|III.||The International Court of Justice|
|3.||THE PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE|
|3.10.5.||Provisional Measures and Merits|
Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. Belgium)
Request for the Indication of
Order of 2 June 1999
[p. D.O. Kreca] 12. ... Extensive use of armed force, in particular if it is used against objects and means constituting conditions of normal life, can be conducive to "inflicting on the group conditions of life" bringing about "its physical destruction" (ibid.).
Of course, it can be argued that such acts are in the function of degrading the military capacity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But such an explanation can hardly be regarded as a serious argument. For, the spiral of such a line of thinking may easily come to a point when, having in mind that military power is after all comprised of people, even mass killing of civilians can be claimed to constitute some sort of a precautionary measure that should prevent the maintenance or, in case of mobilization, the increase of military power of the State.
Of course, to be able to speak about genocide it is necessary that there is an intent, namely, of "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life" bringing about "its physical destruction in whole or in part" (ibid.).
In the incidental proceedings the Court cannot and should not concern itself with the definitive qualification of the intent to impose upon the group conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened. Having in mind the purpose of provisional measures, it can be said that at this stage of the proceedings it is sufficient to establish that, in the conditions of intensive bombing, there is an objective risk of bringing about conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened.