only be justiciable in their own States, and nowhere else17.
38. My conclusion on this point is the following: the Court’s arguments in support of its proposition that immunity does not, in fact, amount to impunity, are very unconvincing.
[pp. 178-179 D.O. Van den Wyngaert] 72. Mr. Yerodia was never arrested, either when he visited Belgium officially in June 200018 or thereafter. Had it applied the only relevant provision of conventional international law to the dispute, Article 21, paragraph 2, of the Special Missions Convention, the Court could not have reached its decision. According to this article, Foreign Ministers “when they take part in a special mission of the sending State, shall enjoy in the receiving State or in third State, in addition to what is granted by the present Convention, the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by international law”19. In the present dispute, this could only lead to the conclusion that there was no violation: the warrant was never executed, either in Belgium, or in third countries.
73. Belgium accepted, as a matter of international courtesy, that the warrant could not be executed against Mr. Yerodia were he to have visited Belgium officially. This was explicitly mentioned in the warrant: the warrant was not enforceable and was in fact not served on him or executed when Mr. Yerodia came to Belgium on an official visit in June 2001. Belgium thus respected the principle, contained in Article 21 of the Special Missions Convention, that is not a statement of customary international law but only of international courtesy20.
74. These are the only objective elements the Court should have looked at. The subjective elements, i.e., whether the warrant had a psychological effect on Mr. Yerodia or whether it was perceived as offensive by the Congo (cf. the term iniuria used by Maître Rigaux throughout his pleadings in October 200121 and the term capitis diminutio used by Maître Vergès during his pleadings in November 200022) was irrelevant for the dispute. The warrant only had a potential legal effect on Mr. Yerodia as a private person in case he would have visited Belgium privately, quod non.
75. In its dispositif (Judgment, para. 78 (2)), the Court finds that Belgium failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability for incumbent Foreign Ministers. I have already explained why, in my opinion, there has been no infringement of the rules on immunity from criminal jurisdiction. I find it hard to see how, in addition (the Court using the word “and”), Belgium could have infringed the inviolability of Mr. Yerodia by the mere issuance of a warrant that was never enforced.
The Judgment does not explain what is meant by the word “inviolability”, and simply juxtaposes it to the word “immunity”. This may give rise to confusion. Does the Court put the mere issuance of an order on the same footing as the actual enforcement of the order? Would this also mean that the mere act of investigating criminal charges against a Foreign Minister would be contrary to the principle of inviolability?
Surely, in the case of diplomatic agents, who enjoy absolute immunity and inviolability under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations23, allegations of criminal offences may be investigated as long as the agent is not interrogated or served with an order to appear. This view is clearly stated by Jean Salmon24. Jonathan Brown notes that, in the case of a diplomat, the issuance of a charge or summons is probably contrary to the diplomat’s immunity, whereas its execution would be likely to infringe the agent’s inviolability25.
If the Court’s dispositif were to be interpreted as to mean that mere investigations of criminal charges against Foreign Ministers would infringe their inviolability, the implication would be that Foreign Ministers enjoy greater protection than diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention. This would clearly go beyond what is accepted under international law in the case of diplomats.
| 1 | Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide, Paris, 9 Dec. 1948, UNTS, Vol. 78, p. 277. |
| 2 | “Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind”, ILCR 1996, United Nations doc. A/51/10. |
| 3 | Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, New York, 25 May 1993, ILM 1993, p. 1192; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 Nov. 1994, ILM 1994, p. 1598. |
| 4 | Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, ILM 1998, p. 999. |
| 5 | Footnote omitted |
| 6 | See e.g., Principle 5 of The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. The Commentary states that “There is an extremely important distinction, however, between ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ immunity”, but goes on by saying that “None of these statutes [Nuremberg, ICTY, ICTR] addresses the issue of procedural immunity.”... |
| 7 | See the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 22, p. 466 “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” |
| 8 | A. Watts, “The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international, 1994, III, p. 82. |
| 9 | See also supra para. 17. |
| 10 | Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILCR 1996, United Nations doc. A/51/10, at p. 41. |
| 11 | Footnote omitted. |
| 12 | Footnote omitted. |
| 13 | Footnote omitted. |
| 14 | R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 25 Nov. 1998, [1998] 4 All ER 897, p. 945. |
| 15 | See for example the trial of four Rwandan citizens by a Criminal Court in Brussels: Cour d’Assises de l’Arrondissement Administratif de Bruxelles-Capitale, Arrêt du 8 juin 2001, not published. |
| 16 | See also infra, para. 65. |
| 17 | C. Tomuschat, Intervention at the Institut de droit international's meeting in Vancouver, Aug. 2001, commenting on the draft resolution on Immunities from jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International law, and giving the example of Iraqi dictator Sadam Hussein: Report of the 13th Commission of the Institut de droit international, Vancouver, 2001, p. 94, see further supra, footnote 19 and corresponding text. |
| 18 | Mr. Yerodia’s visit to Belgium is not mentioned in the Judgment because the Parties were rather unclear on this point. Yet, it seems that Mr. Yerodia effectively visited Belgium on 17 June 2000. This was reported in the media (see the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in De Standaard, 7 July 2000) and also in a question that was put in Parliament to the Minister of Justice. See Question orale de M. Tony Van Parys au ministre de la Justice sur “l’intervention politique du gouvernement dans le dossier à charge du ministre congolais des Affaires étrangères, M. Yerodia”, Chambre des représentants de la Belgique, Compte Rendu Intégral avec compte rendu analytique, Commission de la Justice, 14 Nov. 2000, CRIV 50 COM 294, p. 12. Despite the fact that this fact is not, as such, recorded in the documents that were before the International Court of Justice, I believe the Court could have taken judicial notice of it. |
| 19 | Supra, para. 18.> |
| 20 | See the statement of the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur, referred to supra, para. 17. |
| 21 | Footnote omitted. |
| 22 | Footnote omitted. |
| 23 | Footnote omitted. |
| 24 | Footnote omitted. |
| 25 | J. Brown, “Diplomatic immunity: State Practice Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”, 37 ICLQ 1988, p. 53. |
