III. | The International Court of Justice |
3. | THE PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE |
3.7. | Evidence |
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Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicaragua/United States of America)
Merits. J. 27.6.1986
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14
[p. 24] The use of the term "satisfy itself" in the
English text of the Statute (and in the French text the term "s'assurer")
implies that the Court must attain the same degree of certainty as in any other
case that the claim of the party appearing is sound in law, and, so far as the
nature of the case permits, that the facts on which it is based are supported by
convincing evidence.
[pp. 39-41] The Court is bound by the relevant provisions of its
Statute and its Rules relating to the system of evidence, provisions devised to
guarantee the sound administration of justice, while respecting the equality of
the parties. The presentation of evidence is governed by specific rules relating
to, for instance, the observance of time-limits, the communication of evidence
to the other party, the submission of observations on it by that party, and the
various forms of challenge by each party of the other's evidence. The absence of
one of the parties restricts this procedure to some extent. The Court is
careful, even where both parties appear, to give each of them the same
opportunities and chances to produce their evidence ; when the situation is
complicated by the non-appearance of one of them, then a fortiori the
Court regards it as essential to guarantee as perfect equality as possible
between the parties. Article 53 of the Statute therefore obliges the Court to
employ whatever means and resources may enable it to satisfy itself whether the
submissions of the applicant State are well-founded in fact and law, and
simultaneously to safeguard the essential principles of the sound administration
of justice.
The Court should now indicate how these requirements have to be met in this
case so that it can properly fulfil its task under that Article of its Statute.
In so doing, it is not unaware that its role is not a passive one; and that,
within the limits of its Statute and Rules, it has freedom in estimating the
value of the various elements of evidence, though it is clear that general
principles of judicial procedure necessarily govern the determination of what
can be regarded as proved.
In this context, the Court has the power, under Article 50 of its Statute,
to entrust "any individual, body, bureau, commission or other organization
that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert
opinion", and such a body could be a group of judges selected from among
those sitting in the case. In the present case, however, the Court felt it was
unlikely that an enquiry of this kind would be practical or desirable,
particularly since such a body, if it was properly to perform its task, might
have found it necessary to go not only to the applicant State, but also to
several other neighbouring countries, and even to the respondent State, which
had refused to appear before the Court.
At all events, in the present case the Court has before it documentary
material of various kinds from various sources. A large number of documents have
been supplied in the form of reports in press articles, and some also in the
form of extracts from books. Whether these were produced by the applicant State,
or by the absent Party before it ceased to appear in the proceedings, the Court
has been careful to treat them with great caution; even if they seem to meet
high standards of objectivity, the Court regards them not as evidence capable of
proving facts, but as material which can nevertheless contribute, in some
circumstances, to corroborating the existence of a fact, i.e., as illustrative
material additional to other sources of evidence.
However, although it is perfectly proper that press information should not
be treated in itself as evidence for judicial purposes, public knowledge of a
fact may nevertheless be established by means of these sources of information,
and the Court can attach a certain amount of weight to such public knowledge. In
the case of United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the
Court referred to facts which "are, for the most part, matters of public
knowledge which have received extensive coverage in the world press and in radio
and television broadcasts from Iran and other countries" (I.C.J.
Reports 1980, p. 9, para. 12). On the basis of information, including press
and broadcast material, which was "wholly consistent and concordant as to
the main facts and circumstances of the case", the Court was able to
declare that it was satisfied that the allegations of fact were well-founded (ibid.,
p. 10, para. 13). The Court has however to show particular caution in this area.
Widespread reports of a fact may prove on closer examination to derive from a
single source, and such reports, however numerous, will in such case have no
greater value as evidence than the original source. It is with this important
reservation that the newspaper reports supplied to the Court should be examined
in order to assess the facts of the case, and in particular to ascertain whether
such facts were matters of public knowledge.
The material before the Court also includes statements by representatives of
States, sometimes at the highest political level. Some of these statements were
made before official organs of the State or of an international or regional
organization, and appear in the official records of those bodies. Others, made
during press conferences or interviews, were reported by the local or
international press. The Court takes the view that statements of this kind,
emanating from high-ranking official political figures, sometimes indeed of the
highest rank, are of particular probative value when they acknowledge facts or
conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the person who made them. They
may then be construed as a form of admission.
However, it is natural also that the Court should treat such statements with
caution, whether the official statement was made by an authority of the
Respondent or of the Applicant. Neither Article 53 of the Statute, nor any other
ground, could justify a selective approach, which would have undermined the
consistency of the Court's methods and its elementary duty to ensure equality
between the Parties. The Court must take account of the manner in which the
statements were made public; evidently, it cannot treat them as having the same
value irrespective of whether the text is to be found in an official national or
international publication, or in a book or newspaper. It must also take note
whether the text of the official statement in question appeared in the language
used by the author or on the basis of a translation (cf. I.C.J. Reports 1980,
p. 10, para. 13). It may also be relevant whether or not such a statement was
brought to the Court's knowledge by official communications filed in conformity
with the relevant requirements of the Statute and Rules of Court. Furthermore,
the Court has inevitably had sometimes to interpret the statements, to ascertain
precisely to what degree they constituted acknowledgments of a fact.
At the hearings in this case, the applicant State called five witnesses to
give oral evidence, and the evidence of a further witness was offered in the
form of an affidavit "subscribed and sworn" in the United States,
District of Columbia, according to the formal requirements in force in that
place. A similar affidavit, sworn by the United States Secretary of State, was
annexed to the Counter-Memorial of the United States on the questions of
jurisdiction and admissibility. One of the witnesses presented by the applicant
State was a national of the respondent State, formerly in the employ of a
government agency the activity of which is of a confidential kind, and his
testimony was kept strictly within certain limits ; the witness was evidently
concerned not to contravene the legislation of his country of origin. In
addition, annexed to the Nicaraguan Memorial on the merits were two
declarations, entitled "affidavits", in the English language, by which
the authors "certify and declare" certain facts, each with a notarial
certificate in Spanish appended, whereby a Nicaraguan notary authenticates the
signature to the document. Similar declarations had been filed by Nicaragua
along with its earlier request for the indication of provisional measures.
[pp. 42-45] As regards the evidence of witnesses, the failure of the
respondent State to appear in the merits phase of these proceedings has resulted
in two particular disadvantages. First, the absence of the United States meant
that the evidence of the witnesses presented by the Applicant at the hearings
was not tested by cross-examination; however, those witnesses were subjected to
extensive questioning from the bench. Secondly, the Respondent did not itself
present any witnesses of its own. This latter disadvantage merely represents one
aspect, and a relatively secondary one, of the more general disadvantage caused
by the non-appearance of the Respondent.
The Court has not treated as evidence any part of the testimony given which
was not a statement of fact, but a mere expression of opinion as to the
probability or otherwise of the existence of such facts, not directly known to
the witness. Testimony of this kind, which may be highly subjective, cannot take
the place of evidence. An opinion expressed by a witness is a mere personal and
subjective evaluation of a possibility, which has yet to be shown to correspond
to a fact; it may, in conjunction with other material, assist the Court in
determining a question of fact, but is not proof in itself. Nor is testimony of
matters not within the direct knowledge of the witness, but known to him only
from hearsay, of much weight; as the Court observed in relation to a particular
witness in the Corfu Channel case:
"The statements attributed by the witness... to third parties, of which
the Court has received no personal and direct confirmation, can be regarded only
as allegations falling short of conclusive evidence." (I.C.J. Reports
1949, pp. 16-17.)
The Court has had to attach considerable significance to the declarations
made by the responsible authorities of the States concerned in view of the
difficulties which it has had to face in determining the facts. Nevertheless,
the Court was still bound to subject these declarations to the necessary
critical scrutiny. A distinctive feature of the present case was that two of the
witnesses called to give oral evidence on behalf of Nicaragua were members of
the Nicaraguan Government, the Vice-Minister of the Interior (Commander Carrión),
and the Minister of Finance (Mr. Huper). The Vice-Minister of the Interior was
also the author of one of the two declarations annexed to the Nicaraguan
Memorial on the merits, the author of the other being the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. On the United States side, an affidavit was filed sworn by the
Secretary of State. These declarations at ministerial level on each side were
irreconcilable as to their statement of certain facts. In the view of the Court,
this evidence is of such a nature as to be placed in a special category. In the
general practice of courts, two forms of testimony which are regarded as prima
facie of superior credibility are, first the evidence of a disinterested witness
- one who is not a party to the proceedings and stands to gain or lose nothing
from its outcome - and secondly so much of the evidence of a party as is against
its own interest. Indeed the latter approach was invoked in this case by counsel
for Nicaragua.
A member of the government of a State engaged not merely in international
litigation, but in litigation relating to armed conflict, will probably tend to
identify himself with the interests of his country, and to be anxious when
giving evidence to say nothing which could prove adverse to its cause. The Court
thus considers that it can certainly retain such parts of the evidence given by
Ministers, orally or in writing, as may be regarded as contrary to the interests
or contentions of the State to which the witness owes allegiance, or as relating
to matters not controverted. For the rest, while in no way impugning the honour
or veracity of the Ministers of either Party who have given evidence, the Court
considers that the special circumstances of this case require it to treat such
evidence with great reserve. The Court believes this approach to be the more
justified in view of the need to respect the equality of the parties in a case
where one of them is no longer appearing; but this should not be taken to mean
that the non-appearing party enjoys a priori a presumption in its
favour.
However, before outlining the limits of the probative effect of declarations
by the authorities of the States concerned, the Court would recall that such
declarations may involve legal effects, some of which it has defined in previous
decisions (Nuclear Tests, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran cases). Among the legal effects which such declarations may have is
that they may be regarded as evidence of the truth of facts, as evidence that
such facts are attributable to the States the authorities of which are the
authors of these declarations and, to a lesser degree, as evidence for the legal
qualification of these facts. The Court is here concerned with the significance
of the official declarations as evidence of specific facts and of their
imputability to the States in question.
The declarations to which the Court considers it may refer are not limited
to those made in the pleadings and the oral argument addressed to it in the
successive stages of the case, nor are they limited to statements made by the
Parties. Clearly the Court is entitled to refer, not only to the Nicaraguan
pleadings and oral argument, but to the pleadings and oral argument submitted to
it by the United States before it withdrew from participation in the
proceedings, and to the Declaration of Intervention of El Salvador in the
proceedings. It is equally clear that the Court may take account of public
declarations to which either Party has specifically drawn attention, and the
text, or a report, of which has been filed as documentary evidence. But the
Court considers that, in its quest for the truth, it may also take note of
statements of representatives of the Parties (or of other States) in
international organizations, as well as the resolutions adopted or discussed by
such organizations, in so far as factually relevant, whether or not such
material has been drawn to its attention by a Party.
In addition, the Court is aware of the existence and the contents of a
publication of the United States State Department entitled "Revolution
Beyond Our Borders", Sandinista Intervention in Central America
intended to justify the policy of the United States towards Nicaragua. This
publication was issued in September 1985, and on 6 November 1985 was circulated
as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security
Council, at the request of the United States (A/40/858; 5/17612); Nicaragua had
circulated in reply a letter to the Secretary-General, annexing inter alia
an extract from its Memorial on the Merits and an extract from the verbatim
records of the hearings in the case (A/40/907; 5/17639). The United States
publication was not submitted to the Court in any formal manner contemplated by
the Statute and Rules of Court, though on 13 September 1985 the United States
Information Office in The Hague sent copies to an official of the Registry to be
made available to anyone at the Court interested in the subject. The
representatives of Nicaragua before the Court during the hearings were aware of
the existence of this publication, since it was referred to in a question put to
the Agent of Nicaragua by a Member of the Court. They did not attempt to refute
before the Court what was said in that publication, pointing out that materials
of this kind "do not constitute evidence in this case", and going on
to suggest that it "cannot properly be considered by the Court". The
Court however considers that, in view of the special circumstances of this case,
it may, within limits, make use of information in such a publication.
In connection with the question of proof of facts, the Court notes that
Nicaragua has relied on an alleged implied admission by the United States. It
has drawn attention to the invocation of collective self-defence by the United
States, and contended that "the use of the justification of collective
self-defence constitutes a major admission of direct and substantial United
States involvement in the military and paramilitary operations" directed
against Nicaragua. The Court would observe that the normal purpose of an
invocation of self-defence is to justify conduct which would otherwise be
wrongful. If advanced as a justification in itself, not coupled with a denial of
the conduct alleged, it may well imply both an admission of that conduct, and of
the wrongfulness of that conduct in the absence of the justification of
self-defence. This reasoning would do away with any difficulty in establishing
the facts, which would have been the subject of an implicit overall admission by
the United States, simply through its attempt to justify them by the right of
self-defence. However, in the present case the United States has not listed the
facts or described the measures which it claims to have taken in self-defence;
nor has it taken the stand that it is responsible for all the activities of
which Nicaragua accuses it but such activities were justified by the right of
self-defence. Since it has not done this, the United States cannot be taken to
have admitted all the activities, or any of them; the recourse to the right of
self-defence thus does not make possible a firm and complete definition of
admitted facts. The Court thus cannot consider reliance on self-defence to be an
implicit general admission on the part of the United States; but it is certainly
a recognition as to the imputability of some of the activities complained of.
[p. 49] In the view of the Court, the President's refusal to comment
on the connection between covert activities and "what has been going on, or
with some of the specific operations down there" can, in its context, be
treated as an admission that the United States had something to do with the
Corinto attack, but not necessarily that United States personnel were directly
involved.
[p. 80] Reference was made during the hearings to the testimony of
defectors from Nicaragua or from the armed opposition in El Salvador; the Court
has no such direct testimony before it. The only material available in this
respect is press reports, some of which were annexed to the United States
Counter-Memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. With
appropriate reservations, the Court has to consider what the weight is of such
material, which includes allegations of arms supply and of the training of
Salvadoreans at a base near Managua. While the Court is not prepared totally to
discount this material, it cannot find that it is of any great weight in itself.
Still less can statements attributed in the press to unidentified diplomats
stationed in Managua be regarded as evidence that the Nicaraguan Government was
continuing to supply aid to the opposition in El Salvador.
The evidence or material offered by Nicaragua in connection with the
allegation of arms supply has to be assessed bearing in mind the fact that, in
responding to that allegation, Nicaragua has to prove a negative.
[pp. 82-83] The Court finds, in short, that support for the armed
opposition in El Salvador from Nicaraguan territory was a fact up to the early
months of 1981. While the Court does not possess full proof that there was aid,
or as to its exact nature, its scale and its continuance until the early months
of 1981, it cannot overlook a number of concordant indications, many of which
were provided moreover by Nicaragua itself, from which it can reasonably infer
the provision of a certain amount of aid from Nicaraguan territory.
[pp. 83-84] Secondly, even supposing it well established that
military aid is reaching the armed opposition in El Salvador from the territory
of Nicaragua, it still remains to be proved that this aid is imputable to the
authorities of the latter country. Indeed, the applicant State has in no way
sought to conceal the possibility of weapons en route to the armed opposition in
El Salvador crossing its territory but it denies that this is the result of any
deliberate official policy on its part. As the Court observed in 1949:
"it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by
a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought
to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it
necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and
apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor
shifts the burden of proof." (Corfu Channel, I.C.J. Reports 1949,
p. 18.)
[p. 320 D.O. Schwebel] ... considerations of burden of proof are
beside the point, because the real point is that, where objections are raised to
the appearing party's contentions, that party must convince the Court that those
objections are unfounded if the Court is to meet the standard which Article 53
imposes.
In my view, the correct interpretation of Article 53 is that it affords the
appearing State no advantage beyond that which it enjoys by reason of the
non-appearing State's absence. If, in a given case, such as the one before the
Court, the non-appearing party (or the Court or a judge) raise an affirmative
defence to the claim, the appearing party must demonstrate that the defence is
not good in order to prevail.