III. | The International Court of Justice |
3. | THE PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE |
3.6. | The Procedure in Default of Appearance |
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Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicaragua/United States of America)
Merits. J. 27.6.1986
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14
[pp. 23-26] When a State named as party to proceedings before the
Court decides not to appear in the proceedings, or not to defend its case, the
Court usually expresses regret, because such a decision obviously has a negative
impact on the sound administration of justice (cf. Fisheries Jurisdiction,
I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 7, para. 12; p. 54, para. 13; I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 9, para. 17; p. 181, para. 18; Nuclear Tests, I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 257, para. 15; p. 461, para. 15; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf,
I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 7, para. 15; United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 18, para. 33). In the
present case, the Court regrets even more deeply the decision of the respondent
State not to participate in the present phase of the proceedings, because this
decision was made after the United States had participated fully in the
proceedings on the request for provisional measures, and the proceedings on
jurisdiction and admissibility. Having taken part in the proceedings to argue
that the Court lacked jurisdiction, the United States thereby acknowledged that
the Court had the power to make a finding on its own jurisdiction to rule upon
the merits. It is not possible to argue that the Court had jurisdiction only to
declare that it lacked jurisdiction. In the normal course of events, for a party
to appear before a court entails acceptance of the possibility of the court's
finding against that party. Furthermore the Court is bound to emphasize that the
non-participation of a party in the proceedings at any stage of the case cannot,
in any circumstances, affect the validity of its judgment. Nor does such
validity depend upon the acceptance of that judgment by one party. The fact that
a State purports to "reserve its rights" in respect of a future
decision of the Court, after the Court has determined that it has jurisdiction,
is clearly of no effect on the validity of that decision. Under Article 36,
paragraph 6, of its Statute, the Court has jurisdiction to determine any dispute
as to its own jurisdiction, and its judgment on that matter, as on the merits,
is final and binding on the parties under Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute (cf.
Corfu Channel, Judgment of 15 December 1949 I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.
248).
When Article 53 of the Statute applies, the Court is bound to "satisfy
itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37,
but also that the claim" of the party appearing is well founded in fact and
law. In the present case, the Court has had the benefit of both Parties pleading
before it at the earlier stages of the procedure, those concerning the request
for the indication of provisional measures and to the questions of jurisdiction
and admissibility. By its Judgment of 26 November 1984, the Court found, inter
alia, that it had jurisdiction to entertain the case ; it must however take
steps to "satisfy itself" that the claims of the Applicant are "well
founded in fact and law". The question of the application of Article 53 has
been dealt with by the Court in a number of previous cases, referred to above,
and the Court does not therefore find it necessary to recapitulate the content
of these decisions. The reasoning adopted to dispose of the basic problems
arising was essentially the same, although the words used may have differed
slightly from case to case. Certain points of principle may however be restated
here. A State which decides not to appear must accept the consequences of its
decision, the first of which is that the case will continue without its
participation; the State which has chosen not to appear remains a party to the
case, and is bound by the eventual judgment in accordance with Article 59 of the
Statute. There is however no question of a judgment automatically in favour of
the party appearing, since the Court is required, as mentioned above, to "satisfy
itself" that that party's claim is well founded in fact and law.
The use of the term "satisfy itself" in the English text of the
Statute (and in the French text the term "s'assurer") implies that the
Court must attain the same degree of certainty as in any other case that the
claim of the party appearing is sound in law, and, so far as the nature of the
case permits, that the facts on which it is based are supported by convincing
evidence. For the purpose of deciding whether the claim is well founded in law,
the principle jura novit curia signifies that the Court is not solely
dependent on the argument of the parties before it with respect to the
applicable law (cf. "Lotus", P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p.
31), so that the absence of one party has less impact. As the Court observed in
the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases:
"The Court ..., as an international judicial organ, is deemed to take
judicial notice of international law, and is therefore required in a case
falling under Article 53 of the Statute, as in any other case, to consider on
its own initiative all rules of international law which may be relevant to the
settlement of the dispute. It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain
and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of
establishing or proving rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of
the parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court."
(I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 9, para. 17; p. 181, para. 18.)
Nevertheless the views of the parties to a case as to the law applicable to
their dispute are very material, particularly, as will be explained below
(paragraphs 184 and 185), when those views are concordant. In the present case,
the burden laid upon the Court is therefore somewhat lightened by the fact that
the United States participated in the earlier phases of the case, when it
submitted certain arguments on the law which have a bearing also on the merits.
As to the facts of the case, in principle the Court is not bound to confine
its consideration to the material formally submitted to it by the parties (cf.
Brazilian Loans, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 20/21, p. 124; Nuclear
Tests, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 263-264, paras. 31, 32). Nevertheless, the
Court cannot by its own enquiries entirely make up for the absence of one of the
Parties; that absence, in a case of this kind involving extensive questions of
fact, must necessarily limit the extent to which the Court is informed of the
facts. It would furthermore be an over-simplification to conclude that the only
detrimental consequence of the absence of a party is the lack of opportunity to
submit argument and evidence in support of its own case. Proceedings before the
Court call for vigilance by all. The absent party also forfeits the opportunity
to counter the factual allegations of its opponent. It is of course for the
party appearing to prove the allegations it makes, yet as the Court has held:
"While Article 53 thus obliges the Court to consider the submissions of
the Party which appears, it does not compel the Court to examine their accuracy
in all their details; for this might in certain unopposed cases prove impossible
in practice." (Corfu Channel, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 248.)
While these are the guiding principles, the experience of previous cases in
which one party has decided not to appear shows that something more is involved.
Though formally absent from the proceedings, the party in question frequently
submits to the Court letters and documents, in ways and by means not
contemplated by the Rules. The Court has thus to strike a balance. On the one
hand, it is valuable for the Court to know the views of both parties in whatever
form those views may have been expressed. Further, as the Court noted in 1974.
where one party is not appearing "it is especially incumbent upon the Court
to satisfy itself that it is in possession of all the available facts" (Nuclear
Tests, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 263, para. 31 p. 468. para. 32). On the other
hand, the Court has to emphasize that the equality of the parties to the dispute
must remain the basic principle for the Court. The intention of Article 53 was
that in a case of non-appearance neither party should be placed at a
disadvantage; therefore the party which declines to appear cannot be permitted
to profit from its absence, since this would amount to placing the party
appearing at a disadvantage. The provisions of the Statute and Rules of Court
concerning the presentation of pleadings and evidence are designed to secure a
proper administration of justice, and a fair and equal opportunity for each
party to comment on its opponent's contentions. The treatment to be given by the
Court to communications or material emanating from the absent party must be
determined by the weight to be given to these different considerations, and is
not susceptible of rigid definition in the form of a precise general rule. The
vigilance which the Court can exercise when aided by the presence of both
parties to the proceedings has a counterpart in the special care it has to
devote to the proper administration of justice in a case in which only one party
is present.
[p. 320 D.O. Schwebel] ... considerations of burden of proof are
beside the point, because the real point is that, where objections are raised to
the appearing party's contentions, that party must convince the Court that those
objections are unfounded if the Court is to meet the standard which Article 53
imposes.
In my view, the correct interpretation of Article 53 is that it affords the
appearing State no advantage beyond that which it enjoys by reason of the
non-appearing State's absence. If, in a given case, such as the one before the
Court, the non-appearing party (or the Court or a judge) raise an affirmative
defence to the claim, the appearing party must demonstrate that the defence is
not good in order to prevail.