| III. | The International Court of Justice |
| 2. | THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE |
| 2.1. | General Rules |
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Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide,
Provisional Measures,
Order of 13 September 1993,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 325
[p. 412-413 S.O. Lauterpacht] 14. The special circumstances
attending this case suggest that some explanation is required of the general
basis of the Court's operation. The Court can only act in a case if the parties,
both applicant and respondent, have conferred jurisdiction upon it by some
voluntary act of consent. This can be given in various forms: a treaty
undertaking to that effect; a contracting-in to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court under the so-called "optional clause" (Article 36 (2) of its
Statute); or an acceptance of jurisdiction by a respondent through its conduct
following upon a unilateral commencement of proceedings by an applicant - a
method known as forum prorogatum. Whatever form the consent may take,
the range of matters that the Court can then deal with is limited to the matters
covered by that consent. Thus, jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the
Genocide Convention can extend only to cases involving the interpretation,
application or fulfilment of the Convention. Even if the complaints relate to
appalling atrocities amounting to violations of, for example, the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War, of the various human rights
conventions or even of principles of customary international law, they cannot be
brought before the Court on the basis of the jurisdictional provision in the
Genocide Convention unless they are also acts covered by the terms of that
Convention.
15. The possibility must be recognized and accepted that there are a number
- alas, a very great number - of substantive rights protected by international
law which, for want of a suitable jurisdictional link to the Court, cannot be
made the subject of consideration and decision by it. This is not the fault of
the Court. It is simply a reflection of the present unsatisfactory state of the
international legal system - a reflection, many consider, of a lack of
appropriate political will on the part of States, not a reflection of any
shortcoming in the Court. If jurisdiction exists, the Court will exercise it.
That, after all, is what the Court is for.
