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| III. | The International Court of Justice |
| 2. | THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE |
| 2.1. | General Rules |
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Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 11 July 1996,
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595
[pp. 613-614] 26. ... It is the case that the jurisdiction of the Court must normally be assessed on the date of the filing of the act instituting proceedings. However, the Court, like its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, has always had recourse to the principle according to which it should not penalize a defect in a procedural act which the applicant could easily remedy. Hence, in the case concerning the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, the Permanent Court said:
"Even if the grounds on which the institution of proceedings was based were defective for the reason stated, this would not be an adequate reason for the dismissal of the applicant's suit. The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law. Even, therefore, if the application were premature because the Treaty of Lausanne had not yet been ratified, this circumstance would now be covered by the subsequent deposit of the necessary ratifications." (P.C. I. J., Series A, No. 2, p. 34.)
The same principle lies at the root of the following dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia:
"Even if, under Article 23, the existence of a definite dispute were necessary, this condition could at any time be fulfilled by means of unilateral action on the part of the applicant Party. And the Court cannot allow itself to be hampered by a mere defect of form, the removal of which depends solely on the Party concerned." (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 14.)
The present Court applied this principle in the case concerning the Northern
Cameroons (I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 28), as well as Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America) when it stated: "It would make no sense to require Nicaragua
now to institute fresh proceedings based on the Treaty, which it would be fully
entitled to do." (I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 428-429, para.
83.)
In the present case, even if it were established that the Parties, each of
which was bound by the Convention when the Application was filed, had only been
bound as between themselves with effect from 14 December 1995, the
Court could not set aside its jurisdiction on this basis, inasmuch as Bosnia and
Herzegovina might at any time file a new application, identical to the present
one, which would be unassailable in this respect.