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I. | Substantive International Law - First Part |
8. | VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES |
8.3. | Treaty Violations |
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LaGrand Case
(Germany v. United States of America)
Judgment of 27 June 2001
[pp. ] 61. The United States also contends that Germany's submissions are inadmissible on the ground that Germany seeks to have a standard applied to the United States that is different from its own practice. According to the United States, Germany has not shown that its system of criminal justice requires the annulment of criminal convictions where there has been a breach of the duty of consular notification; and that the practice of Germany in similar cases has been to do no more than offer an apology. The United States maintains that it would be contrary to basic principles of administration of justice and equality of the Parties to apply against the United States alleged rules that Germany appears not to accept for itself.
62. Germany denies that it is asking the United States to adhere to standards which Germany itself does not abide by; it maintains that its law and practice is fully in compliance with the standards which it invokes. In this regard, it explains that the German Code of Criminal Procedure provides a ground of appeal where a legal norm, including a norm of international law, is not applied or incorrectly applied and where there is a possibility that the decision was impaired by this fact.
63. The Court need not decide whether this argument of the United States, if true, would result in the inadmissibility of Germany's submissions. Here the evidence adduced by the United States does not justify the conclusion that Germany's own practice fails to conform to the standards it demands from the United States in this litigation. The United States relies on certain German cases to demonstrate that Germany has itself proffered only an apology for violating Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, and that State practice shows that this is the appropriate remedy for such a violation. But the cases concerned entailed relatively light criminal penalties and are not evidence as to German practice where an arrested person, who has not been informed without delay of his or her rights, is facing a severe penalty as in the present case. It is no doubt the case, as the United States points out, that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention imposes identical obligations on States, irrespective of the gravity of the offence a person may be charged with and of the penalties that may be imposed. However, it does not follow therefrom that the remedies for a violation of this Article must be identical in all situations. While an apology may be an appropriate remedy in some cases, it may in others be insufficient. The Court accordingly finds that this claim of inadmissibility must be rejected.
[p. ] 79. The Court will now consider Germany's second submission, in which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
"that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended".
[pp. ] 88. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended."
89. The Court cannot accept the argument
of the United States which proceeds, in part, on the
assumption that paragraph 2 of Article 36 applies only
to the rights of the sending State and not also to
those of the detained individual. The Court has already
determined that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual
rights for the detained person in addition to the rights
accorded the sending State, and that consequently the
reference to "rights" in paragraph 2 must be read as
applying not only to the rights of the sending State,
but also to the rights of the detained individual (see
paragraph 77 above).
90. Turning now to the "procedural default"
rule, the application of which in the present case
Germany alleges violated Article 36, paragraph 2, the
Court emphasizes that a distinction must be drawn between
that rule as such and its specific application in the
present case. In itself, the rule does not violate
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The problem arises
when the procedural default rule does not allow the
detained individual to challenge a conviction and sentence
by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1,
of the Convention, that the competent national authorities
failed to comply with their obligation to provide the
requisite consular information "without delay", thus
preventing the person from seeking and obtaining consular
assistance from the sending State.
91. In this case, Germany had the right
at the request of the LaGrands "to arrange for [their]
legal representation" and was eventually able to provide
some assistance to that effect. By that time, however,
because of the failure of the American authorities
to comply with their obligation under Article 36, paragraph
1 (b), the procedural default rule prevented
counsel for the LaGrands to effectively challenge their
convictions and sentences other than on United States
constitutional grounds. As a result, although United
States courts could and did examine the professional
competence of counsel assigned to the indigent LaGrands
by reference to United States constitutional standards,
the procedural default rule prevented them from attaching
any legal significance to the fact, inter alia,
that the violation of the rights set forth in Article
36, paragraph 1, prevented Germany, in a timely fashion,
from retaining private counsel for them and otherwise
assisting in their defence as provided for by the Convention.
Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule
had the effect of preventing "full effect [from being]
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this article are intended", and thus violated
paragraph 2 of Article 36.