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III. | The International Court of Justice |
3. | THE PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE |
3.10. | Provisional Measures |
3.10.3. | Provisional Measures and Jurisdiction |
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Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria) Provisional Measures,
Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 13
[pp. 20-21] 28. Whereas the two Parties have each made a declaration
recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article
36, paragraph 2, of the Statute; whereas the declaration of Nigeria was
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 3 September 1965
and that of Cameroon on 3 March 1994; whereas neither of the two declarations
includes any reservation; and whereas Nigeria has made it clear in its
declaration that it was made on the sole condition of reciprocity;
29. Whereas Nigeria has raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of
the Court in the present case, and has claimed inter alia that there is
no substantive reciprocity in the recognition of the jurisdiction of the Court
by the Parties; and whereas in the course of the present proceedings its Agent
expressed the opinion that the Court does not have even "prima facie
jurisdiction over the substantive issues";
30. Whereas on a request for the indication of provisional measures the
Court need not, before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy
itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it may not
indicate them unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima
facie, to afford, a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded;
31. Whereas the Court, which has taken note of the opinion, expressed by the Agent of Nigeria with respect to its prima facie jurisdiction, is of the view that the preliminary objections raised by that State are not such as to exclude that jurisdiction; whereas the Court, in fact, considers that the declarations made by the Parties in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute constitute a prima facie basis upon which its jurisdiction in the present case might be founded;
[p. 21] 32. Whereas Nigeria also raised objections to the admissibility of the the claims of Cameroon, and whereas it contended inter alia that the Parties had a duty to settle all boundary questions pending between them by means of the existing bilateral machinery; and whereas during the present proceedings Nigeria contended that Cameroon's Application as amended on 6 June 1994 describes the dispute between the Parties as concerning the whole of the frontier, that no such dispute exists, and that consequently that Application "is not even prima facie admissible";
33. Whereas without ruling on the question whether, faced with a request for the indication of provisional measures, the Court must, before deciding whether, or not to indicate such measures, ensure that the Application of which it is seized is admissible prima facie, it considers that, in this case, the consolidated Application of Cameroon does not appear prima facie to be inadmissible in the light of the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria;
[p. 45 S.O. Ajibola] Perhaps it is premature to go too deeply into the issue of jurisdiction at this stage, other than to examine the objection put forward by Nigeria that there is, not even prima facie jurisdiction justifying the Court in the indication of provisional measures. In View of the serious doubts now cast on this matter by Nigeria together with its argument of the absence of substantial reciprocity based on a, lack of good, faith by Cameroon, which may need to be further developed and explained at the next stage of this case, I would rather be, inclined to take an attitude, of judicial caution and decline to indicate provisional measures as requested by Cameroon.