A principle of friendliness towards international law can mitigate the national bias of law appliers in the coordination of domestic law with international law that they need to perform. This is particularly important in times of populism, nationalism and a new authoritarianism. This contribution examines the legal theory and legal policy dimensions of the principle as well as some doctrinal aspects that hinge between theory and politics.
My claim in legal theory is that the global network of norms and the plurality of perspectives espoused by the various actors can only function if all the legal systems involved (especially the national legal systems) develop a principle of “friendliness” towards the other legal systems. My claim regarding legal policy is that changes in the political context have radically altered the background conditions of the principle of friendliness towards international law, and that it has thus acquired a new important symbolic function. In order to fulfil the legal policy goal and pay more than mere lip service, law appliers should utilise old and new doctrines as techniques de réglage. There by, loyalty to the international community can be actually lived. The community’s stability is in the long-term self-interest of each and every state.
