1. Vereinte Nationen
199. Im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen nahmen die Bundesregierung sowie Vertreter der Europäischen Union wiederholt Stellung zu konkreten Lagen in bestimmten Staaten oder Regionen. Aus Gründen der Übersichtlichkeit werden die Stellungnahmen zu einem Staat oder einer Region im folgenden zusammenhängend und in alphabetischer Reihenfolge dargestellt.
Am 28. August 1998 äußerte sich der Vertreter Österreichs Manz im Namen der Europäischen Union zur Situation in Afghanistan:
"The EU remains gravely concerned at persistent human rights violations and breaches of humanitarian law in Afghanistan. We are also deeply concerned about the situation of displaced persons in the country, whose number is growing.
The EU calls on all Afghan factions, and in particular the Taliban, to recognize, protect and promote all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to life, liberty and security of persons and fully respect the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which has been repeatedly endorsed by the international community, including Afghanistan.
The EU denounces the continuing discrimination against girls and women in Afghanistan. We urge Afghan factions, and in particular the Taliban, to end discriminatory policies and to recognise, protect and promote the equal rights and dignity of men and women, including access to education and health facilities, employment outside the home, personal security and freedom from intimidation and harassment. The EU will continue to point out the implications of discriminatory policies for the distribution of aid.
The conflict in Afghanistan continues to threaten peace, security and stability in the whole region. By creating favorable conditions for the illicit production and trafficking of drugs as well as for terrorist bases and training camps, the conflict's repercussions reach far beyond Afghanistan and its neighbours. They cause serious damage to member states of the European Union and many countries elsewhere.
The EU is therefore committed to reinforce the fight against illegal drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the EU will take account of drug control objectives when considering contributions to development aid. The EU reiterates its call upon all factions, and in particular the Taliban, to close down training camps for foreign terrorists inside Afghanistan, and to participate in and support international efforts to combat terrorism."500
Unter Bezugnahme auf die Verschlechterung der Situation in Afghanistan stellte der deutsche Vertreter Kastrup am 9. Dezember 1998 einen Resolutionsentwurf501 im Sicherheitsrat vor:
"It calls upon all Afghan parties to cease immediately all armed hostilities, to renounce the use of force and to engage, without delay and preconditions, in a political dialogue under United Nations auspices aimed at achieving a lasting political settlement of the conflict by creating a broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative government acceptable to the Afghan people. The draft resolution also condemns the continued foreign military support to the Afghan parties and calls upon all states concerned to strictly refrain from any outside interference and to end immediately all forms of military support. In accordance with previous resolutions on Afghanistan, the draft Germany is introducing today reiterates that the main responsibility for finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict lies with the Afghan parties. Peace would best be served if both, the Afghan parties and the states with influence over them, responded to international appeals for a renewed and sincere effort aiming at a lasting political settlement of the conflict, based on the principals contained in the text before us."502
Der österreichische Vertreter Sucharipa verurteilte in seiner Stellungnahme zum deutschen Resolutionsentwurf im Namen der Europäischen Union insbesondere die strategische und militärische Unterstützung der afghanischen Gruppen durch Drittstaaten.503
200. Die deutschen Vorstellungen einer globalen Verantwortlichkeit für die Förderung von anhaltendem Frieden und nachhaltiger Entwicklung in Afrika legte der deutsche Botschafter bei den Vereinten Nationen Henze am 24. April 1998 dar. Unter Bezugnahme auf den Bericht des Generalsekretärs hob er die folgenden drei Gesichtspunkte hervor:
"First, the task starts here in New York, here at the United Nations. Drawing on my own personal experience during Germany's non-permanent membership in the Security Council during the years 1995 and 1996 and deeply impressed by the contributions made by our colleagues from African delegations there, I am of the conviction that this body urgently needs to be reformed. We have to overcome what the Secretary General rightly described as paralysis which threatens to undermine the credibility of the organization as a whole. The reform must, among other things, put Africa in a position to shoulder the responsibility of permanent membership. ...
Second, the Organization of African Unity and subregional organizations in Africa ought to be strengthened for the reasons extensively described in the Secretary-General's report. This applies particularily to the improvement of their respective capacities in the areas of conflict prevention, confidence building and peacekeeping. Germany is contributing bilaterally as well as through multilateral channels, primarily through the European Union, towards achieving this very important goal. We agree entirely with the Secretary-General that these efforts have to take place within the context of the United Nations primary resonsibility for matters of international peace and security. ...
Third, Germany believes that the establishment of a permanent international criminal court should be pursued with utmost priority. In this report, the Secretary-General points out the importance of effectively reacting to what he calls a dramatic and unacceptable deterioration in the level of adherence to humanitarian norms in crisis situations."504
201. Die Situation in Angola war Gegenstand mehrerer Stellungnahmen des Vertreters des Vereinigten Königreichs Weston im Namen der Europäischen Union. Am 27. Januar 1998 erklärte er:
"The European Union welcomes the agreement by both parties of a timetable which foresees the completion of the outstanding provisions of the Lusaka protocol by the end of February. We urge both the government of Angola and UNITA to complete their tasks in the timetable agreed. We welcome the conclusion of the registration and disarmament of residual UNITA military personnel. UNITA must now declare itself completely demilitarized. This will open the way for UNITA's formal transition to a political party, and allow it to participate fully and constructively in the democratic process and in the future development of Angola. We note the progress made in extending state administration. We call upon UNITA to co-operate fully and to avoid further delays. In particular, we urge the early extension of state administration to Bailundo and Andulo, as a demonstration of UNITA's commitment to national reconciliation."505
Am 12. Juni 1998 beklagte der Vertreter des Vereinigten Königreichs Weston im Namen der Europäischen Union den fehlenden Fortschritt im Friedensprozeß in Angola:
"UNITA continues to put its own interests before the very real needs of the people of Angola. Consistently it has fallen short of its promises to transform from a military organization to a political one, and to permit the extension of state administration to all Angolan territory. ...
The European Union condemns the armed attacks against MONUA, humanitarian and other international personnel, against the Angolan authorities, and, not least, against civilians. We applaud the Angolan government's patience and continued flexibility in the face of these incidents. We urge the government to resist the temptation to act militarily in response to provocation by UNITA, to govern the activities of the Angolan national police, and to continue to work for peaceful solution.
... We support further Security Council action against UNITA. The existing sanctions have had a positive impact. These further sanctions are not intended to punish, but to encourage UNITA to finalize the implementation of the peace process. Their message is clear: UNITA, particularly the leadership, must keep to its promises. We call upon UNITA to implement fully its obligations by 23 June."506
202. In seiner Stellungnahme zur Lage in Bosnien-Herzegowina ging der deutsche Botschafter bei den Vereinten Nationen Eitel am 15. Juni 1998 zunächst auf das Verhältnis von UNMBIH und SFOR ein:
"The Security Council is today examining two seperate operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The United Nations mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH) and the stabilization force (SFOR). Each one is led by a different organization: The United Nations on the one hand and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the other. There can be no question, however, that they are intrinsically linked, that one cannot exist without the other. UNMBIH still depends on the military protection and the ability to create a secure environment provided by SFOR's presence on the ground. UNMBIH, and in particular the International Police Task Force (IPTF), together with the High Representative and his office, provide the civilian mechanism without which sustainable peace could not be established in that war-torn country."507
Als positive Entwicklung bezeichnete Eitel die gewählte Regierung der Republik Srpska in Umsetzung des Abkommens von Dayton. Er bedauerte aber auch:
"On the other hand, there have been very worrisome incidents caused by elements in Bosnia which wish to maintain ethnic segregation as the result of earlier 'ethnic cleansing'. Germany looks in particular to the leadership of the Bosnian Croats and to those who can influence them to curb efforts to render it possible the return of refugees and displaced persons. Let me add that Germany, which bears a heavy burden in providing for hundreds of thousands of refugees from the former Yugoslavia on its territory, takes a specific interest in the issue of refugee return."508
Am 30. November 1998 unterstrich der Vertreter Österreichs Sucharipa im Namen der Europäischen Union erneut die Bedeutung der Rückkehr der Flüchtlinge nach Bosnien-Herzegowina:
"The return of refugees and displaced persons remains a priority. A very large number of refugees and displaced persons have still not returned home for fear of acts of intimidation and violence. Measures must be taken to put an immediate end to such acts. Furthermore, urgent administrative and legal measures must be taken by all parties to allow the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons in accordance with the UNHCR regional strategy, in particular to areas where they would be a minority, and their reintegration into their communities of origin under conditions of safety and dignity, which must include full respect for their property rights. Although freedom of movement within and between the entities has improved, much remains to be done to guarantee the free circulation of people and goods on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."509
203. Zum Resolutionsentwurf betreffend die Lage in Georgien510 führte der deutsche Botschafter bei den Vereinten Nationen Henze zum deutschen Standpunkt näher aus:
"The first message is: The fighting that broke out in May was a major setback for peace and brought the parties to the brink of full-scale war. Both parties have allowed the situation in the Gali region to degrade to this point. It is now the demand of the international community that they take determined steps to move back from this brink and engage constructively in the peace process led by the United Nations. Germany is willing to render its assistance to the party to reach a comprehensive political settlement, provided they show their genuine commitment to the search for peaceful options ...
The second and even more important message we see in the draft resolution is: The Abkhaz side must allow the refugees from the Gali region to return to their homes immediately and without condition. The recent destruction of houses in the Gali region by Abkhaz forces, in an apparent campaign to drive out the local population, is totally unacceptable and a matter of utmost concern. We welcome that the Council is not afraid to address the facts in their proper terms and evaluate them accordingly. It is certainly no coincidence that, in this context, the draft resolution recalls the declaration of the Lisbon summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which refers to related earlier events.
A third and final basic message is also clearly expressed in the draft resolution: the patience of the Security Council is running out. Unless there is an improvement in the peace process and in the security situation on the ground, a reconsideration of the United Nations peace keeping commitment in Abkhazia, Georgia, cannot be excluded."511
204. Zur Lage in Libyen und zum Bombenattentat auf den Pan Am-Flug 103 brachte der Vertreter des Vereinigten Königreichs Weston im Namen der Europäischen Union am 20. März 1998 zum Ausdruck:
"The European Union reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms. Terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The European Union stresses the need to strengthen international cooperation between states, international organizations, agencies, regional organizations and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations wherever and by whom so ever committed. The decisions taken by the Security Council with regard to Libya were and remain guided by the desire to curb international terrorism, and to ensure that justice is done.
The European Union deeply regrets that more than 9 years after the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 with the loss of 270 lifes and six and a half years after charges were filed, those accused of this crime have still not been brought to justice. The European Union calls on the Libyan government to comply fully with the resolutions of the Security Council, in particular to ensure the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 for trial before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court, as set forth in Resolution 883."512
205. Zur Lage im Mittleren Osten gaben Vertreter des Vereinigten Königreichs und Vertreter Österreichs im Namen der Europäischen Union mehrere Einschätzungen ab. Zur Siedlungspolitik Israels in Jerusalem erklärte der Vertreter des Vereinigten Königreichs Weston am 30. Juni 1998:
"The EU is deeply concerned at the Israeli Government's endorsement of plans to extend the municipal authority of Jerusalem in a way which will alter the demographic balance in the Jerusalem area and tends to pre-empt the final status of occupied land.
That concern is heightened by statements attributed by the media to senior Israeli spokesmen that the new arrangements are 'a basic change in Jerusalem's status, which will be remembered as a turning point'.
The EU reaffirms the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in including Jerusalem, and to the other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967.
... The extension of the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem municipal authoritiy to settlements to the east and north of Jerusalem tends to pre-empt final status negotiations and contravenes the spirit of the Madrid and Oslo accords.
The EU reaffirms its policy and the status of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is subject to the principals set out in the Security Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, notably the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by force, and is therefore not under Israeli sovereignty."513
Die Vertreterin Österreichs Proidl begrüßte am 18. November 1998 die Unterzeichnung des Wye-River-Memorandums vom 23. Oktober 1998 und mahnte:
"The impasse in the Middle East peace process prior to the Wye River Talks, and the serious economic situation in the Palestinian territory increased the feeling of deep despair and frustration amongst the Palestinian population, and high tension and violence in the region. In order to reduce mistrust and build confidence between Israelis and Palestinians, we remind the parties of their obligations to avoid all unilateral acts, which could become the source of new tensions or prejudge the outcome of the final status negotiations. The European Union is of the view that a sound economy is of high importance to social and political stability among the Palestinian people. We therefore encourage the government of Israel to fully meet its responsibilities in promoting the conditions for economic development."514
Im Namen der Europäischen Union würdigte der Vertreter Österreichs Sucharipa am 1. Dezember 1998 erste Schritte auf dem Weg zur Umsetzung des Wye-River-Memorandums und sprach die Hoffnung aus, daß dies auch den Friedensprozeß Israels mit Syrien und dem Libanon neu beleben könne.515
206. Zur Lage in Sierra Leone nahm der österreichische Vertreter Manz im Namen der Europäischen Union wie folgt Stellung:
"In spite of promising developments in the country the European Union remains deeply concerned about the continued presence of remnants of the ousted junta and members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the eastern part as well as in some areas in the north of Sierra Leone. The European Union condemns the continued resistance of these elements against the legitimate government of Sierra Leone and joins the Secretary-General in calling on them to lay down their arms and to surrender immediately. The European Union strongly condemns the mutilations, rapes, the looting and all the other atrocities carried out by the rebels. The European Union calls for an immediate end of all violence against the civilian population of Sierra Leone. Any military support being provided to the rebels has to cease. In this context the European Union stresses the importance that the provisions of Resolution 1132 (1997) and Resolution 1171 (1998) be strictly observed and that any action be avoided that might destabilize the situation in Sierra Leone."516
207. Der österreichische Vertreter Sucharipa äußerte sich im Namen der Europäischen Union am 18. November 1998 zur Situation in Zentralamerika und begrüßte, daß alle zentralamerikanischen Staaten heute unter demokratischer Herrschaft stünden. Sie seien in eine vielversprechende Periode ihrer Geschichte eingetreten und hätten Fortschritte in der Bildung und der Förderung eines dauerhaften Friedens gemacht.
In seiner Einschätzung der gegenwärtigen Situation in Guatemala hob er die Billigung verfassungsrechtlicher Reformen im Kongreß positiv hervor, bedauerte aber zugleich:
"The EU deploys that serious law and order problems continue to imperil citizens' security in Guatemala. We are concerned about unresolved cases of violent crimes, in particular the still unresolved murder of Bishop Gerardi and human rights violations. The EU calls upon the competent authorities of Guatemala to renew efforts to ensure full investigation and bring those responsible to justice. We believe that strengthening the judicial power will be crucial to end impunity and to guarantee the rule of law. The EU also calls upon the government of Guatemala to continue to support the work of the 'Comisi�n de la Verdad' (clarification commission) and to take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety of its members."517
Ein besonderes Augenmerk legte er auch auf die Situation in El Salvador:
"As to El Salvador, the EU recognizes that further advances have been made in the implementation of outstanding elements of the 1992 peace agreements, in particular with regard to the Land-Transfer-Programme.
In other fields, however, certain obstacles to the implementation of pending issues remained. In this connection, may I just mention the rural settlements programme and the problems faced by relatives of diseased combatants who didn't appear in the original 1993 census.
Furthermore, we hope for further progress regarding the respect, protection, and promotion of human rights. In this connection, we would like to stress the importance of an impartial and active role of the human rights ombudsman. Furthermore, the EU wishes to underline that in the field of public security and in particular with regard to the national civilian police, efforts to implement necessary reforms must continue. In general, we consider it imperative to sustain the gains of the peace process and consolidate the institutions it created."518
208. Zu verschiedenen Aspekten der Reform der Vereinten Nationen und des Sicherheitsrats legte Botschafter Eitel die Ansicht der Bundesregierung im Rahmen der "Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other Matters related to the Security Council" dar. Zu den Stimmrechten der neuen ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrats äußerte er sich am 22. April 1998 folgendermaßen:
"I would ... like to focus on three elements which appear to be essential in this context:
1. non-discrimination between old and new permanent members
2. future-oriented approaches to new veto rights
3. final decision by the General Assembly.
1. Non-discrimination between old and new permanent members
The principle of non-discrimination between old and new permanent members can hardly be questioned. In this context let me remind you of the almost identical position of the African States as expressed in their Harare Declaration of 1997 (cf. Doc. A/51/47, Annex XII). Germany has repeatedly requested that both existing and new permanent members should be given equal footing. Equal footing refers to two factors which reflect the traditional concept of permanent membership, namely a) time (permanency) and b) voting power. Regarding the first factor, we reaffirm our position that new permanent members should neither become 'eternal' nor members subject to election every two years. By the same token, new permanent members must have a voice in the Council, which is to be taken seriously. The first but also the second element will have to comply with the principle of non-discrimination. Yes, Germany insists on non-discrimination. But that does not mean that she insists on the right of veto as such. Because in no way does non-discrimination exclude the reform of the veto. Rather, non-discrimination can very well take place at different levels of the veto.
2. Future-oriented approaches to new veto-rights
A reform which shapes the framework for the Security Council of the next millenium should provide the organization with the type of new permanent membership that is oriented for its future - not the past. How might modern, future-oriented permanent membership look like?
First: New permanent members will no longer be eternal or unremovable. This can be achieved through a periodic review clause which implies that new permanent members have no veto right at the time of review. Germany has suggested elements of such a review in the past. Thus, a concept of modern permanent membership would include the possibility of being replaced by another Member State with better qualifications at the time of review. Though this element would introduce a clear distinction vis-à-vis the existing permanent members whose consent remains to be necessary for any amendment to the Charter (cf. Art. 108), the review clause corresponds to the needs of the future and would therefore not be regarded as a discriminatory element.
Second: New permanent members will not necessarily need to be provided with special voting rights from the very first day. Institutional changes often come with transitional clauses and periods. This concept could be easily applied to the expansion in the category of permanent membership, for instance in the form of a High-Level Working Group which would continue to discuss the final former voting rights given to new permanent members. Transition periods enable new permanent members to become familiar with their new status. At the same time they enable the rest of the membership to observe carefully the new elected permanent members and weigh the results. Again, rather than describing this as a case of discrimination, one should conceive of it as the transition to a future-oriented decision-making process.
Third: During the transition period, further interim elements regarding the new elected permanent members should be introduced. These interim elements would take up the numerous proposals made to modernise and curtail the veto. For instance, for an interim period, the veto right of new permanent members could be limited to Chapter VII. It could also be linked with the exercise of the veto right of at least one other new permanent member, resulting in a so-called collective veto right. Both elements would diminish the fears of those who are afraid of possible misuses by the new permanent members of their rights. At the same time they would mean nothing less than the first important step towards a modern and more rational veto right without depriving new permanent members of significant voting rights. Again, the resulting clear distinction between old and new permanent members would be future-oriented but not discriminatory. ...
3. Final decision by the General Assembly
My last observation is very simple. Whatever the decision on the veto right will be, the Assembly will have the last word. It is the Assembly which decides in the end by a two-thirds-majority of all Member States and concrete amendments to the Charter. The Assembly is sovereign. Any decision the Assembly will take in accordance with these rules and Charter provisions will be its free and own decision. Some voices might continue to call any new approach taken by the Assembly discriminatory, say it was imposed or that it establishes new clauses of membership. The truth is that any decision taken by the Assembly will be the outcome of a democratic vote based on the search for genuine compromise and a new Security Council fit for the next millenium."519
Zum Gebrauch des Veto-Rechts machte er folgende Angaben:
"Germany proposes that a reform of the Security Council take into consideration the following elements:
- All members of the Security Council should make every effort to seek consensus in the Council decision-making process;
- Permanent members of the Security Council should make a statement, either individually or collectively, that the veto will be exercised in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter, that they will generally be guided by the annex to resolution 267 (III) regarding which matters should be deemed procedural in that in the event on any veto of a draft resolution of the Security Council they should accompany that decision with a formal explanation of such action. A High-Level Working Group shall consider the extent to which the veto-right is extended to new permanent members;
- During an interim period the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto right;
- During that period the concurring vote of at least four out of five new permanent members will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and are taken under Chapter VII of the Charter."520
Im Hinblick auf die Erweiterung des Sicherheitsrats stellte der deutsche Botschafter Henze am 5. Mai 1998 vier prinzipielle Beobachtungen an:
"1. Clear mandate and mainstream views
As title and content of the Working Group prove, the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council is the centre of its work. Voting rights and other matters related to the Security Council are important too, but were not the issues which gave birth to this Working Group.
In its fifth year of deliberations, clear mainstream views regarding the expansion of the Security Council have emerged. They are reflected in the major findings of the Co-Vice-Chairman resulting from their consultations with 165 member states, which showed that 'a very large majority of those interviewed supported an increase in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership' (Doc. A/51/47, Annex VII). Along the same lines, the comprehensive reform proposal presented by the former Chairman of the Working Group, Razali Ismail, proposes an increase in both categories, suggesting a new Council with four new non-permanent and five new permanent seats (Doc. A/51/47, Annex II).
My delegation supports both the mandate's subjective and mainstream's views.
2. Inadequate and outdated composition of the present Council
Neither composition of the two categories of membership corresponds any longer to the needs of today.
a) The substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations has led to an insufficient representation of countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean in the category of non-permanent seats compared to the situation in 1965, the year of the last reform of the Council.
b) Neither the south nor the new 'diplomatic and economic powers' of the world, in order to use the words used by the British Ambassador yesterday, are represented in the permanent category of the Council at all. Only an increase in the permanent category can redress this imbalance and bring about participation of those countries and continents on which the Council legitimately relies.
3. A concept of future-oriented permanent membership
Changing the composition of permanent membership entails more than just adding more permanent members. Definition of permanent membership should no longer be a mere question of nuclear capacity or military power. New permanent members will reflect a reality beyond these narrow criteria. New permanent members will develop their own, future-oriented style, aimed at the benefit of the organization, always bearing in mind their position as former non-permanent members. New ways of using the veto right and reviewing the Charter are ways of a future-oriented concept of permanent membership. Germany has submitted substantial ideas in both issues.
4. No convincing alternatives exist
The mainstream concept of an increase in both categories is further buttressed by the substantial flaws of all existing alternatives. This so-called 'fall back'-position which would remain a partial expansion that ignores one of the principal motives for the reform of the Security Council, e.g. the important 'changes in international relations' (see the mandate of the Working Group). Even worse: it would finally confirm and newly legitimize the present composition of the permanent category.
The second option, the creation of semi-permanent seats allowing 30 countries to rotate is neither feasible (lack of criteria) nor desirable, as the distinguished Ambassador of Lithuania has rightly pointed out. This kind of new category would almost exclusivley benefit those states which have occupied most of the non-permanent seats in the past. It would lead to continuous and huge election campaigns, to mention only one of the many drawbacks. Election campaigns already absorb and divert too much of our intention from the real issue we are supposed to deal with.
Together with a very large majority of Member States, my delegation believes that there is no alternative to comprehensive expansion of both non-permanent and permanent categories of membership."521
In diesem Zusammenhang teilte er seine vorläufigen Beobachtungen bezüglich CRP.12 mit:
"I. With regard to the size of an enlarged Council, we are prepared to show flexibility. We share the arguments forwarded both with regard to the need of a more balanced and equitable composition as well as to maintaining the efficiency of the Council. Looking at the different positions which range from 20 to 26, it still seems to my delegation that the wisest option would be a number in between. 24 seats (option 4) thus remains the number which, in our view, is the closest to a possible compromise.
II. As I have elaborated previously, I am absolutely certain that option 1 represents the mainstream view. Let me also recall what several speakers, among them the distinguished representative of Bolivia have said in yesterday's debate. If today, at the dawn of the 21st century, we were in a position to reinvent the United Nations from zero, we might perhaps, or even most certainly, wish to do certain things quite differently from the way they were done in 1945. But since this is not the case we have to reform the existing structures. Increase in only non-permanent seats would not do the trick, since, as others have said before, it is the imbalance in the permanent seats that is most notable. Increase in only non-permanent seats would frustrate the legitimate aspirations of both developing and industrial countries. It would not be a real reform of the Security Council, but perpetuate and even strengthen the existing imbalance.
III. 1./2.: In the view of my delegation, a rigid ratio between both categories of seats should be avoided. Australia has provided today and in the past appropriate figures to handle the ratio-related aspects in a pragmatic way. New permanent seats should be distributed along the lines of the Razali-proposal (three seats for developing countries from each of the regions of the South, two seats for industrialised countries). 3./4.: If a region decides to opt for special or rotating arrangements, its decision should be respected. In this regard, I have nothing to add to the remarks the distinguished Ambassador of Senegal made today. However, no country or region can be forced into such an arrangement. The ultimate decision lies with the Assembly (option 1). The same holds true for the designation of new permanent members (submission of candidatures, followed by an election in the General Assembly). 5.: In this regard we would like to once again draw attention to the substantial proposal we put forward in our statement of 22 April 1998 as contained now in CRP. 9. 6.: The distribution of new non-permanent seats depends on their number. If we agreed on additional four seats, a possible seat allocation could be one seat each for Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. 7. We support vigorously Option 1, since any other arrangement would result in the creation of a new category of seats with the disadvantages described above. Option 2 is not an option within the framework of the concept of non-permanent seats as set out in the Charter.
IV. Answers to the questions asked in this part are contained in the previous observations."522
Zur afrikanischen Position im Hinblick auf die Erweiterung des Sicherheitsrats, wie sie in CRP.16 vom 26. Juni 1998 enthalten ist, äußerte sich Botschafter Henze am 13. Juli 1998 folgendermaßen:
"If I read CRP.16 correctly, it is:
1. that rotation consists in choosing two candidates to fill two seats;
2. that the two candidates are chosen from a pool which itself will result from a list of candidates consisting of two countries nominated by each of the five African subregions.
This, in my reading, means that any African seat will be filled with an individual African country. The duration of that mandate has not been fixed. As ambassador Ka from Senegal has pointed out in his transmission statement, the mandate for a seat might extend to the time of the next review and will be determined by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU, which has preferred not to fix definitely a duration time at this stage.
Germany welcomes the Ouagadougou decision which she considers helpful, constructive and as clarifying matters. We are confident that it will become an essential element of the reform package. Germany continues to support African efforts to be permanently represented in the Security Council as she has done from the very beginning of this exercise."523
Schließlich äußerte sich Botschafter Henze in der Working Group auch zu der Frage des Überprüfungsmechanismus am 26. Mai 1998:
"Why is the review clause so popular? Let me briefly elaborate on three answers to that question:
1. The review clause guarantees the reversibility of reform steps which therefore will not be decisions for 'eternity';
2. the review clause is not mere cosmetics but an effective mechanism;
3. the review clause leads to a new and modern concept of accountable membership in the Security Council.
1. The review guarantees the reversibility of reform steps if need be.
One of the misleading arguments in this debate is the argument that a modernization of both categories of Council membership, non-permanent and permanent, would lead to new and 'eternal' privileges.
Quite the opposite is true: If new and prominent seats are created, the review mechanism guarantees the reversibility of that measure after a period of 10, 12, 15, or 20 years if the necessary majority of Member States (two thirds) so decides. No new prominent member would be allowed to object to or veto such a decision taken by the General Assembly. Thus, new prominent members will be permanent but not eternal.
Further positive consequences:
- We can put any reform step through its paces until (the time of) review. If a repair is needed, repair can be done;
- New political and economic realities can be taken into account at the time of review. Countries with old and new emerging aspirations will have a fair chance, too.
- Reform becomes possible without the fear of missing a 'once in a century' chance since the review is already agreed.
2. Review is not a cosmetic, but an effective mechanism.
The review is not a cosmetic measure. It can either be incorporated into the Charter (see our proposal in the year 1996 report) or agreed upon otherwise, as long as the arrangement is compulsory. Additional votes of the General Assembly or of the Security Council will not be needed to undertake the review. Thus, the review of the Security Council reform will not face the problems the general review of the charges faced in the past (cf. Art. 109 (1)-(3)).
In fact, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, there would be an effective review of one of its principle organs. Of course, if the review results in changes of the Charter, it is subjected to provisions contained in the present Charter (necessary thresholds, ratifications etc.).
3. The review leads to a new and modern concept of permanent membership.
Besides the many other inherent advantages, the review contains an almost revolutionary element. New permanent members will be watched and judged by their performance. If they perform poorly or make inappropriate use of their rights (for instance, in the area of exercising the veto), they might risk their Council membership at the time of the next review, since they are simply replaceable. In other words: New permanent members will be de facto accountable to the membership and will have an additional incentive to really 'act on behalf' of the members (Art. 24 (1)).
Those countries or groups of countries who see an interest in rotation arrangements for permanent seats might also like to use the review mechanism for their purposes in the way they deem it appropriate.
The time for rigid and inflexible systems is over. Solutions like the ones taken in 1945 no longer fit today needs. New members, non-permanent and permanent, will have to follow a different, future-oriented path. The review clause is one element of this approach, together with those elements we have outlined in our statement of 22 April 1998 (cf. CRP.9)."524
209. Im Berichtszeitraum fand eine Überprüfung des Arbeitsmechanismus des Wirtschafts- und Sozialrats der Vereinten Nationen statt. Der österreichische Vertreter Sucharipa äußerte sich im Namen der Europäischen Union zum Ergebnis am 31. Juli 1998 im Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat wie folgt:
"As to the substantive session proper, we believe that in particular the High-Level Segment, the Humanitarian Segment, and the Coordination Segment were successful. The High-Level Segment saw a significant improvement in its outcome. Instead of lengthy, not communicable conclusions, we agreed on a concise ministerial communiqué which we were able to adopt at the end of the segment. Effective and efficient preparation before the start of the High-Level segment facilitated this positive outcome. In this context we would like to commend the efforts by the President of the Council to conclude each segment with the adoption of the corresponding outcome which were - at least - in part effective. We would like to encourage the next bureau of ECOSOC to continue in these endeavours.
The innovation of the humanitarian segment in ECOSOC proved to be a good opportunity to discuss important issues of coordination of humanitarian activities. The segment should be repeated on an annual basis and improvements should be discussed at an organizational session as called for in the agreed conclusions.
The conduct and results of the coordination segment demonstrate that the segment is an important and appropriate tool to ensure coherent and integrated work of the UN system. The participation of representatives of UN bodies and institutions in the presentations and the general debate greatly facilitated informed deliberations. The agreed conclusions on the segment recognize the achievements since the World Conference by the entire UN system in the field of human rights and give concrete meaning to the VDPA's call for UN-system-wide approach to human rights."525
Dennoch hielt er Verbesserungen in den folgenden Bereichen für erforderlich:
"- The agenda of the General Segment needs further streamlining with the aim of bringing the Council's review of work of its subsidiary bodies, and in particular its functional commissions more in line with its managerial and oversight functions. As the focus has to be on coordination we should also refrain from repeating debates which had already taken place in the subsidiary bodies. ECOSOC should, though, be able to conduct targeted discussions on items which require its particular attention.
- The quality as well as the timely availability of reports is crucial for providing this oversight and guidance function. We note with appreciation the improved quality of the reports. But it is very difficult for the Council to act in a substantive manner without having the reports received on time.
- We saw a marked improvement in the substantive preparations for most of the segments which is crucial for the quality of the outcome. We would appreciate if this positive tendency could be pursued further, in particular through an improved interaction with the bureau with regard to organizational questions in the preparation and the conduct of the substantive session."526
210. Im Berichtszeitraum kam es in den Organen der Vereinten Nationen zu zahlreichen Stellungnahmen zu internationalen Strafgerichtshöfen. Auch diese Stellungnahmen sollen zusammenhängend dargestellt werden.
Hinsichtlich des Ruanda-Strafgerichtshofs äußerte sich der Vertreter des Vereinigten Königreichs Weston im Namen der Europäischen Union am 30. April 1998 im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen wie folgt:
"In paragraph 7 of resolution 955, the Council agreed that it would consider increasing the number of judges and charges on the tribunal if it became necessary. ... We have therefore noted with great concern the current situation with regard to the number of accused persons in pre-trial detention in the tribunal prison quarters in Arusha. Of the 25 accused persons currently detained, 21 are in pre-trial detention, and 5 have been detained awaiting the trial for almost three years. We also note that it is possible that other accused persons, and there are still others against whom charges have not yet been filed, may in the future join those currently detained in Arusha. In these circumstances, the European Union believes that it is now important to create a third trial chamber for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, consisting of three judges, in order that the administration of justice by the Tribunal can be accelerated, and so that those in custody can be brought swiftly to trial."527
In einer Stellungnahme zum Bericht des Ruanda-Strafgerichtshofs hob der österreichische Vertreter Sucharipa im Namen der Europäischen Union am 28. Oktober 1998 in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen die Vorbildfunktion des Ruanda-Strafgerichtshofs für den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof528 hervor:
"En fait, le Tribunal criminel international pour le Rwanda a constitué un précédent important de la création d'une cours pénale internationale dont le statut a été adopté à Rome le 17 juillet 1998 introduisant ainsi une nouvelle étape dans le processus de traduire en justice ceux qui commettent des crimes internationaux. La pratique et les expériences rassemblées par le Tribunal criminel international pour le Rwanda constitueront une source précieuse dans la mise au point des règles qui permettront de poursuivre et de punir, au niveau international, les graves violations du droit humanitaire, sans égard au lieu o� elles ont été commises ou à la personne de ceux qui sont responsables de ces actes. Elles sont notamment permis de prendre conscience de l'importance de la question de l'accès des victimes au tribunal, et de leur protection."529
In einer weiteren Stellungnahme zum Bericht des Jugoslawien-Strafgerichtshofs äußerte sich der österreichische Vertreter Sucharipa im Namen der Europäischen Union am 19. November 1998 in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen zur Lage im Kosovo:
"As in the past the European Union for reasons of principle will refrain from commenting on action cases now before the Tribunal. Chapter II B of the report on the Tribunal's judicial activities contains detailed information in that regard. We wish to reiterate that in order to do its job impartially the Tribunal must be totally independent of any political authority. However, we have to stress again the need for unstinting co-operation by all States and all parties with the Tribunal to enable it to perform its duties satisfactorily. The corresponding duties of the authorities concerned extend not only to executing the Tribunal's arrest warrants, but also to facilitating the Tribunal's investigative activity, by allowing entry of investigators, in co-operating with them.
In the latter respect the European Union notes that recently a serious issue has arisen as far as the Tribunal's role in response to recent events in Kosovo is concerned. International humanitarian law applies to the situation in Kosovo and the Tribunal has a mandate to gather relevant information and evidence.
The President of the Tribunal in recent letters addressed to the Security Council (S/1998/990 and 1040) has drawn attention to the fact that the necessary co-operation of the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not forthcoming. The European Union is thus deeply concerned about the FRY's government's decision to deny a delegation from the Tribunal the permission to conduct investigations in Kosovo. This decision is a clear case of non-compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the recent Holbrook/Milosevic agreement which the EU fully supports."530
In einer Stellungnahme der Europäischen Union zu den Internationalen Strafgerichtshöfen von Jugoslawien und Ruanda faßte die österreichische Vertreterin Butschek am 24. November 1998 Fortschritte und Kritikpunkte kurz zusammen:
"A brief glance at ICTY's current administrative set-up shows that the infrastructure now in place can be regarded as sufficient and up-to-date. Two additional court rooms were constructed, and the Tribunal occupied further additional space for the Registry. Although there may be a need for a future expansion of the detention facility, the Tribunal is also able to manage for the present installation. These installations currently are holding 27 detainees who were indicted by the Tribunal.
With regard to the ICTR the European Union takes note of the status of implementation of the recommendations of OIOS provided by the Secretary-General in Annex V of his report and the corresponding comments in the fourth annual report of OIOS. The European Union recognizes the corrective actions taken by the Tribunal's administration so far and wishes to restate its strong support of the Tribunal. It appears however that some important issues with regard to the administrative functions of the tribunals still remain unsolved. This continues to cause the EU serious concern. In order to secure the functioning of the Tribunals, it is important that all the recommendations made for the improvement of the administration be fully implemented. We would expect the Secretary-General to keep the Member States informed of the ongoing developments, including the measures taken to enhance the security staff and to improve the witness protection program."531
211. Auf eine Kleine Anfrage äußerte sich die Bundesregierung am 22. April 1998 zum Gesetzesbeschluß des US-Repräsentantenhauses, die Rückzahlung von US-Schulden an die Vereinten Nationen an die Einhaltung bestimmter Richtlinien, wie z.B. der Nichtförderung von Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen durch internationale Familienplanungsorganisationen, die im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen tätig sind, zu binden, folgendermaßen:
"Die Bundesregierung hat, gemeinsam mit den EU-Partnern, wiederholt bekräftigt, daß die VN-Mitgliedstaaten ihren Beitragsverpflichtungen in vollem Umfang und ohne Bedingungen nachzukommen haben. Diese Haltung ist der Regierung der USA bekannt. Die Bundesregierung begrüßt die Bemühungen der US-Administration, eine entsprechende Einigung mit den amerikanischen Gesetzgebungskörperschaften zu erreichen. In das amerikanische Gesetzgebungsverfahren mischt sie sich jedoch nicht ein und würde dies auch für kontraproduktiv halten. Im übrigen ist darauf zu verweisen, daß die Bemühungen der US-Administration um Zahlung der Beitragsschulden durch weit über 100 amerikanische Nichtregierungsorganisationen unterstützt werden, die sich dabei auch für eine Aufhebung des Junktims einsetzen."532
212. Am 18. Juni 1998 nahm der Bundestag auf Empfehlung des Ausschusses für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung einen Antrag von CDU/CSU und FDP zur Verstärkung deutscher Beiträge zu Krisenprävention und Friedenspolitik an.533 Nach dem Willen des Bundestages sollen Regionalorganisationen bei der Regelung von Problemen und Konflikten in ihrem Bereich eine stärkere Eigenverantwortlichkeit wahrnehmen. Gefordert wird zudem eine Stärkung des Menschenrechtszentrums und des Hochkommissars für Menschenrechte der Vereinten Nationen sowie ein glaubwürdiger Sanktionsmechanismus zur Aufnahme der Tätigkeit internationaler Gerichtshöfe bei der Ahndung schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Kriegsverbrechen. Der Bundestag verlangte außerdem die Einrichtung einer Analyse- und Planungseinheit im Rahmen der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union, die dem Rat möglichst frühzeitig Handlungsoptionen einer klaren Politikfolgenabschätzung vorzulegen habe. Verbessert werden sollen darüber hinaus die Möglichkeiten der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE).534
213. Anläßlich des 25. Jahrestages des Beitritts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zu den Vereinten Nationen am 18. September 1998 erklärte Bundesaußenminister Kinkel am 17. September 1998:
"Morgen jährt sich zum 25. Mal der Tag, an dem Deutschland Vollmitglied der Vereinten Nationen wurde: Am 18. September 1973 wurden die beiden deutschen Staaten als 133. und 134. Mitglied in die Weltgemeinschaft aufgenommen. Damit waren ehemalige Sieger und Besiegte des Zweiten Weltkrieges gemeinsam in einer Organisation vertreten, deren wichtigstes Ziel es ist, Kriege zu verhindern und dem Frieden in der Welt zu dienen.
Von Anfang an hat Deutschland sich hinter die Verwirklichung der Ziele der Vereinten Nationen gestellt. Umgekehrt hat dieses starke multilaterale Engagement Deutschlands entscheidend dazu beigetragen, daß unser Land nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zu einem geachteten Mitglied der Weltgemeinschaft werden konnte und die uneingeschränkte Zustimmung der Staatengemeinschaft zur Wiedergewinnung der eigenen Staatlichkeit erhielt.
Deutschland setzt sich in den VN aktiv für die weltweite Achtung der Menschenrechte und grundlegende Prinzipien der Staatsführung ein und hat dazu zahlreiche Initiativen in den Vereinten Nationen ergriffen. Sie galten insbesondere der weltweiten Abschaffung der Todesstrafe, der Verhinderung von Flüchtlingsströmen, vertrauensbildenden Maßnahmen und der Vernichtung von Kleinwaffen in Krisengebieten. ...
Insgesamt war die Bundesrepublik Deutschland dreimal nichtständiges Mitglied im Weltsicherheitsrat, dem bedeutendsten Organ der Vereinten Nationen für die Wahrung des Weltfriedens. Wir drängen nicht; wir sind aber bereit, uns der Verantwortung zu stellen und einen ständigen Sitz anzunehmen.
Die Vereinten Nationen können ihren Auftrag nur erfüllen, wenn sie von den Mitgliedstaaten mit den nötigen Finanzmitteln ausgestattet werden. Deutschland trägt knapp 10 % zum regulären Haushalt bei und ist damit drittgrößter Beitragszahler nach den USA und Japan. Darüber hinaus leistet Deutschland erhebliche freiwillige Zahlungen für eine Vielzahl von Sonderorganisationen der Vereinten Nationen sowie für Friedensmissionen. ...
Die Vereinten Nationen haben das starke deutsche Engagement auch durch die Ansiedlung mehrerer ihrer Organisationen in Bonn gewürdigt. Sowohl das Freiwilligenprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (UNV), das VN-Informationszentrum (UNIC) wie auch das Sekretariat der Klimarahmenkonvention (KRK) und das Sekretariat zur Bekämpfung der Wüstenbildung (UNCCP) sind hier beheimatet. Hamburg ist seit 1996 Sitz des Internationalen Seegerichtshofes (ISGH).
Deutschland wird auch in Zukunft der seinem politischen und wirtschaftlichen Gewicht entsprechenden Verantwortung in den Vereinten Nationen gerecht werden und seinen Beitrag zu ihrer Stärkung leisten."535
Beim Festakt der Deutschen Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen (DGVN) am 14. September 1998 im Haus der Geschichte in Bonn führte Bundesaußenminister Kinkel weiter aus:
"25 Jahre deutsche Mitgliedschaft in den Vereinten Nationen sind Anlaß zu Freude über den Verlauf unseres eigenen Schicksals. Aber das Wort von Immanuel Kant bleibt weiterhin gültig: 'Frieden unter den Menschen ist kein Naturzustand - er muß gestiftet werden.' Mit Tatkraft, mit Zuversicht - und mit Realismus.
Wir müssen alles tun, was zur Vorbeugung gegen Konflikte möglich ist. Aber die Betonung der Konfliktprävention darf nicht zum Alibi werden. Hüten wir uns vor der Vision, alles sei 'machbar'. Und vor der Vorstellung, Politik sei so etwas wie ein 'social engineering'.
Wer für kollektive Sicherheit plädiert, ohne zu militärischem Beistand bereit zu sein, oder es ablehnt, mit wirtschaftlicher Hilfe die Kooperation von Konfliktparteien zu honorieren, der täuscht sich über Konsequenzen und über die ethische Problematik dieser Ordnungskonzepte. Wer umgekehrt nur militärische Lösungen sucht, errichtet stählerne Kolosse auf tönernen Füßen. An der zentralen Bedeutung des Politischen bei Krisenbewältigung und Konfliktprävention führt kein Weg vorbei."536
500 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r280898.htm.
504 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (Anm. 10): http://www.undp.org/missions/germany/state/240498.htm.
505 Das Vereinigte Königreich besaß in der ersten Jahreshälfte von 1998 die Präsidentschaft der Europäischen Union. Einige Reden der Vertreter des Vereinigten Königreichs im Namen der Europäischen Union sind im Internet von der United Kingdom Permanent Mission to the United Nations veröffentlicht worden. Wird im folgenden auf die Veröffentlichungen im Internet Bezug genommen, so wird unter Hinweis auf die Quelle nur die genaue Adresse des Zitats genannt. Die hier zitierte Erklärung befindet sich unter der Adresse: http://www.britain-info.org/BIS/UKMIS/SPEECHES/27Jan98.htm.
506 UK Mission to the United Nations (Anm. 141): http://www.britain-info.org/bis/ukmis/speeches/12Ju98-2.stm.
509 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r3011982.htm.
512 UK Mission to the United Nations (Anm. 141): http://www.britain-info.org/bis/ukmis/speeches/20Ma98-2.stm.
513 UK Mission to the United Nations (Anm. 141): http://www.britain-info.org/bis/ukmis/speeches/30jun98.stm.
514 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r1811982.htm.
515 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r3011981.htm.
516 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/c6130798.htm.
517 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r181198.htm.
519 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (Anm. 12): http://www.undp.org/missions/germany/state/220498.htm.
521 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (Anm. 12): http://www.undp.org/missions/germany/state/050598.htm.
523 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (Anm. 12): http://www.undp.org/missions/germany/state/071398.htm.
524 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (Anm. 12): http://www.undp.org/missions/germany/state/05598.thm.
525 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r310798.htm.
527 UK mission to the United Nations (Anm. 141): http://www.britain-info.org/bis/ukmis/speeches/30Apr98.stm.
528 Vgl. zum Internationalen Strafgerichtshof insbesondere Ziff. 1 dieses Berichts.
529 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r281098.htm.
530 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r1911981.htm.
531 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations (Anm. 14): http://www.undp.org/missions/austria/r2411982.htm.
533 BT-Drs. 13/6389 vom 4.12.1996.
534 Blickpunkt Bundestag 2/98, 42.
535 Pressearchiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Anm. 10): http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/98/p/P980917d.htm.
536 Bull. Nr. 72 vom 18.9.1998, 798 f.
