| I. | Substantive International Law - First Part |
| 5. | THE UNITED NATIONS |
| 5.6. | Relationship between Different Organs |
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Questions of Interpretation and Application
of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya / United Kingdom),
Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 3
[pp. 14-15] 35. Whereas in its observations on Security Council
resolution 748 (1992) presented in response to the Court's invitation, Libya
contends as follows: first, that that resolution does not prejudice the rights
of Libya to request the Court to indicate provisional measures, inasmuch as by
deciding, in effect, that Libya must surrender its nationals to the United
Kingdom and the United States, the Security Council infringes, or threatens to
infringe, the enjoyment and the exercise of the rights conferred on Libya by the
Montreal Convention and its economic, commercial and diplomatic rights; whereas
Libya therefore claims that the United Kingdom and the United States should so
act as not to infringe Libya's rights, for example by seeking a suspension of
the relevant part of resolution 748 (1992);
36. Whereas Libya in its observations contends, secondly, that the risk of
contradiction between the resolution and the provisional measures requested of
the Court by Libya does not render the Libyan request inadmissible since there
is in law no competition or hierarchy between the Court and the Security
Council, each exercising its own competence; whereas Libya recalls in this
connection that it regards the decision of the Security Council as contrary to
international law, and considers that the Council has employed its power to
characterize the situation for purposes of Chapter VII simply as a pretext to
avoid applying the Montreal Convention.
37. Whereas in its observations on Security Council resolution 748 (1992),
presented in response to the Court's invitation, the United Kingdom recalls the
arguments it put forward during the hearings on the questions of the
relationship between the present proceedings and proceedings in the Security
Council, and of the powers of the Court and the Council under the Charter, and
submits further that the resolution imposed obligations upon both Parties (which
the United Kingdom specified), which continue to subsist, and that, under the
system of the Charter (in particular Articles 25 and 103), those obligations
prevail in the event of conflict with obligations under any other international
agreement;
38. Whereas the Court, in the context of the present proceedings on a
request for provisional measures, has, in accordance with Article 41 of the
Statute, to consider the circumstances drawn to its attention as requiring the
indication of such measures, but cannot make definitive findings either of fact
or of law on the issues relating to the merits, and the right of the Parties to
contest such issues at the stage of the merits must remain unaffected by the
Court's decision;
39. Whereas both Libya and the United Kingdom, as Members of the United
Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; whereas the Court, which
is at the stage of proceedings on provisional measures, considers that prima
facie this obligation extends to the decision contained in resolution 748
(1992); and whereas, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the
obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under
any other international agreement, including the Montreal Convention;
40. Whereas the Court, while thus not at this stage called upon to determine
definitively the legal effect of Security Council resolution 748 (1992),
considers that, whatever the situation previous to the adoption of that
resolution, the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention cannot now
be regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional
measures;
[pp. 17-18 Decl. Oda 1] I. I do not deny that under the positive
law of the United Nations Charter a resolution of the Security Council may have
binding force, irrespective of the question whether it is consonant with
international law derived from other sources. There is certainly nothing to
oblige the Security Council, acting within its terms of reference, to carry out
a full evaluation of the possibly relevant rules and circumstances before
proceeding to the decisions it deems necessary. The Council appears, in fact, to
have been acting within its competence when it discerned a threat against
international peace and security in Libya's refusal to deliver up the two Libyan
accused. Since, as I understand the matter, a decision of the Security Council,
properly taken in the exercise of its competence, cannot be summarily reopened,
and since it is apparent that resolution 748 (1992) embodies such a decision,
the Court has at present no choice but to acknowledge the pre-eminence of that
resolution.
However, to base the Court's Order solely on that non possumus
ground is to leave open the possibility that the Court, prior to the adoption of
resolution 748 (1992), might have indicated provisional measures, and indeed to
suggest that an analysis of the legal factors could have led the Court to a
decision incompatible in its effects with the Security Council's actions. If
this was not the case, and lest the Court be blamed for not having given its
decision last month, it would have been preferable to say so. Accordingly, I
wish to present my own view of the matter as a Member of the Court.
Before doing so, however, I feel bound to point out that Security Council
resolution 748 (1992) was adopted in line with the Council's determination to
eliminate international terrorism, the extradition of the two Libyan accused
serving basically as a convenient focus for that determination, and that, three
days of public hearings at the Court having taken place between 26 and 28 March
(a Saturday) 1992, the members of the Security Council could have been no less
aware of the urgency of the Court's procedure as of the minimum time required
for it to be able to deliver a considered decision. When the Council, following
of course the logic of its own timetable and purposes, adopted its resolution on
31 March 1992, a mere three days after the hearings, it must therefore have
acted in full cognizance of the impact of its own decision on that which still
fell to be taken by the Court as well as of the possible consequences of the
latter.
[pp. 20-21 Decl. Ni 2] Question arises whether the Security
Council and the Court can now exercise their respective functions at the same
time in respect of the dispute between Libya on the one side and the United
Kingdom and the United States on the other. It can be urged on behalf of the
Security Council that under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, Members of
the United Nations confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, in order to ensure prompt and
effective action by the United Nations. But on the other hand, it can also be
argued that it is provided in Article 92 of the United Nations Charter that the
International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations which is given the power, under Article 36 of the Court's
Statute, to settle "all legal disputes concerning: (a) the
interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; ...".
In this respect, we are not without guidance from the jurisprudence of the
Court. As recently as the 1980s, we have the case of the United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran and the case of Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. In the former case which
was decided in 1980, resolutions were previously passed by the Security Council
and even a fact-finding commission was established by the Secretary-General with
the agreement of the two parties. These did not prevent the Court from
exercising its judicial functions.
[p. 22 Decl. Ni 3] Here the mention of complementary
functions should not be overlooked. Although both organs deal with the same
matter, there are differing points of emphasis. In the instant case, the
Security Council, as a political organ, is more concerned with the elimination
of international terrorism and the maintenance of international peace and
security, while the International Court of Justice, as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations, is more concerned with legal procedures such as
questions of extradition and proceedings in connection with prosecution of
offenders and assessment of compensation, etc. But these functions may be
correlated with each other. What would be required between the two is
co-ordination and co-operation, not competition or mutual exclusion.
[pp. 26-27 S.O. Lachs 4] In the normal course of events, the
request made to the Court in proceedings instituted on the basis of the Montreal
Convention would have aced the Court with the necessity of deciding whether a
genuine case existed for granting interim measures. However Libya's Application
and request were placed before the Court when the Lockerbie catastrophe and the
wider problem of international terrorism, which merits condemnation in all its
manifestations, were already on the agenda of the Security Council, which had
brought them together under the terms of resolution 731 (1992). The Council, by
moving onto the terrain of Chapter VII of the Charter, decided certain issues
pertaining to the Lockerbie disaster with binding force. Hence problems of
jurisdiction and the operation of the sub judice principle came into the
foreground as never before.
While the Court has the vocation of applying international law as a
universal law, operating both within and outside the United Nations, it is bound
to respect, as part of that law, the binding decisions of the Security Council.
This of course, in the present circumstances, raises issues of concurrent
jurisdiction as between the Court and a fellow main organ of the United Nations.
The framers of the Charter, in providing for the existence of several main
organs, did not effect a complete separation of powers, nor indeed is one to
suppose that such was their aim. Although each organ has been allotted its own
Chapter or Chapters, the functions of two of them, namely the General Assembly
and the Security Council, also pervade other Chapters than their own. Even the
International Court of Justice receives, outside its own Chapter, a number of
mentions which tend to confirm its role as the general guardian of legality
within the system. In fact the Court is the guardian of legality for the
international community as a whole, both within and without the United Nations.
One may therefore legitimately suppose that the intention of the founders was
not to encourage a blinkered parallelism of functions but a fruitful
interaction.
Two of the main organs of the United Nations have the delivery of binding
decisions explicitly included in their powers under the Charter: the Security
Council and the International Court of Justice. There is no doubt that the
Court's task is "to ensure respect for international law ..." (I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 35). It is its principal guardian. Now, it has become clear
that the dividing line between political and legal disputes is blurred, as law
becomes ever more frequently an integral element of international controversies.
The Court, for reasons well known so frequently shunned in the past, is thus
called upon to play an ever greater role. Hence it is important for the purposes
and principles of the United Nations that the two main organs with specific
powers of binding decision act in harmony - though not, of course, in concert -
and that each should perform its functions with respect to a situation or
dispute, different aspects of which appear on the agenda of each, without
prejudicing the exercise of the other's powers. In the present case the Court
was faced with a new situation which allowed no room for further analysis nor
the indication of effective interim measures. The Order made should not,
therefore, be seen as an abdication of the Court's powers; it is rather a
reflection of the system within which the Court is called upon to render
justice.
[pp. 34-35 D.O. Bedjaoui 5] 6. Libya was fully within its rights
in bringing before the Court, with a view to its judicial settlement, the
dispute concerning extradition, just as the United Kingdom and the United States
were fully within their rights in bringing before the Security Council, with a
view to its political settlement, the dispute on the international
responsibility of Libya. The respective missions of the Security Council and the
Court are thus on two distinct planes, have different objects and require
specific methods of settlement consistent with their own respective powers. Such
a situation, involving two distinct procedures before two principal organs of
the United Nations having parallel competences, is, I might add, not an unusual
one, as I observed in paragraph 2 above. But the difficulty in the present case
lies in the fact that the Security Council not only has decided to take a number
of political measures against Libya, but has also demanded from it the extradition
of its two nationals. It is this specific demand of the Council that creates an
overlap with respect to the substance of the legal dispute with which the Court
must deal, in a legal manner, on the basis of the 1971 Montreal Convention and
international law in general. The risk thus arose of the extradition
question receiving two contradictory solutions, one legal, the other political,
and of an inconsistency between the decision of the Court and that of the
Security Council.
7. Such an inconsistency between the decisions of two United Nations organs
would be a matter of serious concern. For it is as a rule not the Court's role
to exercise appellate jurisdiction in respect of decisions taken by the Security
Council in the fulfilment of its fundamental mission of maintaining
international peace and security, no more than it is the role of the Security
Council to take the place of the Court, thereby impairing the integrity of its
international judicial function. But, at this stage of provisional measures
requested by Libya, the present case compels us to confront this possibility of
inconsistent decisions inasmuch as one of the Security Council's demands creates
a "grey area" in which powers may overlap and a jurisdictional
conflict comes into being. For the facts of this case give the Court the power
to indicate provisional measures to preserve the possible right of the Applicant
to refuse the extradition of two of its nationals, whereas the Security Council
has just taken a decision that is mandatory under Chapter VII of the Charter
calling for the extradition of these two individuals.
8. All the necessary conditions appear to me to have been fulfilled in order
that the Court should have the power to indicate provisional measures at the
request of the Applicant, pending a decision on the merits. First of all, no one
doubts that the Court has before it a legal dispute concerning very precise
questions of law arising from the interpretation and application of the 1971
Montreal Convention. Moreover the Court's competence is established on the basis
of Article 14, paragraph 1, of that Convention. This Article subjects the
submission of the matter to the Court to an initial requirement, namely, that
prior negotiations between the Parties should have taken place. This requirement
has been satisfied fully. The brief analysis I made earlier of the duality and
non-identity of the disputes submitted pari passu to the Court and the
Security Council shows that the negotiations sought with a view to settling the
question of the extradition were essentially and in view of their nature
destined never to become a reality. Since Libya refused to extradite its
nationals and proposed substitute solutions (surrender of the two suspects to
the United Nations, to the Arab League, to the judicial authorities of a third
country, or to an international judicial or arbitral body, whereas the United
Kingdom and the United States only offered Libya the choice between an
extradition that as a matter of principle was not negotiable or the adoption of
sanctions by the Security Council), it was obvious that the very notion of a
negotiating process was meaningless in such a context.
[p. 41 D.O. Bedjaoui 6] 18. It seems that the Court was right not
to allow itself at any time to be tempted to pronounce on the validity of the
way the Security Council had intended to deal with the case of the international
responsibility of a State for terrorist activities, which is wider than the
dispute here. Leaving aside the thorny problem of the possible jurisdiction of
the Court as regards contentious proceedings on the legality of the decisions of
the Security Council, and also the fact that, in any case, the exercise of this
possible jurisdiction would be premature at the present stage of a request for
the indication of provisional measures, all that needs to be borne in mind is
that the Court has not been seised of this vast dispute, brought before the
Security Council. The Court was therefore right to refrain from reviewing the
exercise by the Security Council of its exclusive power to deal with this case
politically, that is to say, without regard to the norms and procedures
applicable in a judicial institution such as the Court.
[p. 44 D.O. Bedjaoui 7] 22. Hence, if the simple but essential
distinction made at the beginning of this opinion is borne in mind, between the
quite specific juridical dispute submitted to the Court and the much wider
political dispute brought before the Security Council, it becomes perfectly
understandable that, given its functions and powers, the Court has no
alternative but to refrain from entertaining any aspect whatever of the
political solutions arrived at by the Security Council. The Court's attitude in
this respect continues to be defensible so long as no aspect of these
political solutions adopted by the Council sets aside, rules out or renders
impossible the juridical solution expected of the Court. It is clear that, in
this case, it is the judicial function itself which would be impaired. Indeed,
this is what is happening here in the area where these two disputes overlap,
where the solution arrived at by the Council to the question of the extradition
of two individuals deprives a solution found by the Court of all meaning.
23. Such a situation, in which, on the basis of the inherent validity of the
case, the Court should have indicated provisional measures solely in order to
protect a right that the Security Council annihilates by its resolution 748
(1992) when the case is sub judice, is not satisfactory for the judicial
function.
[p. 45 D.O. Bedjaoui 8] 24. Security Council resolution 748 of 31
March 1992 states, in paragraph 1, "that the Libyan Government must now
comply without any further delay with paragraph 3 of resolution 731 (1992)
regarding the requests" that the two Respondents had made to it and, in
particular, the request for extradition, which is the whole subject of the
present proceedings. This is where the "conflict" lies. During the
hearings, the Applicant State had already raised the question of the
constitutional validity of resolution 731 of 21 January 1992 in general terms, resolution 748 (1992) not yet having come into force (Public Sitting of 26 March 1992 (morning)). This question of
validity is liable to raise two major problems, at once serious and complex,
namely, whether the Security Council should, in its action, firstly respect the
United Nations Charter and secondly respect general international law.
25. The first problem is perhaps the less difficult of the two. Simplifying
a great deal, one could say that it would not be unreasonable to state that the
Security Council must respect the Charter, on the one hand because it is the act
to which it owes its very existence and also and above all because it serves
this Charter and the United Nations Organization. The travaux préparatoires
of the San Francisco Conference showed the degree of concern aroused by this
problem and it transpires therefrom that the spirit of the Charter is indeed to
prevent the Security Council from diverging in any way at all from that Charter.
But over and above the spirit of the Charter, the actual text points the
same way. Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Charter expressly states that "in
discharging [its] duties, the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". In that case, one of the
questions which would arise would be whether one organ can act in a way which
renders the role of the other impossible. And this applies as much to the
Security Council as to the Court itself, inasmuch as it is true that the Charter
lays down that each of the United Nations organs should carry out its task
fully, and not abdicate any part of it, in order to assist in the accomplishment
of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Now, Article 92 of the
Charter states that the Court is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations and Article 36 of the Court's Statute, which is an integral part of the
Charter, confers upon the Court the power to settle "all legal disputes
concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question
of international law; ...".
26. The second problem, relating to respect for international law by the
Security Council, is a more acute one. In laying down that the Council shall act
in accordance with the "Purposes and Principles of the United Nations",
Article 24 of the Charter (which I have already cited) refers to Article 1,
paragraph 1, which provides that the action of the Security Council (as that is
essentially what is referred to in the context of that Article) is to take
measures "in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law". Of course, the Council must act in accordance with the "principles
of justice" - a relatively vague expression - just as it should also draw
inspiration from other principles of a political or other nature.
[p. 47 D.O. Bedjaoui 9] 29. The situation thus characterized, with
rights which deserve protection by the indication of provisional measures but
have also been annihilated by a Security Council resolution that should be
deemed prima facie to be valid, does not fall completely within the framework of
Article 103 of the Charter, but in fact goes slightly beyond it. That Article,
which gives precedence to obligations under the Charter (i.e., Libya's
obligation to comply with resolution 748 (1992)) as compared to obligations "under
any other international agreement" (here the 1971 Montreal Convention) is
aimed at "obligations" - whereas we are dealing with alleged "rights"
such as, in my view, are protected by provisional measures - and, in addition,
does not cover such rights as may have other than conventional sources and be
derived from general international law.
30. Subject to this minor nuance, it is clear that the Court could do no
more than take note of that situation and hold that, at this stage of the
proceedings, such a "conflict", governed by Article 103 of the
Charter, would ultimately deprive the indication of provisional measures of any
useful effect. However, the operative part of the two Orders places itself at
the threshold of the whole matter and decides that the Court, in the
circumstances of the case, is not required to exercise its power to
indicate provisional measures. I take the rather different view that the facts
of the case do indeed justify the effective exercise of that power, while I
would point out that its effects have been nullified by resolution 748
(1992). This means that I arrive, concretely, at the same result as the Court,
albeit by means of a quite different approach, but also with the important
difference that I am not led to reject the request for provisional measures, but
rather to say that its effects have ceased to exist.
[p. 56 D.O. Weeramantry 10] Yet this much they have in common -
that all organs alike exercise their authority under and in terms of the
Charter. There can never truly be a question of opposition of one organ to
another but rather a common subjection of all organs to the Charter. The
interpretation of Charter provisions is primarily a matter of law, and such
questions of law may in appropriate circumstances come before the Court for
judicial determination. When this does occur, the Court acts as guardian of the
Charter and of international law for, in the international arena, there is no
higher body charged with judicial functions and with the determination of
questions of interpretation and application of international law. Anchored to
the Charter in particular and to international law in general, the Court
considers such legal matters as are properly brought before it and the fact that
its judicial decision based upon the law may have political consequences is not
a factor that would deflect it from discharging its duties under the Charter of
the United Nations and the Statute of the Court.
[p. 67 D.O. Weeramantry 11] However, in my respectful view, it does
not necessarily follow that the binding nature of resolution 748 (1992) renders
it inappropriate for the Court to indicate provisional measures. I arrive at
this conclusion after a careful perusal of all the provisions of resolution 748
(1992). There still seems to be room, while preserving full respect for
resolution 748 (1992) in all its integrity, for the Court to frame an
appropriate measure proprio motu which in no way contradicts resolution
748 (1992), Article 25 or Article 103 of the Charter.
[p. 73 D.O. Ranjeva] 6. The adoption of the recommendation which is
the subject of Security Council resolution 731 (1992) does not deprive the
Applicant of its right to institute proceedings before the Court to request the
indication of provisional measures. On examination, the operative parts of this
resolution prove to be an interpretation that this principal political organ of
the United Nations gives of the application of the rules in the Lockerbie
bombing. The nature of the Security Council does not confer upon its
recommendatory acts the legal effects of res judicata. It is from the
standpoint of international law, of which the Charter and the law of the United
Nations form an integral part, that the scope of resolution 731 (1992) must be
considered with respect to the request for the indication of provisional
measures. In the present case, the Applicant has used a remedy open to every
State wishing to request of the Court the legitimate protection of its right to
pass judgment. The adage una via electa does not apply when it comes to
governing two rights of action which are different in nature, namely, one before
the Court and the other in the Security Council. In the judicial field, it is
the judicial course, based upon international law, which prevails in case of
conflict.
7. For these reasons, the Court was in my view empowered to indicate
provisional measures for the protection of the rights of all the Parties, rights
which were under threat of disappearance. The duty to co-operate and afford
legal assistance laid down by the Montreal Convention provided the Court with a
suitable framework for determining the object of the appropriate measures.
Hence, the request for the Court to indicate provisional measures was well
founded, Security Council resolution 731 (1992) notwithstanding.
[pp. 73-74 D.O. Ranjeva] 8. The adoption of the decision to impose
sanctions, which are the subject of Security Council resolution 748 (1992), is a
given whose effects, under Articles 103 and 25 of the United Nations Charter,
could not be ignored by the Court. The absence of action or objection, with
respect to this decision by one of the principal political organs of the United
Nations, did not prevent the Court from noting that the first paragraph of the
resolution deprived of all effect the provisional measures that the Court might
have ordered with respect to all Parties to the dispute. The fundamental change
in the legal circumstances since the filing of the Application, without there
being any change in the factual circumstances of the case, prevented the Court,
the principal judicial organ, from exercising its legal function to settle the
dispute between the Parties to the full extent of its powers.
[p. 88 D.O. Ajibola 12] Resolution 748 (1992) which was adopted
while the Court was considering Libya's request for interim measures, is
undoubtedly within the power and function of the Security Council since it falls
under Chapter VII of the Charter, particularly Article 41.
What then is the legal effect of resolution 748 (1992) on the Court's
authority to indicate interim measures? There is no doubt that there is an
overlap between the powers and functions of the Court and Security Council,
which I mentioned earlier in the opinion. The resolution is a decision
of the Security Council and therefore its effect and validity is even stronger
than that of resolution 731 (1992) in light of the provisions of Article 25 and
Article 103 of the Charter. Article 25 enjoins Members to "respect
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" and Article 103
provides that in any case of conflict of obligations between the Charter and
other international agreement, the obligation under the Charter is supreme and
shall prevail. Arguably, certain intrinsic defects may invalidate the two
resolutions mentioned herein. For example, there is the issue of nemo iudex
in sua causa, as well as the possible effect of Article 27 (3) of the
Charter on the resolutions. Nevertheless, I do not pronounce on their validity
here, nor need I do so in order to reach my decision.
However, in view of the provisions of resolution 748 (1992), it is my
opinion that the Court should decline to indicate the provisional measures
requested by Libya. However, it is also my belief that the Court should indicate
provisional measures proprio motu under Article 75 of the Rules of Court
against both Parties to ensure non-use of force or aggravation or extension of
the dispute pending the Court's judgment on the merits.
[p. 105 D.O. El-Kosheri 13] 33. In the light of the statements
emanating from the above-mentioned authorities, it is possible to consider that
the Security Council, when adopting paragraph 1 of resolution 748 (1992),
impeded the Court's jurisdiction freely to exercise its inherent judicial
function with regard to issues on which argument had been heard just a few days
before, and that by doing so the Security Council committed an act of excès
de pouvoir which amounts to a violation of Article 92 of the Charter, which
entrusted the International Court of Justice with the mission of being "the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations".
34. In order properly to discharge its main function, the Court must have
full liberty to exercise its adjudicating powers and to form its own opinion on
the issues under consideration without any limitation.
[p. 106 D.O. El-Kosheri 14] 42. Doubtless the Court itself, the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, was not the target of the
Council's haste; the adoption of resolution 748 (1992) without waiting for the
Court's ruling on the request for provisional measures seems to have been more
intended to put the maximum pressure possible on Libya to forfeit its claim to
invoke sovereign rights under Article 1, paragraph 2, Article 2, paragraph 7,
and Article 55 of the Charter. Yet the entire Organization is based on the
principle of sovereign equality of all its Members, and the exercise of domestic
jurisdiction in matters such as extradition imposes on all other States, as well
as on the political organs of the United Nations, an obligation to respect such
inherent rights, unless the Court decides that such exercise is contrary to
international law, whether customary or conventional.
| 1 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 129-130. |
| 2 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 132-133. |
| 3 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 134. |
| 4 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 138-139. |
| 5 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 144-145. |
| 6 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 151. |
| 7 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 154. |
| 8 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 155. |
| 9 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 157. |
| 10 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 166. |
| 11 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 177. |
| 12 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 192-193. |
| 13 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 210. |
| 14 | Cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
/ United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 211. |
