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III. | The International Court of Justice |
1. | FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES |
1.2. | Consent of States |
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Case Concerning Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic
of the Congo v.
Uganda)
Counter-Claims
Order of 29 November 2001
[pp. Decl. Verhoeven] That said,
it is a specific feature of the International Court
of Justice that its jurisdiction is currently purely
voluntary. That jurisdiction exists only because and
insofar as the parties have so desired it. It is therefore
possible that the Court, absent agreement, may not
be able to assume jurisdiction tomorrow in respect
of a claim of which it is seised today by way of counter-claim.
Are we accordingly to conclude that the
Court should adopt a particularly "liberal" approach
when ruling on the admissibility of a counter-claim
and, in particular, on the requirement that the counter-claim
be directly connected to the subject-matter of the
principal claim? I seriously doubt it. It is true that
the peaceful settlement of disputes could be enhanced
by such an approach. However, the risk is that it would
encourage States to avoid a Court which keeps too many
"surprises" up its sleeve, rather than submit to its
jurisdiction. Further, the internal logic of a system
of voluntary jurisdiction undoubtedly requires - irrespective
of any considerations of jurisdictional policy - particular
rigour in evaluating the connection which the counter-claim
must have with the principal claim if it is not to
be ruled inadmissible.