| III. | The International Court of Justice |
| 1. | FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES |
| 1.1. | General Questions |
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East Timor (Portugal v. Australia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90
[p. 160 D.O. Weeramantry] While it is important, then, that
objections based on lack of third party consent must receive the Court's most
anxious scrutiny, there is to be weighed against it, in areas of doubt, the
other consideration, equally important, of the Court's statutory duty to decide
a dispute properly brought before it within its judicial authority. Too strict
an application of the first principle can result in an infringement of the
second.
In the international judicial system, an applicant seeking relief from this
Court has, in general, nowhere else to turn if the Court refuses to hear it,
unlike in a domestic jurisdiction where, despite a refusal by one tribunal,
there may well be other tribunals or authorities to whom the petitioner may
resort.
[p. 219 D.O. Weeramantry] The Court, by its very constitution, lacks
the means of enforcement and is not to be deterred from pronouncing upon the
proper legal determination of a dispute it would otherwise have decided, merely
because, for political or other reasons, that determination is unlikely to be
implemented. The raison d'être of the Court's jurisdiction
is adjudication and clarification of the law, not enforcement and
implementation. The very fact that a justiciable dispute has been duly
determined judicially can itself have a practical value which cannot be
anticipated, and the consequences of which may well reach into the area of
practicalities. Those are matters beyond the purview of the Court, which
must discharge its proper judicial functions irrespective of questions
of enforceability and execution, which are not its province.
