Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1996

Volker Röben

XVI. Internationale Organisationen

1. Vereinte Nationen

Die Bundesregierung nahm im Rahmen ihrer Mitgliedschaft im Sicherheitsrat zu den dort verhandelten Fragen Stellung. Die Beratungsgegenstände des Sicherheitsrates waren konkrete Lagen in bestimmten Staaten oder Regionen. Mit den im folgenden zu berichtenden Stellungnahmen begründete die Bundesregierung in der Regel ihre Haltung in der Abstimmung über einen Resolutionsentwurf. Sie nahm dabei zu zahlreichen völkerrechtlichen Fragen Stellung. Wegen des Sachzusammenhangs der Befassung des Sicherheitsrates mit einer Lage werden die Stellungnahmen im folgenden zusammenhängend und in weitgehenden Zitaten aus den Verbalprotokollen der Sitzungen berichtet.³²³

164. Zum Beratungsgegenstand der Lage in Kroatien führte die Bundesregierung aus:³²⁴ Der Entscheidung des Sicherheitsrates über den Entwurf der Resolution zu Ost-Slawonien komme große Bedeutung zu. Die Resolution habe mit der friedlichen Reintegration von Ost-Slawonien, Baranja und West Sirmium nach Kroatien ein klares Ziel.

"This is a national priority of the Government and the people of Croatia, which the German side fully understands and supports. We are ready to acknowledge that Croatia's patience has been tested severely over a long time in this regard. The events of Vukovar and the establishment of Serb Control over Eastern Slavonia, which took place in 1991 with the decisive assistance of the former Yugoslaw army, must not be forgotten. It is something that no country would have accepted. The full implementation of the Basic Agreement offers the best chance we have had in a long time to avoid further war. It is, in our view, also the best chance to begin a process that can and - we hope - will lead to a better future of peaceful co-existence of Serbs and Croats in the Republic of Croatia. This is why [Germany] fully supports the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation for the region of Eastern Slavonia, with both military and civilian components, under the name of UNTAS - United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. Like the Basic Agreement itself, this operation must be guided by two important principles: on the one hand, the gradual re-establishment of the sovereignty of Croatia with regard to Eastern Slavonia; and, on the other, the indispensable necessity to ensure full protection for, and guarantees for the rights of, the local Serb population."

Zur Lage in Liberia nahm sie wie folgt Stellung:³²⁵

"Germany is extremely concerned at the lack of progress in the implementation of the Abuja Peace Agreement. The parties in Nigeria have fallen several months behind schedule in meeting their obligations, a development which is starting to affect seriously the entire peace process in the country. ... In this context we would like to make it very clear that the cessation of hostilities between the warring factions and the restoration of security in Liberia is essential to any measures of reconstruction and development that the international community might consider to help Liberia and its people overcome the devastating consequences of the civil war. ... Germany would like to emphasize the important and useful role that ECOMOG has been playing in Liberia, and thank the troop-contributing countries for their commitment in Liberia. ... The work of ECOMOG in Liberia is an important example of a successful African peace-keeping mission in which African countries have assumed a great share of responsibility for the re-establishment of peace and stability in one of the countries of their continent, and thus for the stabilization of the region as a whole. Furthermore, the cooperation between ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) demonstrates that cooperation and a division of labour between the United Nations and regional organizations is a feasible model. In this context, Germany supports the initiatives by the Secretary-General to develop coordination and cooperation with regional organisations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African States can play an important role in conflict resolution in Africa. Germany therefore also welcomes and supports the continuing efforts of the OAU and the African states to strengthen their capacity with regard to preventive diplomacy, conflict management and peace-keeping."

Bei der erneuten Befassung mit dem Beratungsgegenstand der Lage in Liberia nahm sie wie folgt Stellung:³²⁶

"Germany voted in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 31 May 1996. We had already made our position clear on the occasion of the public debate last week. ...We welcome, however, the fact that the factions represented in the Council of State seem determined to adhere to the Abuja Agreement, and we urge them to exert the necessary control over their military forces. A wider deployment of ECOMOG throughout the country should be a necessary accompanying measure, and it will be an important stabilizing factor for the country as a whole. In this context, my country would like to emphasize the important and useful role which ECOMOG has been playing, and we would like to thank the troop-contributing countries."

Zur Lage in Angola legte die Bundesrepublik folgende Ansicht dar:³²⁷

"Germany calls on the Angolan Government and UNITA to adhere to the Lusaka Protocol and to the timetable agreed upon on 12 January 1996 by both parties regarding the implementation of their obligations. ... Also further efforts must be made to integrate UNITA contingents into the national army. UNITA personnel must also participate in the country's administration. ...Finally, I should like to express my country's concern about UNAVEM's financial situation. In his report, the Secretary-General points out that $ 26.4 million in assessed contributions to UNAVEM remained outstanding at the end of last year. This situation constitutes a serious threat to UNAVEM's ability to carry out its mandate, I shall not dwell on peace-keeping operations in general, which are compromised by the lack of funds resulting from unpaid contributions. It is of the utmost importance that all Member States pay their assessed contributions in full and on time."

Zur Lage in Angola begründete sie ihr Abstimmungsverhalten wie folgt:³²⁸

"Germany voted in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) for two months. ... By extending the mandate, the international community underlines its readiness to promote the peace process. However, both parties in Angola have to be reminded of the lack of progress since the last extension of UNAVEM's mandate has given rise to serious doubts as to the will for peace. ...We recognize the efforts made by the Angolan Government to fulfill its obligations arising under the Lusaka Protocol. ...At the same time, we appeal to UNITA to renew its efforts to meet its obligations as well. ...The German government attaches particular importance to the question of mine clearance. We very much deplore the fact that UNAVEM's efforts to free the country from that curse, which particularly hurts civilians, still encounters obstruction, especially by UNITA."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand Haiti führte die Bundesregierung aus:³²⁹

"We had strongly supported the first draft resolution, which was prepared by the friends of Haiti and which was in line with the report of the Secretary-General and the request of the Government of Haiti. We are therefore less happy with the final outcome of the informal consultations in the Council as was stated by other speakers, we know that more time is needed to help create a really stable situation in Haiti. Germany believes, however, that the improvements which have been achieved in Haiti could have been jeopardized by an immediate withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). That is why we voted for the resolution adopted today despite the misgivings I have expressed. In the four months to come, UNMIH will continue to contribute to the maintenance of a secure and stable environment for the rebuilding of the country and to the establishment of a well-trained Haitian National Police to which these functions will be transferred."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand der Lage in Burundi nahm sie wie folgt Stellung:³³⁰ Deutschland unterstützte die Erklärung, die Italien im Namen der EU abgegeben hatte. Ferner bekräftigte sie:

"Germany fully supports the initiatives taken by the Secretary-General, by the Organization of African Unity, by the European Union and by the facilitators to bring about the conditions necessary for a political dialogue in Burundi. ... Those who continue to encourage ethnic violence in Burundi or who refuse to enter into a comprehensive dialogue will have to face the sanctions of the international community. In this context, we support the call to cooperate in the identification and dismantling of radio stations which incite hatred and acts of violence in Burundi."

Bei erneuter Befassung des Sicherheitsrates mit dem Beratungsgegenstand Burundi legte die Bundesregierung ihre Ansicht in diesen Worten dar:³³¹

"We are concerned at the acts of violence. We are concerned at the incitement to ethnic hatred. We are concerned that the situation might escalate. We are concerned at the humanitarian situation. Burundi needs serious and comprehensive dialogue leading to a permanent political settlement and national reconciliation. This is not an easy task under the prevailing circumstances. But it is not impossible either. The signatories of the Convention of Government have agreed to a national debate. This should be the framework for the much needed dialogue. Dialogue will not be possible in a violent environment. Therefore, all parties, including and particularly those who hold extremist positions, are called upon to refrain from acts of violence. Furthermore, the dissemination in Burundi of propaganda which incites hatred must stop. The radio waves in Burundi should be used to promote reconciliation and dialogue, and to relay constructive information. ...What happens in Burundi will have repercussions beyond the country's borders and depending on what road it takes, may pose a threat to the stability of the whole region or reinforce it. Preparations for convening a Regional Conference for Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region should therefore be intensified. ... For the reasons stated, Germany strongly supports this draft resolution and will vote in favour of it."

Zur Lage in Ruanda vertrat die Bundesregierung folgende Ansicht:³³²

"The draft resolution³³³ is a response to the fact, that despite all the progress made, much remains to be done in Rwanda, and that the assistance of the international community continues to be needed in this regard. The maintenance of a United Nations office will allow the United Nations to support, in a coordinated manner, what the Government of Rwanda is doing to promote national reconciliation, strengthen the judicial system, facilitate the return of refugees and rehabilitate the country's infrastructure."

Bei erneuter Befassung des Sicherheitsrates mit der Lage Ruanda machte die Bundesregierung geltend:³³⁴

"We are very grateful to the International Commission of Inquiry for the intensive and thorough work it has carried out and for the report delivered to the Council. In view of the priority aim of achieving peace and stability in the Great Lakes region, it is of major importance for the whole international community to stop the uncontrolled flow of arms to the area. ... For this reason, we strongly support the suggestion that the countries mentioned in the report should do their utmost to contribute to investigating the sources of their nationals who may be involved in purchasing and supplying arms to the region. ... This is why we have voted for the resolution³³⁵ adopted today. ... Finally, let me express our hope that the Tunis Declaration of Heads of States of the Great Lakes region of 18 March 1996 will be implemented soon."

Zur Lage in Somalia legte die Bundesregierung ihre Position wie folgt dar:³³⁶

"Germany does not share the view that UNOSOM II was a failure. In many regions, a stabilization of the situation was achieved. Tens of thousands of people were saved from starvation. We admit, however, that UNOSOM II did not become the success we had wanted it to be. The reason is clear: Peace and stability in a country depend in the first place on the forces in that country. Without the cooperation of all factions in Somalia, UNOSOM II could not bring about the desired peaceful solution to the internal conflict. UNOSOM II had to be withdrawn. We again pay tribute to those men and women who served in that operation. We honour those peace-keepers who lost their lives in Somalia. The United Nations has not abandoned Somalia. Political efforts and humanitarian assistance continue. Our meeting today, which is open to all Member states, is proof of our ongoing commitment."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand Situation von Irak und Kuwait führte die Bundesregierung aus:³³⁷

"On 11 October 1991, the Council adopted resolution 715 (1991). ... Today, we will approve³³⁸ the mechanism and give it the binding force Chapter VII of the Charter provides for. Its aim is to prevent the misuse of items legally imported into Iraq for the illegal purposes of production or acquisition of banned weapons. This aim justifies the new obligations imposed on Iraq and other States. To reach this aim, a system of notifications will be established; notifications, both by Iraq and by States planning to supply dual use items to Iraq, will be required. These notifications will be complemented by the possibility of an inspection of those items at the end-user site. I am confident that the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency will provide the necessary advice and assistance with regard to the implementation of the mechanism. The mechanism will be complementary to the other elements of ongoing monitoring and verification. It is a regime not for international licensing, but for the transmission of information. It will therefore fulfil its purpose of effectively monitoring activities relevant to prohibited weapons while not impeding Iraq's legitimate right to import or export items for non-proscribed purposes. The mechanism will enter into force while the sanctions imposed on Iraq are still in force. It should be applied as soon as possible. The sanctions allow the import of humanitarian items to Iraq. ... As a matter of fact, implementation of the mechanism is a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions."

Zur Situation zwischen Irak und Kuwait legte die Bundesregierung ferner dar:³³⁹

"Iraq's claim that its sovereignty and independence are infringed upon by UNSCOM inspections are obviously not valid. Iraq has accepted Security Council resolution 687 (1991), including the role UNSCOM is given by that resolution. UNSCOM can only fulfil its task if its inspection rights are fully respected by Iraq and if it is allowed to work without obstruction, ... . The draft resolution³⁴⁰ we are to adopt today is the appropriate answer to the unacceptable actions taken by the Iraqi Government to prevent UNSCOM from carrying out no-notice inspections. It sends a clear signal that the Security Council will not tolerate attempts to undermine UNSCOM's inspection rights."

Zur Lage in Afghanistan nahm der Vertreter der Bundesregierung in dieser Weise Stellung:³⁴¹

"The situation on the ground in Afghanistan is frustrating. So far, all international peace efforts have been in vain. An end to all this bloodshed is not yet in sight. This conflict does not concern Afghanistan alone. It could easily develop into a threat to the peace and stability of the whole region. ...The international community has made a commitment to Afghanistan. This commitment is contained in the General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan adopted by consensus on 19 December 1995³⁴². What we are to do is, essentially, to put our consensus back to work, with the aim of ensuring this resolution's full implementation. The resolution is very clear both on the aims of international peace efforts in Afghanistan and on the ways the international community wants to pursue to achieve these aims."

Deutschland stelle einen der 4 "political officers".
Zur Lage in den besetzten Gebieten nahm die Bundesregierung wie folgt Stellung:³⁴³

"The situation in the Middle East had remarkably improved after Oslo and Madrid. Deeply rooted hostility affecting the whole Middle East region had given way to an effective peace-process. This process has already yielded results that would have been unimaginable not so long ago. Recent events remind us, however, that the peace-process is not yet all-inclusive, and that it continues to be threatened by terrorism. At the same time, it is obvious that lasting stability in the Palestinian territories requires the genuine support of the local population. It is only natural that they want to see concrete improvements as regards their own living conditions. Concrete successes in this regard will lead to ever greater dynamics for the peace process and will successfully discourage terrorism and extremism aimed at derailing what has been achieved with so many sacrifices and efforts over the past years. Terrorism has taken a particularly heavy toll on Israel. ... At the same time, we are concerned about reports of economic hardship in the Palestinian territories. ... My Government fully agrees with and actively contributed to the results of the summit meeting held in Sharm El Sheikh on 13 March 1996. ... In the light of this, we strongly welcome the efforts made by the Palestinian authorities to combat terrorism and to prevent the territory they control from being used for terrorist attacks against Israel. We also welcome Israeli decisions over the last few weeks to ease parts of the measures imposed on the Palestinian territories. ... We call upon all parties concerned to use maximum restraint and to stand against any escalation of violence. All provisions of international law must be respected, including common article 3 of the Geneva Convention."

Zur Lage in den besetzten Gebieten führte Bundesaußenminister Kinkel ferner aus:³⁴⁴

"The recent incidents have shocked the region and endangered the process of peace and autonomy, which is so vital to the region. This is a process without alternative, a process that must continue. Those on both sides who are in a position of political responsibility must remain level-headed at this time. ... A return to the negotiating table is indispensable now. ...The issue of Hebron will have to be solved, and of course - and here I refer back to the speech I made earlier this week to the General Assembly - a solution has to be found to the situation of the people sealed off in the Palestinian territories, because the people have to get the feeling that the peace agreement is paying off, that it is something from which they too benefit. Both sides must contribute to avoiding an escalation of the situation. And of course, each side must respect the religious feelings of the other, and must respect the holy sites. Here I warmly welcome the announcement that the tunnel is to be closed."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand Lage im Mittleren Osten nahm die Bundesregierung ebenfalls Stellung:³⁴⁵

"Like all other members of the European Union, we are also concerned about the security of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). ... We would like to express our sympathy for Israel when trying to protect its civilian population. We strongly welcome the fact that Israel, in spite of constant terrorist acts directed against it, remains committed to the peace process. At the same time, it is obvious that, like Israel, Lebanon is also entitled to territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence within its internationally recognized borders. This is clearly spelled out in Secrurity Council resolution 425 (1978). While self-defence is clearly legitimate, measures of self-defence can become illegal if they do not abide by the basic rule of law prescribing proportionality. This legal rule has been universally recognized at least since the Second World War. ... Measures of self-defence must not be directed against innocent civilians. That is laid down in article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which both Israel and Lebanon are parties. Any measure of self-defence must be proportionate not only in size but also in direction. Whereas all states, especially those in the region, are responsible for complying with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), the Lebanese Government is responsible for doing all it can to prevent its territory from being used for attacks against persons protected by the four Geneva Conventions. ... The most urgent step now is an end to the fighting. We appeal to all parties involved to refrain from further use of arms. The civilian population must be protected. Germany will continue to help with humanitarian assistance."

Bei der erneuten Behandlung des Beratungsgegenstands Lage im Mittleren Osten stellte die Bundesregierung ihre Sicht ebenfalls dar:³⁴⁶

"Today's shelling incident, in which more than 90 civilians were killed at a UNIFIL site, is particularly shocking. We want to express our sincere condolences to the families of the victims. ... International humanitarian law must be fully respected. The safety and security of civilians and other protected persons is of the highest priority, and must be ensured. There must be a political solution on the basis of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 425 (1978). We believe that such a political solution, in the framework of the peace process, will best be helped by a decision of the Council that addresses the principal problems and at the same time commands the widest support. That is why we voted for the draft resolution contained in document S/1996/304, and that is why, in consequence, we had to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/1996/292."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand des Briefes des Ständigen Vertreters von Äthiopien bei den Vereinten Nationen an den Präsidenten des Sicherheitsrates betreffend die Auslieferung der des Anschlags auf den ägyptischen Präsidenten in Addis Abeba am 26. Juni 1995 (S/1996/10)verdächtigten Personen nahm der deutsche Vertreter wie folgt Stellung:³⁴⁷

"Over the past six weeks, the Security Council has been seized with the serious matter of the attempted assassination of the President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, on 26 June last year during the Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. My Government has strongly condemned this terrorist act. It fully supports any measure to apprehend and bring to justice those who are responsible for the crime. As a result of its investigation, the Government of Ethiopia has sought the extradition of three suspects by the Government of Sudan. Having sought to settle the problem first at the bilateral and then at the regional levels, the Government of Ethiopia finally turned to the Security Council for support. The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, in its statement of 19 December 1995, expressed very clearly its conclusion that the Government of Sudan had not cooperated sufficiently in this matter. As we have seen in our discussion, this impression is widely shared by members of the Security Council. We therefore listened with great interest to the statement that has just been read out by the representative of Sudan, and we welcome his remarks regarding the cooperative attitude of his Government. We shall attentatively monitor the actions that are to implement the promises made. The action taken by the OAU, and today by the United Nations Security Council, is a reaction to a terrorist attack that is viewed not only by Ethiopia and the Organization of African Unity, but by many other Governments, including that of Germany, as an attempt to disturb peace and security in the region. This criminal act must not remain unpunished. The Council's action is complementary to the work and initiatives already undertaken by the OAU in this respect. The Council fully supports the role of the regional organization in this matter. In the text of the draft resolution before us today, the Council has therefore made numerous references to the actions and decisions of the OAU - in particular, by explicitly mentioning in operative paragraph 4 the requests submitted by the OAU to the Government of Sudan. This is a position that has been advocated by Germany throughout our consultation. We are confident that the intention of this draft resolution is quite clear to all the parties concerned. Its purpose is to bring to justice those responsible for a criminal act which flagrantly violated national and international law and could have had most serious effects for the stability of the entire region. We therefore appeal to the Government of Sudan to fully comply with this resolution."

Zur Lage in Liberia führte die Bundesregierung aus:³⁴⁸

"The present situation in Liberia is a matter of deep concern to all of us. ... The responsibility for disrupting the peace process lies solely with the leaders of the various militias, who have shown no regard for the Liberian people's quest for survival - let alone their well-being - or for the universally accepted principles of international humanitarian law and human rights. ... We strongly urge the faction leaders to put an immediate end to the fighting and to comply with the demands put forward in the Mechanism for Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement issued by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Committee of Nine on Liberia on 8 May, which also received unaminous support from the members of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) in its second meeting on 24 May 1996 in New York."

Zur Lage in Mazedonien (FYRM) bekräftigte die Bundesregierung:³⁴⁹

"Since its first days we have consistently supported the United Nations peace-keeping mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. ... We also believe that the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), along with its predecessor mission, is one of the success stories of the United Nations. So when we began to put together the first elements for a new draft resolution³⁵⁰ on UNPREDEP, it was our wish to contribute, as a member of the Security Council, to the continuation of this peace-keeping operation, which is not big in size and cost, but big in terms of usefulness, success and achievement. Today the Council will decide on the question of a further extension of the mandate of UNPREDEP. Let me sum up our own view with the following brief remarks. First, we have been told by the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that it believes it in the best interest of the Macedonian people for the presence of UNPREDEP to be continued without substantial changes, and this information has been confirmed today by the representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In addition, also all the troop-contributing countries ... have made it known that it is their considered common view that the mandate of UNPREDEP should be reaffirmed for another regular extension of six months. We believe that the considered common opinion of the host country and of the troop-contributing countries is in itself a very important element because, obviously, it is in their own interest to continuously assess the security situation in the area in the most careful manner. ... Germany will be among the first to welcome a situation in which peace and stability have been secured in the region in such a manner that the UNPREDEP can be sent home with its mission fully accomplished. But unfortunately, we have not yet reached this point."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand Lage in Tadjikistan führte die Bundesregierung aus:³⁵¹

"Germany supports the draft resolution³⁵² which provides for an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tadjikistan (UNMOT) for another six months. ...If UNMOT is effectively to fulfil its mandate, all restrictions on its freedom of movement must be lifted, especially by the Government of Tadjikistan."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand Lage in Haiti nahm die Bundesregierung wie folgt Stellung:³⁵³

"The developments in Haiti since the return of President Aristide in 1994 and the results achieved by United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) so far are encouraging. ... The successful role of UNMIH in laying the foundations for a new start towards a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Haiti is beyond doubt. I am glad to say that UNMIH will probably be recognized as one more of the success stories of the United Nations. ... The new United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) will certainly help stabilize, in particular, security and ordre public - indispensable requirements for a normal life in Haiti."

Zur Lage in Abkhazien (Georgien) gab die Bundesregierung foglende Stellungnahme ab:³⁵⁴

"The reason for this impasse in the political process lies in the uncompromising attitude of the Abkhaz leadership, which insists on separate statehood for Abkhazia. As early as several months ago, the Georgian government made a substantial, but so far unsuccesful offer to the Abkhaz side, amounting to the creation of a federal state with far-reaching autonomy for Abkhazia. It is urgent now that the Abkhaz leadership learn to accept that any solution of the conflict must be based on the principles of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia. ... Germany sees the rationale of UNOMIG and of German contribution to it as support for an ongoing political process leading to a durable political solution. I would like to stress a second major point. My Government continues to be very concerned by the deteriorated security situation which has brought patrolling by UNOMIG virtually to an end. We expect the parties to take forceful measures against the laying of mines, which is a danger not only to UNOMIG personnel and the CIS peace-keeping forces, but also, and most notably, to the local population, as well as to refugees."

Zum Beratungsgegenstand Abschuß von zwei Zivilflugzeugen am 24. Februar 1996 machte die Bundesregierung folgende Erklärung:³⁵⁵

"Germany will vote in favour of the draft resolution³⁵⁶ on the communication which has been presented at the request of this Council by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on the incident which occurred on 24 February 1996 and which led to the shooting down of two United States-based unarmed civilian aircrafts by the Cuban Air Force. ...The main item at stake is the basic rule that States must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight. Let me add, in the light of what has been explained at some length by the representative of Cuba, that shooting down unarmed civilian aircrafts - regardless of where this is done: whether it is done over territorial waters or over the high seas - is a clear breach of international law - if not codified and ratified, then of customary international law - which must not be tolerated."

165. Zum Bericht des Sicherheitsrates an die Generalversammlung insbesondere zur Reform der VN und des Sicherheitsrates legte Botschafter Eitel die Ansicht der Bundesregierung dar:³⁵⁷

"We welcome the presentation of the Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. It reflects the vast agenda the Council had to deal with between June 1995 and June 1996. As the President of the Security Council, Ambassador Wisnumurti, put it, the report is a guide to the previous activities of the Council. As a guide, it does not replace substance. It serves rather as an indicator of direction and as a reference. From a German perspective, three aspects deserve particular mention in this context: 1. the format of the report, 2. transparency and related measures, 3. the overall reform context. 1. The format of the Report - Any comment on the Security Council report would be incomplete without a reference to the widespread dissatisfaction in the General Assembly regarding its format. My delegation shares this dissatisfaction. In our opinion, future reports could and ought to be both more concise and more substantial. As to the first of these two criteria, the volume of this year's report has been reduced by 10% compared to the previous one. However, the report still has more than 300 pages. This reflects the enormous work load of the Council. But it may also leave some leeway to make it even shorter and more precise. The wording of many parts of the report is identical with the edition of last year. In our view, it should be possible to replace these formal and repetitive parts by more substance and analysis, for instance in the introduction of the report. Thus the General Assembly and its President would be helped in assessing and debating the report. This aspect is rightly mentioned in the report of the Open-ended High-level Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations System (Doc. A/50/24). Proposals to achieve these goals are on the table in the Informal Working Group of the Council concerning the Council's Documentation, but views diverge on how to proceed. My delegation is one of those who have been and will continue to be actively interested in the matter. A careful reduction of the matters of which the Security Council is seized may also contribute to a shorter and more precise report. After extensive consideration in the Informal Working Group of the Security Council concerning the Council's documentation and other procedural questions, the Security Council has approved, during the German Presidency, the final version of a mechanism that provides for a yearly deletion of topics that have not been considered by the Council for five years. At the same time it allows for all Member States to have any item retained by way of a simple notification to the Secretary-General. This last element enhances not only the transparency of the Council's work but also the co-operation between the Council and all Member States of the United Nations. - 2. Transparency and related measures - During its two presidencies in June 1995 and August 1996, Germany has tried to ensure an extensive, substantial briefing of non-members by the President of the Council on a daily basis, implementing thereby previous measures of the Council. It has successfully asked for more open meetings of the Council, thus opening the Council to the general membership, including observer delegations. The improvement of transparency is also one of Germany's central concerns with regard to the Sanctions Committees. In particular our chairmanship in the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait gave us the possibility to contribute in this matter. Among the different measures adopted I will only mention the new practice of comprehensive briefings by the Chairman to non-members and to the press immediately after each Committee meeting. Judging from the reactions we have received this has been a welcome help for non-members to better understand the work of the Committee. But we do not see these measures as the end of our efforts. They are good steps in the right direction and must be continued. Enhanced transparency was also at stake when the question of coordination between the Security Council and troop contributing countries in peacekeeping operations was discussed over several months. Germany actively supported and contributed to the efforts initiated by Argentina and New Zealand aiming at an improvement of the then existing regime. Without a doubt, the arrangements contained in the Presidential statement of 28 March 1996 are an important step ahead. Their implementation will, however, have to be kept under review, and we stand ready to come back to the issue if need be. - 3. The overall reform context Chapter 23 of the report contains the statement of the President of the Security Council on 26 September 1995 to commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. She stated: 'The Security Council recognizes that the challenges facing the international community demand a resolute response, based on the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The members of the Security Council consider that the United Nations must be strengthened and revitalized to help meet these challenges. They take note of the conclusions of the Working Group of the General Assembly on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council, inter alia, that the Council should be expanded and its working methods should continue to be reviewed'³⁵⁸. Improving the transparency of the Council and improving its composition and size are two sides of the same coin. Both elements are connected. They are not hostage to each other, but sisters. These are not the only connected elements. Another important aspect is the relationship between the Security Council and other organs. The most prominent among them is the General Assembly. The reform of the General Assembly, the only organ in which all Member States are equally represented, has been one of the main foci of discussion of the agenda item 'Strengthening of the United Nations System', consideration of which we just concluded this morning. A more transparent Security Council would lead to a stronger General Assembly. Further measures should be taken to strengthen the latter even more. However, all measures must be balanced and take place in the context of a comprehensive approach that includes both bodies. The documents put forward by the Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations System give a strong indication of these aspects. Another example in this context is the Czech proposal made in the Working Group on the reform of the Security Council. A broader and teleological interpretation of Article 31 of the UN Charter could lead to more frequent invitations of non-members to participate in the discussions of the Council, whenever the latter considers that the interests of a non-member are specially affected. ... I am confident that the capacity and effectiveness of the United Nations can be further strengthened, the representative character of their organs enhanced and their working efficiency and transparency improved. Many of the constructive suggestions made by Member States will contribute to this end. They are an integral part of the reform package aimed at making the Council more transparent, credible and more capable of maintaining peace and security. With the necessary political will and determination, this goal can be reached without undue delay."

Botschafter Eitel gab ferner folgende Erklärung ab:³⁵⁹

"Mr. President, as President of the General Assembly, you will also preside over the deliberations in the Open-ended Working Group on the question of equitable representation on and an increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council during the 51^st session. ... For almost four years the UN reform train has been waiting in the United Nations Central Station on the East River to be repaired and overhauled. Passengers outside in United Nations Country are waiting for the train to depart and arrive at destinations called Peace and Security, Development, Human Rights and Environmental Protection. They are waiting in places which suffer from internal conflicts, places which are still marked by poverty or lack of democracy and human rights, and in places which are threatened by destruction of or serious damage to their environment. The United Nations train is the only train in the world which can reach these places. The train needs competent staff as well as a strong engine in which Member States have confidence. We therefore must replace the old steam locomotive made in 1945 by an up-to-date model engine that runs forward and is at the same time easily controlled and adapted to the needs of the passengers, waiting at the various stations. ... Where do we stand today in our discussion and, second, where do we go from here? With regard to my first question, in the view of Germany and many other countries, we are ready for concrete negotiations on the reform of the Security Council. The latest report of the Working Group of 13 September 1996³⁶⁰ includes all elements necessary for a reform package which are the following: a) The first element is more transparency in the working methods of the Security Council, in particular better information of non-members of the Security Council, consultations with present and potential troop-contributing countries and the participation of non-members of the Council in its discussions. During its presidency of the Security Council in July 1996, Germany has held extensive daily briefings and several open formal meetings of the Security Council allowing a broad flow of information between members and non-members of the Security Council. There have also been statements of an observer country and an organisation with observer status in an open public debate of the Security Council. As President of one of the Sanctions Committees, I have briefed on its work during the whole year. b) The second element is enlargement in both categories of membership, permanent as well as non-permanent. During the last General Debate many Member States referred to Germany as a possible new permanent member. We are very grateful for this support. Germany continues to stress that a reform should also provide for permanent membership for the South, e. g. three seats for Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Together with new non-permanent seats, the overall size of a future Security Council should be between 23 and 26, preferably 24. The recent discussions have focussed on how to determine those who should have access to the three new permanent seats for the South. In this context, we have noticed that quite a number of Member States who have expressed support for the creation of new permanent seats have also mentioned the Italian proposal. This may be understood as a desire to combine the principles of permanent regional representation and rotation, leading to permanent regional rotating seats as a possible solution to the problem of selecting permanent members from the three regions I mentioned. c) As a third element the decision-making procedures will have to be adapted to the new size and composition of an enlarged and reformed Security Council. The report of the Working Group includes several proposals to this effect which deserve our interest and attention. The German position regarding the so-called 'action threshold'; and the veto are well known. It is evident, however, that the scope and configuration of these decision-making procedures are depending on the political role of the new Security Council. Thus, progress in this area will not only require creative thinking and close negotiation but will also be possible only after the other reform aspects have been resolved. d) The fourth and last element is a Periodic Review. Several countries have proposed to re-examine or to periodically review the new composition of the Security Council as an element of an overall agreement. Germany, in this context, has presented a proposal for a periodic review clause (PERECLA, see Doc. A/50/47, Annex XIV), the details of which are known to participants. The general purpose of this proposal is twofold: To guarantee that neither the increase in membership nor the new composition of the Security Council is irreversible and to thus facilitate the decision for reform now. ... This is where we stand today. Several reform proposals are on the table. Where do we go from here? First: We must prepare a Security Council reform package based on the now existing proposals. After excluding the proposals that have been proven to be too unrealistic or that have provoked only obvious silence on the part of the Membership, the remaining proposals should merge into a reform package on which a general agreement of the Membership can be reached. Second: Progress will only be possible by ways of concrete political negotiation. While the Working Group will continue its work, the membership must remain mindful of the reform mandate and enter into concrete negotiations that lead to decisions. These decisions will have to be taken according to the provisions and requirements for amendments stipulated by the Charter. All of us will work for the largest possible majority, but it would be unrealistic to expect decisions on the basis of a 100% consensus. Third: We must not forget other reform areas. The financial situation of the United Nations, the Agenda for Development, the Agenda for Peace and the strengthening of the system of the United Nations as a whole are equally in the center of ongoing reform efforts. Germany shares the view of other countries that the lack of tangible progress with regard to the reform of the Security Council 'has an adverse effect on the negotiations on other aspects of the Organization's future activities'³⁶¹. Fourth: The time to act is now. Let me quote the outgoing President of the General Assembly and previous Chairman of the Working Group, Professor Diego Freitas do Amaral: 'The Member States ... must now deliver ... . The issues cannot just be endlessly debated. There must be action. And there must be action soon.' ... The General Assembly, with its principle of 'one State, one vote' will have the final word on the composition, transparency and effectiveness of the United Nations train into the 21^st century, on its destinations and on its schedule. The passengers have been waiting long enough."

Ferner nahm Botschafter Eitel zu dieser Frage in der Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council at the United Nations wie folgt Stellung:³⁶²

"Mr. Chairman, I would like to add some remarks to yesterday's discussions, which in my view were remarkably frank and useful. To my feeling, they have shown three things: 1) If you look closer to semi-permanent or frequent rotation models, they are less promising than at a first glance, 2) They offer neither to the regions nor to smaller countries accountable advantages, 3) They let basic questions unanswered. As our discussion developed over the last days from frozen cakes to more philosophical items like Harakiri and the theology of seat categories, I would like to come back today to the different models of frequent rotation seats which we have before us. My delegation firmly believes that this new category of special seats does not solve our problem. As far as the word "shareholder" is concerned, I don't understand the excitement about it. It describes exactly what is the gist of the creation of the new category of rotating or semi-permanent seats: As sovereign a member country may be, it would not have a seat of its own; it would have to share a seat. And that is what, mustering all my knowledge of the English language, I shall continue to call "shareholding". The Italian and the Turkish model do not differ very much in substance. I don't want to repeat my general remarks of yesterday, but I could sum up what are in my view the basic defaults of these special seats as follows: - they exclude additional permanent seats, a feature which we and many others feel important - would create new privileges (24-30 seat sharing countries) - no substantial advantages for remaining 150 Member States; some Member States speak even of "marginalisation" of smaller states - no convincing criteria for drawing the line between 30 privileged and 150 regular members - A lot of unanswered questions linked with financial contributions and elections. The Turkish proposal to increase the number of members occupying special seats to 40 would make it even more difficult to justify their privileges compared to the remaining "ordinary" Member States. Let me mention in this context, that one delegation has submitted yesterday a tentative list of objective criteria which could be applied to semi-permanent seat-candidates. This list seems to be carefully elaborated and the intent deserves applause. However, it shows very clearly, how extremely difficult it would be to define which country would be included and who would not be. I do not see how this difficulty could ever be overcome. Coming back to the Turkish idea of introducing new regional groups, this idea seems to be an interesting one, but it would certainly lead to new problems of distributing seats and balancing regional interests. An analysis of the Mexican proposal shows, that this model does not change the number of permanent members. In this respect, it misses the chance - as do the Italian and Turkish proposals - to increase the small number of permanent members and to adapt it to today's realities and a better representation of the regions. - The proposal reflects better the weight and standing of my country than other seat-sharing models. It is difficult to see, however, why a permanent seat for Germany is refused, but a seat every two years would be acceptable. - An advantage of the Mexican proposal would be that it avoids to create a completely new category of 20-40 rotating Member States at the expense of the remaining smaller countries. - However, the rotation between an Asian and a Western European Country is not coherent with the overall system of geographical distribution of seats in the SC. - The proposal does not seem to be fair to Eastern European Countries, which deserve 2 non-permanent seats, and should not be obliged to share one of their seats with another regional group. - An increase of 5 new seats does not seem to be enough to reflect the new realities and the increase in the membership since the last increase in 1963. As to the model proposed by Belize, our main observations are: - The proposal offers an interesting, rather unorthodox approach. The proposal in the Compendium has been amended by the proposal suggested by Belize in the last Meeting of the Working Group on February 1, 1996. The main disadvantage of both proposals is probably their often technical and sometimes maybe unrealistic approach. - It does not seem appropriate to speak of permanent or 'indefinite' members, if these are only elected for a term of five years. - The overall number of 33 seats is likely to harm the efficiency of the work of the SC. Given the character of the UN as an intergovernmental body, SC seats should not be given to agencies but only to states. - The model of Belize foresees permanent membership for countries which qualify on the basis of their contribution to the budget of the UN. This seems to be a realistic approach which should be seriously taken into account when discussing an increase of the traditional category of permanent seats in other proposals. - The idea of linking the veto of a permanent member with the veto of a non-permanent member also deserves further consideration. In the long run, the veto, if maintained, must be qualified and newly defined in its scope. An analysis of the model of the Nordic countries shows a lot of positive ideas, such as balanced and appropriate increase in permanent membership. - The ratio between non-permanent and permanent seats is fair. - The idea of regions establishing their own regional seat system is a very interesting one. ... Let me conclude with a remark on the new realities, which, together with the anniversary, are the compelling reasons for our discussion: Since the last reform of the Security Council in 1963 some 70 countries joined. Their interests could not have been taken into consideration when the reform was decided upon. They today make up more than a third of the membership. And, let me remind you, it is as one of those 70 new members that are now asking for their role in the institution, that Germany is seeking her role, responsibilities and aspirations. ..."

Botschafter Eitel ergänzte seine vorzitierten Ausführungen vor der Arbeitsgruppe in einer weiteren Sitzung wie folgt:³⁶³

"Mr. Chairman, on several occasions, Germany has pronounced itself on the principles governing the possible expansion of non-permanent membership. Let me recall some of these principles today: First: An increase in the membership of the Security Council has to take place in both categories, permanent and non-permanent membership. Both increases are firmly inter-related. If we were to rule out one of both increases, the reform would miss its comprehensiveness and main objectives. We have tried to explain this in depth in our statement of 23 April 1996. Discussions during the last weeks and months have demonstrated that proposals which insist categorically on an increase in only one category, have found interest by many - including my own country -, but not support by more than roughly three percent of the whole membership. I call on these delegations to reconsider their categoric positions and join the broad and comprehensive approach of the majority. Second: The increase in the non-permanent category is essential, as it reflects particularly the increase in the general membership which has occured since 1965. It will guarantee an improved chance for all countries to be represented better and more often on the Security Council. This implies improved chances for smaller and medium-sized countries, too. Third: This increase in the non-permanent category must respect the principle of equitable geographical distribution as laid down in Art. 23 I of the Charter. It must be safeguarded that all world regions are equitably represented in the Council. Fourth: Increase in either one of both categories must not endanger the effectiveness of the work of the Council, but enhance it. The Council works and deliberates in a way that often requires immediate decisions. If we want a modern and strong Council, we must bear this in mind. The ratio between non-permanent and permanent members should be similar to the ratio existing when the United Nations were created. The ratio, for which no rigid conditions exist, depends on the increase to take place in both categories. As we have shown in our statement of 23 April 1996, the new Council as proposed by us would have a ratio between non-permanent and permanent members of 1.4 : 1 (overall-size 24 members) or 1.5 : 1 (overall-size 25 members). The ratio in 1945 was 1.2 : 1 (overall-size 11 members). ... The criteria for new non-permanent members are laid down in the Charter. The General Assembly elects non-permanent members with special regard in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution (Art. 23 I). The described criteria which seem to have worked well in the past should be maintained. The new overall-size of the Council should be in the low mid-twenties. As we have stated on numerous occasions, it is a must that the South gets permanent membership. Germany supports permanent membership for Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, three seats altogether. At the same time, we believe Japan and Germany eligible for permanent membership. The number of new non-permanent seats should be four, one each for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and for Eastern Europe. We feel due consideration should be given to the question of creating an additional (fifth) non-permanent seat. Together with five new permanent seats, it would bring the overall size of the new Council to 24 or 25 members, depending on an additional 5^th seat. This number seems to us in line with the principles governing the possible expansion of non-permanent membership. Australia, in its thorough statement of 27 March 1996, to this Working Group, has shown that this would lead to 7 representatives from African and Asian states (+2), 2 from Eastern European countries (+1), 3 from Latin American and Caribbean states (+1) and 3 from Western European or other states (+1) if the 5^th seat would go to WEOG. 14 (15) non-permanent members would, as Australia has shown, re-establish the ratio of representation of the general membership in the Council as it existed before the strong increase in the general membership since 1965. ..., the modalities for the selection of new non-permanent members are contained in the Charter. They are elected by the General Assembly (Art. 23 I). These Charter provisions seem to be up to date and valid. There is no need to change them. Applying them to the new seats guarantees the same - henceforth even improved - access to non-permanent membership for all members. ... Special global rotational arrangements are in our belief no way of reforming the Council. Particularly, if they are linked with a categoric exclusion of an increase in the regular categories of permanent and non-permanent membership. We have tried to demonstrate in extenso the disadvantages of such exclusive models of special seats for a number of 30 or more member states in our statements of 28 and 29 February 1996: - Special seats for some 30 or more countries simply institutionalize the advantages larger countries had in the past, when they were competing for non-permanent membership. - The chances of the remaining 160 'normal' member states for an 'ordinary' non-permanent seat do only improve insignificantly, if at all. - Turning ordinary non-permanent members into holders of third class seats does not improve but deteriorate the balance within the Council. - It seems to be impossible to think of just and fair criteria to determine in advance who is allowed access to a special seat and who is not. - The many questions which have been asked in this Working Group with regard to the financial contributions of these new special seats to the costs of peacekeeping operations remain unanswered. - The same is true with regard to the difficult questions regarding the modalities of the election of those new special seats or semi-permanent members. They have not been answered. These considerations are only the most obvious problems of exclusive special seats for some 20, 30 or 40 members. There are more problems. We have followed the debate during the last months carefully in this respect. To our understanding, there has been a lot of interest, a lot of critical questions - especially from smaller member states which allegedly were to benefit from these models -, but only little and certainly not a growing support for them among member states. This model is apparently not an alternative to an increase in both the existing categories of membership, non-permanent and permanent. ... Art. 23 II of the Charter foresees a term of office of two years for new non-permanent members. This term seems to us appropriate. Art. 23 II also states that a retiring non-permanent member should not be eligible for immediate re-election. In this regard, Germany had in an earlier statement in 1994 considered the possibility to remove the ban to re-elect new non-permanent members in order to give a fuller range of options to the regions. But we have noted the reservations of many member states with regard to the removal of the ban of re-election. With regard to this question, we therefore are ready to follow the view of the majority."

Die Bundesregierung gab zu diesem Fragenkomplex noch weitere Stellungnahmen ab.³⁶⁴
Die Vertretung der Bundesrepublik brachte ferner ein Arbeitspapier zur sog. Periodic Review Clause ein.³⁶⁵

"The mandate of the Open-ended Working Group on the reform of the Security Council is defined in GA-Res. 48/26 of 3 December 1993 as follows: 'To consider all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council.' In its considerations, the resolution recognizes, inter alia, 'the need to review the membership of the Security Council and related matters in view of the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations.' Based on this mandate, reform efforts are aimed at achieving a comprehensive and genuine reform, embracing at the same time so-called Cluster II ('other matters related to the Security Council') and Cluster I ('increase in the membership of the Security Council') issues. In Germany's view, the latter implies an increase in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership. Any other result would remain partial. It would ignore the new realities and changes in international relations as mentioned in Res. 48/26. Submissions in Doc. A/49/965 of 18 September 1995 indicate that only a small minority of states so far wishes to exclude an increase in the category of permanent membership. In the same Doc. A/49/965, several countries have proposed to re-examine or to review periodically the new composition of the Security Council as an element of an overall-agreement (Nordic countries, Movement of non-aligned countries). Germany shares their view and has stated this on several occasions. In Germany's view, a periodic review clause (PERECLA) will represent an essential element for reaching general agreement on a comprehensive reform package: Benefits 1. PERECLA will guarantee that an increase in both membership categories is not irreversible. All new permanent and non-permanent seats would be subject to re-examination after a certain period. As far as new permanent members are concerned, their status will be permanent but not eternal. 2. New permanent members will become accountable to the general membership. Their performance and actions will be taken into account at the moment of the review. Any new permanent member could be replaced. 3. Countries whose aspirations have not been taken into consideration for a seat in the Security Council keep their chance to improve their status. They may demonstrate their qualification for a better status, including the possibility of permanent membership, at the moment of the review of the Council's composition. 4. A periodic review will allow the membership to re-examine the composition of the Council against the background of possible new political and economic realities. This flexibility would meet better the needs of a political decision of this kind than any 'objective' criteria, be they based on the size of population, financial contributions or military troop contributions. 5. Altogether, PERECLA would allow a far-reaching, genuine reform while maintaining the possibility of adapting the composition of the Security Council in the future to new and changing realities. - Terms of reference. Field of application - 6. A review should address all aspects of a reform package. The elements of a comprehensive reform package are closely inter-linked. It would therefore be difficult to exclude any of them from a periodic review. This refers to all elements contained in Cluster I and II which will become part of the package. 7. PERECLA would not restrict rights and obligations held by the existing five permanent members. 8. New permanent members would not be entitled to use a possible veto right regarding the review results. 9. The review would take place after 15 years. 15 years is the average of existing proposals, which have mentioned periods of 10, 12, 15, 20 or 10-20 years. A period of 15 years is less than half of the time that has gone by since the last change in the composition of the Security Council (1965-1996). 15 years would be a foreseeable and at the same time stabilizing time period in regard to any new composition of the Council. The period would start after the entry into force of the changes agreed upon in the comprehensive reform package. 10. The review would be compulsory and be automatically put on the agenda of the General Assembly. An eventual new composition of the Council would have to be decided within two years, i.e. at the latest at the end of the following General Assembly. - Possible reading - 11. An appropriate place for PERECLA would be Art. 23 (4, 5 new) of the Charter. Art. 23 would read as follows: Art. 23 (1) -to be adapted- (2) -to be adapted- (3) Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative. (4) New permanent members who are not the original five permanent members are subject to a periodic review in accordance with Art. 108. The review process is compulsory and will take place after 15 years. Ratification of the review result does not necessarily require ratification by the new permanent members. (5) Other changes regarding composition and working methods of the Security Council than those mentioned in paragraph 4 are subject to the same periodic review. 12. This reading is a preliminary proposal. The final wording is subject to further discussion. 13. In the same context, other articles of the Charter may also need to be amended. Furthermore, details of the review process could be included in a resolution of the General Assembly."

166. Bundesaußenminister Kinkel sprach sich vor der Vollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen dafür aus, die Reform des Sicherheitsrats nach dreijähriger Diskussion nun "anzupacken". Der Zeitpunkt, an dem die Mitgliedstaaten entscheiden müßten, rücke näher. Es sei an der Zeit, die "vorliegenden Elemente zusammenzuführen" sagte Kinkel, ohne eine deutsche Mitgliedschaft im Sicherheitsrat noch einmal direkt zu fordern. Vielmehr äußerte er seine Freude darüber, daß inzwischen eine große Zahl von Mitgliedstaaten für einen ständigen Sitz Deutschlands eintrete.³⁶⁶

    167. In ihrer Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage zur Finanzkrise der VN und Haltung der Bundesregierung differenzierte die Bundesregierung: Der derzeitigen Finanzkrise der VN lägen zwei Komponenten zugrunde: Ein Liquiditätsengpaß und ein reformbedürftiges Beitragssystem. Das Prinzip des nominalen Nullwachstums sei nicht ursächlich für den Liquiditätsengpaß. Er sei ausgelöst durch die Beitragsschulden von Mitgliedstaaten bei den VN. Für die Erfüllung der VN von den Mitgliedstaaten übertragenen Aufgaben sei die Finanzausstattung ein entscheidendes Kriterium. Es führe daher kein Weg an der vollständigen und unkonditionierten Honorierung der Verpflichtungen der Mitgliedstaaten gegenüber den VN vorbei. Darüber hinaus gelte es auch, die Reform des Beitragssystems in Angriff zu nehmen. Die von der 49. Generalversammlung der VN auf maßgebliche Initiative der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als seinerzeitiger Präsidentschaft der EU eingesetzte hochrangige offene Arbeitsgruppe zur Finanzreform der VN beschäftige sich seit Anfang des Jahres 1995 mit der Reform der Beitragsskalen der VN mit dem Ziel, diese transparenter, gerechter und einfacher zu gestalten sowie mit der Ausarbeitung eines Anreiz- und Abschreckungssystems zur Erreichung pünktlicher und vollständiger Beitragszahlungen der VN-Mitgliedstaaten. In dieser Arbeitsgruppe arbeitet die Bundesrepublik Deutschland aktiv und engagiert mit. Der vom Untergeneralsekretär für Verwaltung und Management eingesetzte Wirtschaftlichkeitsrat, der mit der Ermittlung von Einsparungs- und Rationalisierungsmöglichkeiten im VN-Sekretariat betraut sei, sei vom Auswärtigen Amt durch eine einmalige freiwillige Zuwendung von 10.000 US $ gefördert worden. Die Bundesrepublik sei im Kreise der VN-Mitgliedstaaten und im VN-Sekretariat als zuverlässiger Zahler anerkannt. Darauf habe der Generalsekretär der VN, Boutros Boutros Ghali, bei seinem Deutschlandbesuch im Juni 1996 ausdrücklich hingewiesen. Die Bundesregierung habe sich in Gesprächen mit Vertretern der USA auf allen Ebenen (auch mit Mitgliedern des US-Kongresses) wiederholt und mit Nachdruck für eine bedingungslose und zügige Begleichung von deren Rückständen eingesetzt. Der VN-Generalsekretär vermochte durch Rationalisierung und Umschichtung sowie eine Steigerung der Effizienz einen Haushaltsvorschlag für das reguläre Budget für 1996/97 mit realem Rückgang vorzulegen. Die Bundesregierung sah keine Veranlassung, diesem Vorschlag ihre Zustimmung zu versagen. Hinsichtlich der freiwilligen Beitragsleistungen an UNDP ab 1996, das nach Angaben des UNDP-Administrators Speth wesentlich höhere Beiträge benötige, stellte die Bundesregierung fest, ihre Planung für die Jahre 1997 bis 2000 sehe nominal konstante Beiträge zur UNDP vor. Bei der Planung der Beiträge zur UNDP berücksichtige die Bundesregierung die Funktion UNDPs, die Wirksamkeit seiner Arbeit sowie die Situation des Bundeshaushaltes. Die Bundesregierung halte den Anteil der Leistungen an multilaterale Einrichtungen an der deutschen öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe von ca. 30 % - einschließlich der Beiträge an die Europäische Union - für einen angemessenen Orientierungsrahmen. Längerfristige Finanzierungszusagen könnten die langfristige Programm- und Projektplanung von UNDP auf eine verläßlichere Grundlage stellen. Damit ein solches System wirksam würde, müßte allerdings die große Mehrheit der Geber daran teilnehmen. Dies zeichnete sich derzeit nicht ab.
    Zu dem Vorschlag des Generalsekretärs der VN Boutros Ghali³⁶⁷ für eine Sondersitzung der Generalversammlung zur Bewältigung der Finanzkrise stellte die Bundesregierung fest, eine solche Sondersitzung könne nur erfolgreich sein, wenn ein konsensfähiges Grundkonzept zur Lösung der Finanzkrise vorliege. Dies sei zur Zeit noch nicht der Fall. Unter den Mitgliedstaaten divergierten nicht nur die Einschätzung über die Ursachen der Finanzkrise und mögliche Reformansätze, eine große Anzahl von Staaten stelle die Notwendigkeit einer Reform insgesamt in Abrede. Die Finanzreform sei integraler Bestandteil des gesamten Reformkonzeptes und dürfe daher nicht losgelöst werden von den übrigen Teilen. Fortschritte in diesem Bereich müßten einhergehen mit solchen in den übrigen Reformgruppen. Eine Paketlösung dürfte am ehesten Erfolg versprechen.³⁶⁸
    In ihrer Antwort auf eine Große Anfrage legte die Bundesregierung dar, daß die VN aufgrund ihrer derzeitigen organisatorischen und politischen Struktur der Vielzahl von Aufgaben nicht voll gewachsen seien.³⁶⁹ Das gesamte System der UNO bedürfe deshalb einer "durchgreifenden Reform". Ziel sei es, seine Arbeitsfähigkeit den gestellten Anforderungen anzupassen und die VN in die Lage zu versetzen, die Herausforderungen an der Schwelle des 3. Jahrtausends zu bewältigen. In diesem Kontext sollte nach Ansicht der Bundesregierung auch die Zusammensetzung des VN-Sicherheitsrates den heutigen politischen Gegebenheiten durch eine Erweiterung sowohl als ständige als auch nicht ständige Mitglieder stärker Rechnung tragen.

    ³²³ In allen ihren Stellungnahmen führt die Bundesregierung aus, sie schließe sich den Ausführungen Italiens im Namen der EU allumfänglich an. Dieser Passus wird im folgenden fortgelassen.
    ³²⁴ SR 3619 15.1.1996, 17.
    ³²⁵ SR 3621 25.1.1996, 6.
    ³²⁶ SR 3624 29.1.1996, 11.
    ³²⁷ SR 3628 6.2.1996, 7, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) (S/1996/75).
    ³²⁸ SR 3662 8.5.1996, 17.
    ³²⁹ SR 3638 29.2.1996, 14, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Haiti (S/1996/112).
    ³³⁰ SR 3623 29.1.1996, 15.
    ³³¹ SR 3639 5.3.1996, 17, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/1996/116).
    ³³² SR 3640 8.3.1996, 6, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (S/1996/149).
    ³³³ S/1996/149.
    ³³⁴ SR 3556 23.4.1996, 19. Letter dated 13 April 1996 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/195).
    ³³⁵ S/1996/298.
    ³³⁶ SR 3641 15.3.1996, 10.
    ³³⁷ SR 3644 27.3.1996, 2, Letter dated 7 December 1995 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/1017).
    ³³⁸ Draft resolution S/1996/221.
    ³³⁹ SR 3672 12.6.1996, 4.
    ³⁴⁰ S/1996/426.
    ³⁴¹ SR 3650 9.4.1996, 10.
    ³⁴² GA resolution 50/88 B.
    ³⁴³ SR 3652 15.4.1996 Letter dated 10 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/257).
    ³⁴⁴ SR 3698 27.9.1996, 14.
    ³⁴⁵ SR 3653 15.4.1996 Letter dated 13 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/280).
    ³⁴⁶ SR 3654 18.4.1996 Letter dated 13 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.
    ³⁴⁷ SR 3627 31.1.1996, 9 f.
    ³⁴⁸ SR 3667 28.5.1996, 13, Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (S/1996/362).
    ³⁴⁹ SR 3670 30.5.1996, 3, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1046 (1996) (S/1996/373 and Add.1).
    ³⁵⁰ S/1996/392.
    ³⁵¹ SR 3673 14.6.1996, 5, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Tajikistan (S/11996/412).
    ³⁵² S/1996/430.
    ³⁵³ SR 3676 28.6.1996, 5, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti (S/11996/416 and Add.1/Rev.1).
    ³⁵⁴ SR 3680 12.7.1996, Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhasia, Georgia (S/1996/507 and Add. 1).
    ³⁵⁵ SR 3683 26.7.1996, 16, Note by the Secretary-General (S/1996/509).
    ³⁵⁶ S/1996/596.
    ³⁵⁷ Positions of Germany: Ambassador Tono Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, the United Nations' 51st General Assembly, Agenda item 11: Report of the Security Council.
    ³⁵⁸ S/PRST/1995/48.
    ³⁵⁹ Positions of Germany: Statement, Ambassador Tono Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, the United Nations' 51st General Assembly, Agenda item 47: Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters.
    ³⁶⁰ UN-Doc. 8/50/47.
    ³⁶¹ Working paper of Ukraine, UN-Doc. A/50/47/Add. 1, Annex XVIII.
    ³⁶² Positions of Germany: 29 February 1996, Statement by Ambassador Tono Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council at the United Nations: Observations concerning the Submissions by Belize, Italy, Mexico, the Nordic Countries and Turkey.
    ³⁶³ Positions of Germany: 10 May 1996, Statement by Ambassador Dr. Gerhard Henze, Acting Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council at the United Nations: Composition and Size of the Security Council: Non-permanent Members.
    ³⁶⁴ 28 February 1996, Statement by Ambassador Tono Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council at the United Nations: Rotating Seats, Semi-Permanent Seats, Regional Seats: General Remarks.
    ³⁶⁵ Working Paper, Germany, 28 June 1996.
    ³⁶⁶ FAZ vom 26.9.1996, 2.
    ³⁶⁷ Vgl. UN-Doc. SG/SM/5892 vom 6.2.1996.
    ³⁶⁸ BT-Drs. 13/5788.
    ³⁶⁹ BT Drs. 13/6773.

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