Sie befinden sich hier: Publikationen Archiv Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1997
1. Vereinte Nationen
213. Die Bundesregierung sowie Vertreter der Europäischen Union nahmen im Sicherheitsrat mehrfach zu den dort verhandelten Fragen Stellung. Die Beratungsgegenstände des Sicherheitsrates waren konkrete Lagen in bestimmten Staaten oder Regionen. Dabei wurde zu zahlreichen völkerrechtlichen Fragen Stellung genommen. Wegen des Sachzusammenhangs der Befassung des Sicherheitsrates mit einer Lage werden die Stellungnahmen im folgenden zusammenhängend und in weitgehenden Zitaten aus den Verbalprotokollen der Sitzungen berichtet.
214. Im Namen der Europäischen Union nahm der Vertreter der Niederlande Stellung zur Situation in Angola:
"The European Union attaches paramount importance to preserving the spirit of Lusaka and is firmly committed to a long and lasting peace in Angola. The ultimate responsibility for the restoration of peace in Angola, however, rests with the Angolans themselves. In order to ensure the continued involvement of the international community in the peace process, it is imperative for the parties, in particular UNITA, to take urgent and decisive steps to fulfil their commitments. The European Union shares the view of the international community that continued pressure should be applied until compliance with the commitments undertaken in the Lusaka Protocol is assured. We therefore fully endorse the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III by only one month, until 31 March 1997, and we support the readiness of the Council to consider the imposition of appropriate measures, should the government of national unity and reconciliation not have been formed by that day."397
Der Vertreter der Niederlande begrüßte im Namen der Europäischen Union die Einsetzung der neuen Regierung Angolas ("a government of unity and national reconciliation") am 11. April 1997 als einen der wichtigsten Schritte im Friedensprozeß. Er verlangt schnelle Fortschritte bei der Inkorporierung der UNITA-Truppen in die angolanische Armee und die nationale Polizei sowie bei dem vorgesehenen Demobilisierungsprogramm. Zur weiteren Rolle der VN-Truppen in Angola führt er folgendes aus:
"We have taken note of the Secretary-General's intention to complete the phased drawdown of UNAVEM's military units by the end of August of this year. At the same time, we feel that the United Nations still has a role to play in support of the peace process. Accordingly, we concur with the Secretary-General's recommendation to extent the mandate of UNAVEM III until 30 June 1997, on the understanding that the operation would gradually proceed with the transition towards a United Nations observer mission in Angola to be formally established on 1 July 1997. In addition to the completion of the remaining military tasks, the observer mission would focus on political, police and human rights aspects, as well as on humanitarian and public information programmes aimed at consolidating the national reconciliation process. We attach particular importance to the deployment of human rights officers and of police observers, who would monitor compliance with the peace accords, including freedom of movement throughout the country."398
215. Der Vertreter der Niederlande nahm im Namen der Europäischen Union im Sicherheitsrat Stellung zum Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten. Er bringt die Hoffnung zum Ausdruck, daß das Hebron-Protokoll zu den Osloer Friedensvereinbarungen die Atmosphäre des gegenseitigen Vertrauens stärken würde. Er führt jedoch weiter aus:
"The European Union deeply deplores the decision of the Israeli Government to approve construction plans for the Jabal Abu Ghneim/Har Homa on the West Bank in the Jerusalem Area. This decision poses a threat to these positive developments. The European Union has repeatedly stated that settlements in the occupied territories contravene international law and pose a major obstacle to peace.
The European Union again reaffirms its policy on the status of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is subject to the principle set out in the Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), notably the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and is therefore not under Israeli sovereignty. The European Union considers that the 4th Geneva Convention is fully applicable to East Jerusalem, as it is to other territories under occupation.
(...) The European Union remains firmly of the view that the peace process is the only path to security and peace for the Palestinians as well as for Israel and the neighbouring States. The European Union calls upon Israel to respect its obligations under international law and once again appeals to the Israeli Government to refrain from building the new settlement in Har Homa and to respect the rights of the Palestinians. To do otherwise would not be conducive to a climate in which rapid and substantial progress in the peace process can be achieved."399
216. Zur Lage in Liberia nahm der Vertreter der Niederlande im Namen der Europäischen Union wie folgt Stellung:
"The European Union (...) fully supports the electoral process as defined by the Liberians and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the basis of the recommendations of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine. (...) We welcome the fact that the military component of UNOMIL has now finally reached its full, though small, authorized strength and we support the Secretary General's proposal that UNOMIL's electoral unit be strengthened. Every effort should be made to enable as many Liberian refugees as possible to be registered and to vote. The Union notes in this respect the need for voluntary repatriation in the shortest possible time.
... At this critical juncture, strict adherence to the agreed timetable - the enactment of the electoral law and regulations by the end of March, voter registration in April, and the election campaign in May - is of the utmost importance. Provided the timetable is respected, the European Union confirms its willingness to provide financial and technical assistance to the electoral process."400
217. Zur Lage in Afghanistan gab der Vertreter der Niederlande im Namen der Europäischen Union folgende Einschätzungen ab:
"Furthermore, harmful influence by countries in the region continues. In this context, the European Union wishes to reaffirm its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan. The European Union strongly urges third parties to refrain from interfering in the conflicts and from supplying arms to the warring factions. On 17 December 1996 the European Union established an arms embargo concerning Afghanistan, under which no European member State will deliver arms to any of the warring parties in that country. The associated countries have aligned themselves with this embargo. The European Union encourages all States to follow a similar policy of restraint.
(...) The already serious situation in Afghanistan is compounded by grave persistent human rights violations and breaches of humanitarian law. Of particular concern to the European Union is the deteriorating situation of women and girls, who are increasingly deprived of their human rights, particularly in areas controlled by the Taliban. The European Union is also concerned about the situation of displaced persons in Afghanistan, in particular those from villages north of Kabul. The European Union urgently appeals to all Afghan parties involved to respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms."401
Der Vertreter Deutschlands schloß sich den Ausführungen der Niederlande im Namen der Europäischen Union an. Daneben betonte er die zentrale Bedeutung der Special Mission der Vereinten Nationen unter der Leitung des Deutschen Norbert Holl:
"So far, the parties have decided to continue fighting. But Norbert Holl and his dedicated staff have been successful in keeping channels open, to the extent where, as experience has shown, the Special Mission is currently the only institution that can bring together all parties for talks. So long as we do not want to give up hope that we may see the Afghan conflict solved peacefully, the task of the Special Mission will remain of crucial importance."402
218. Der Vertreter der Niederlande begrüßte im Namen der Europäischen Union die Bemühungen verschiedener Staaten aus der Region, aber auch von außerhalb der Region, um eine Friedensvereinbarung für Somalia. Weiter führte er hierzu aus:
"Unfortunately the results of these efforts have so far not been altogether inclusive, as in every case one or more important players have refused to participate. This points to the need for coordinating various regional peace efforts and integrating them into one comprehensive political settlement for Somalia as a whole. We should like to reiterate, however, the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and for restoring peace lies with the Somali people themselves. The European Union therefore calls upon all Somali factions immediately to cease all hostilities, and to cooperate with the efforts for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. We are encouraged in this regard by the recent meeting of the National Salvation Council and by the establishment of the joint committee on Mogadishu, aimed at reaching a political settlement in Mogadishu that could give impetus to the current momentum for dialogue and compromise."403
219. Der Vertreter der Niederlande nahm im Namen der Europäischen Union Stellung zu Fragen des Schutzes von Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen sowie zu dem Verhältnis von humanitärer Hilfe und friedenserhaltenden Maßnahmen:
"The presence of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces whose mission is largely to support humanitarian assistance has in several cases helped to establish more secure conditions. In some cases they prepared the way for a peace-settlement by demonstrating the readiness of the international community to assist and monitor such an outcome. Nevertheless, it remains important to differentiate clearly between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, since too close a link between humanitarian aid delivery and a military operation could, in some cases, endanger the perception of impartiality associated with humanitarian aid.
We increasingly face security situations which hamper the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The following issues should be given further attention to address this situation.
The Council should insist that in concrete situations safe and unimpeded access for international humanitarian organizations, such as UNHCR, to refugees in and outside camps is ensured. Refugee camps should never be misused as military bases. All parties involved in a conflict should ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel and human rights monitors. The Council should emphasise, whenever appropriate, the responsibilities of host States and parties concerned in this respect. No attempt should be made by warring parties to use humanitarian assistance for political objectives that would endanger the impartiality of the humanitarian assistance. The mandates and nature of specific operations also need to be clearly explained to local populations and to the international media through a pro-active and coordinated public information strategy, including through the deployment of United Nations radio stations.
(...) Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law is a basic precondition for the effective protection of humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations. Greater cooperation between peacekeeping and the humanitarian community is required. Peacekeeping should focus primarily on contributing to the creation of secure environment, while humanitarian organizations should concentrate on the effective delivery of humanitarian relief assistance and the protection of human rights and humanitarian law. When the provision of humanitarian relief assistance is envisaged to be provided within the context of a peacekeeping operation, it must be based on a clear and feasible mandate from the Security Council, and the international community should provide the necessary resources for the successful completion of that mandate."404
Der Vertreter der Bundesrepublik Deutschland weist in seiner Stellungnahme vor dem Sicherheitsrat darauf hin, daß humanitäre Hilfe und friedenserhaltende Maßnahmen grundsätzlich zu trennen seien, dies in der Praxis jedoch nicht immer vollständig durchzuhalten sei:
"When the neutrality of a humanitarian operation is questioned by the parties to a conflict, when humanitarian organizations are arbitrarily denied access to refugees and displaced persons or access is prevented due to the security situation in the area, and peoples lives are put at risk because of a lack of food or shelter, then the Security Council is asked to take action.
(...) Obviously, humanitarian assistance, as a rule, should not be done by peacekeepers. But, on the other hand, there may often be a reason for some kind of dual role, both military and civilian, for peacekeepers as well. In any event, it seems doubtful whether there really is a clear-cut fault line between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance in a conflict environment. Even humanitarian assistance as such will be drawn, in one way or another, into the conflict's own very specific logic. A mandate in an international operation must take this into account, or else it will fail."405
220. Zur Situation in der ehemaligen jugoslawischen Republik Mazedonien sowie zu Fragen der Verlängerung des Mandats der United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) nahm der Vertreter der Bundesrepublik im Sicherheitsrat Stellung:
"With preventive missions - and UNPREDEP is a model in this regard - it is always particularly difficult to gauge the degree of success. It is similarly difficult to decide when a preventive mission has satisfactorily completed its task and is no longer necessary. This is due to the fact that the lack of negative events, that is, the forestalling of destabilisation, is the goal to be achieved, but there can never be absolute certainty that the preservation of stability is really due to the presence of the mission, or perhaps would have been possible even without it. Nevertheless, there seems to be general agreement that UNPREDEP has been a success story that the United Nations and the Council can claim full credit for, and we entirely share this assessment. Germany also believes that we should take no chances by ending the international military presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia before a sufficient degree of stability is achieved throughout the surrounding region.
In view of this situation, Germany supports the draft resolution before the Council today, which foresees an extension of UNPREDEP's mandate for nine months."406
221. Zur Situation in Bosnien und Herzegowina nahm der Vertreter Luxemburgs im Namen der Europäischen Union Stellung.
"One of the most delicate areas, which remains a determining factor for the return to normality in Bosnia and Herzegowina, is the training of police forces. Indeed, a great many refugees and displaced persons, including those from regions in which they were members of minority groups, has still not returned home for fear of acts of intimidation and violence. Administrative and legal measures must be taken immediately to put an end to such acts. If these measures are to be implemented promptly and without discrimination, action by police force imbued with democratic principles is essential.
The European Union welcomes the progress made in the two entities in restructuring the police thanks to the tireless activities of the International Police Task Force. In particular, we wish to welcome the disbandment of the special units, the re-entry into the regular civilian police of some qualified members of those units and the creation of mixed police patrols. Furthermore, we wish to underline the importance of organising in the territory of both entities courses on respect for human dignity and the role of the police in a democratic society, as well as the importance of reopening and developing police academies to ensure the training of police in accordance with democratic principles.
Improved cooperation between the IPTF and the local police, in the context of promoting freedom of movement between and within the entities, and with the assistance of the stabilization force, has enabled many illegal checkpoints to be dismantled. The number of checkpoints has been considerably reduced, and we wish to welcome this positive development.
(...) It is true that the results achieved will remain fragile if further progress is not made soon. It is obvious that much more could have been achieved had the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed fully to the construction of the civic and democratic society in the country. As we enter the third year of implementation of the peace agreement and the last phase of the consolidation period, major efforts are still needed to ensure the functioning of viable structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two entities. The European Union is concerned about the fact that the central government in Bosnia and Herzegovina operates without any organic law, secretariat or fixed headquarters. The assembly has met only five times since its election last year. The central budget is not funded by the entities, which withhold customs revenues or do not collect them. Large sums are been managed without the necessary transparency and outside the legal process. Bosnia and Herzegovina still has neither a flag nor a common currency."407
222. Der Vertreter der Bundesrepublik nahm zum selben Thema wie folgt Stellung:
"UNMIBH and IPTF cannot operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina without the necessary security arrangements. At present, a secure environment for the United Nations personnel can be guaranteed only by the International Military Force. In our opinion, the current distribution of responsibilities between IPTF and SFOR has been effective and has met the challenges. The civilian and military international engagement are mutually reinforcing. Only a successful civilian implementation under the protection of the military forces can lead to a self-sustaining peace that may finally make an international military presence unnecessary.
Germany welcomes the arrest of two more persons indicted for war crimes by members of SFOR on Thursday 9. The operation in vitez underlines once more the resolve of the international community to bring the indicted persons to trial in The Hague. If justice is not brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina, peace and reconciliation will remain a distant goal."408
223. Der Vertreter Luxemburgs nahm im Namen der Europäischen Union vor der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen Stellung zum Jahresbericht des Präsidenten des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs für Ruanda:
"We are also concerned that, according to the Report of President Kama, ten accused people have been detained without trial for more than one year, and in certain cases for more than two years. Such slowness is hardly compatible with justice that seeks to be exemplary, and recall for this situation to be remedied quickly. In this framework, we welcome the fact that since the Report was issued, a second courtroom was opened in Arusha in September 1997. The European Union reaffirms that, in order to carry out its tasks with impartiality, the Tribunal must conduct its activities in a way that is totally independent of political powers of any kind. The European Union, which has been providing substantial legal and logistical cooperation to the Tribunal, will therefore refrain from commenting on the cases before the Tribunal.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, like the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, constitutes an important precedent for setting up an international criminal court. The practice and experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda will constitute a valuable source for finalising rules making it possible to prosecute and punish, at international level, serious violations of international humanitarian law, irrespective of where they have been committed or the identity of those responsible for such acts."409
224. Bei den Verhandlungen im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen über die Einrichtung eines Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (ICC) nahm der Leiter der deutschen Delegation, Hans-Peter Kaul, am 4. August 1997 zu Fragen der Komplementarität und des auslösenden Mechanismus wie folgt Stellung:
"We are all conscious of the fact that the various draft articles on complementarity and trigger mechanism have a certain peculiarity:
To a large extent they are interrelated, interdependent. You can say that, to a large extent, the draft articles on complementarity and trigger mechanism build upon each other. If you accept, or if you want to change a certain building block a certain provision with the specific regulatory content, quite often this is bound to have consequences for other provisions of the draft statute, even for the functioning of the future court in general. What is the reason for this, why is this so? In our view when we discuss, when we devise the draft articles on complementarity and trigger mechanism, we are indeed laying the fundaments for the institutions to be built, the very fundaments of the court to be established.
We all agree - at least in principle - that the ICC should be an effective and functioning complement to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures are not available or ineffective. Now, when we want such an effective and functioning International Criminal Court, we have to do the fundaments of the court right, with building blocks as solid and effective as possible.
(...) With regard to the systematic built-up of the draft articles on complementarity and trigger mechanism, Germany continues to support the use of four specific building blocks in the Statute:
No. 1: The Court should have inherent (automatic) jurisdiction over the three core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, so that the Court can exercise, if necessary, concurrent jurisdiction with regard to the crime of aggression once the Security Council - in accordance with the principle contained in Art. 23 para. 2 of the ILC Draft Statute - has first determined that a State has committed an act of aggression.
Building-block No. 2: The Court itself should have the power to determine whether in a given situation national trial procedures are not available or may be ineffective.
Building-block No. 3: The prosecutor of the Court should have the competence to initiate investigations ex officio, on his or her own initiative, in any case where the Court has jurisdiction. Such a regulation - in line with the Statutes of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda - is in our view not only a meaningful but a necessary supplement to the ILC Draft Statute whereby hitherto only complaints by a state party and referrals by the Security Council can initiate an investigation.
Building-block No. 4: We support the ILC proposal that the Statute should give to the Security Council the explicit competence to submit to the Court situations involving threats to or breaches of international peace and security and acts of aggression. But it would be in our view quite inappropriate if the Security Council could submit individual cases or prevent investigation and prosecution of cases involving such situations.
(...) This concludes my brief remarks on the four specific building blocks that we deem essential, even decisive or proper functioning of the court.
With regard to the concrete form in which these principles are built into the draft statute we remain quite flexible. We are open for any reasonable text proposal that safeguards these principles."410
Zur Rolle des Sicherheitsrats im geplanten Statut für einen Internationalen Strafgerichtshof führte der Leiter der deutschen Delegation weiter folgendes aus:
"Let me now explain our position in more detail by analysing paragraph by paragraph Art. 23 of the ILC-Draft.
First we are in favour of retaining Art. 23 para. 1 of the ILC-Draft according to which the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, may refer a matter to the Court. We believe this is a useful and even necessary part of the Statute. The creation of the two ad hoc tribunals demonstrates in a certain context that the Security Council indeed has the power to endow judicial organs with criminal jurisdiction, a view that was confirmed by the Yugoslavia Tribunal itself in the Tadic case. We do not see any reason why the Security Council should not be able to - instead of creating separate ad hoc tribunals - make use of any already existing international criminal court under similar conditions.
Even more important, we have to envisage the case that the crimes we are considering are committed by nationals and on the territory of a state which is not party to the Statute. In such a situation the state concerned is under no obligation whatsoever to cooperate with the Court, even less to surrender the persons who committed the crimes. Therefore, the only possibility is to have the Security Council make use of its powers under Chapter VII and grant the Court jurisdiction also vis-à-vis that third state. Thus if we want to see a fully effective Court, we have to provide for a provision similar to the one contained in Art. 23 para. 1 of the ILC-Draft.
We believe however, that the appropriate place for such a provision would be Art. 21, as included in Option 1b of the chairman's rolling text on Art. 21.
Secondly we are also in favour of Art. 23 para. 2 of the ILC-Draft. We strongly believe that the crime of aggression should come within the jurisdiction of the Court and we will therefore at the appropriate time make further efforts to consolidate the existing draft proposals for a definition of the crime of aggression.
With regard to Art. 23 para. 2 of the ILC-Draft one has to take into account that under Art. 24 of the UN-Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore it is its role to make a determination under Art. 39, whether an act of aggression has been committed. This essential, indeed crucial competence, which we all granted the Security Council by becoming members of this organization could be seriously hampered if the Court would exercise its jurisdiction as to the crime of aggression without a prior determination by the Security Council that such an aggression has occurred. Indeed this prerogative of the Security Council granted to it by the Charter must be also relevant in regard of the Statute of the Court. This is due to the fact that in accordance with Art. 103 of the UN-Charter in case of a conflict between the Charter on the one hand and any other treaty on the other hand, the obligations under the Charter, including the obligation of member states to respect the primary role of the Security Council in determining acts of aggression, must prevail.
However, Art. 23 para. 2 does not grant the Security Council the power to make a determination as to individual criminal responsibility. Instead it would be still for the independent court to find and decide whether a given individual is responsible for the act of aggression and what his or her punishment should be. In that regard the prior determination by the Security Council is only a necessary precondition for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction, the existence of which the Court would take judicial notice.
Thirdly, is the inclusion of Art. 23 para. 3 of the ILC-Draft into the Statute of the Court really advisable? Would it not have the effect, that the Court could not exercise its jurisdiction in many if not in most cases?
There is no provision contained in the Charter that a judicial organ may not simultaneously consider a situation which is already under consideration by the Council. Indeed it was the International Court of Justice which held in the Hostages case that the case submitted by the United States was admissible even if the situation was also at the same time considered by the Security Council. Now if cases may be considered simultaneously by the Security Council and principal judicial organ of the United Nations itself, should the same principle not also apply with regard to the ICC?
Regarding the competence of the Security Council as described in Art. 23 para. 3 and the meaning of the wording 'any situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter', does this mean for example that already a mere discussion of the given situation under 'other matters' in the form of the usual informal consultations would bar the Court from exercising its otherwise existing jurisdiction? - Or would it need an inscription on the Security Council Agenda and an analogous application of the exceptional rule of Art. 12 para. 1 of the Charter?
What would happen if a prosecution or even a trial had already commenced when the situation starts to be considered by the Council: Would that scenario also be covered by paragraph 3? Would the prosecution only be interrupted or would it be barred forever if the situation is at a later stage no longer under consideration by the Council? All in all we are rather sceptical and therefore believe that this matter should be examined and discussed fully in the most careful way."411
225. Zu verschiedenen Aspekten der Reform der VN und des Sicherheitsrats legte Botschafter Tono Eitel die Ansicht der Bundesregierung vor der VN-Generalversammlung412 sowie im Rahmen der "Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on an Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council" dar. Zum Wahlverfahren äußerte er sich in der Working Group folgendermaßen:
"Today I would like to concentrate on the issue of election procedures as laid out in CRP. 1 and CRP. 8. As I have pointed out earlier, this point is a crucial one.The Chair has suggested election procedures for new permanent members to take place in phase II of a three phase reform process (phase I: the overall framework; phase II: identification/election of permanent members; phase III: vote on the final amendments to the Charter). In my view, the wording for phase II as suggested in CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 sets the base for an election procedure which does not seem to be too far from being acceptable to almost everyone.
'3. <The General Assembly> Decides to proceed by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly by 28 February 1998, to the designation of the States that will be elected to exercise the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council, according to the pattern described in paragraph 1b, it being understood that if the number of States having obtained the required majority fall short of the number of seats allocated for permanent membership, new rounds of balloting will be conducted for the remaining category(ies), until five States obtain the required majority to occupy the five seats;'
'7. The General Assembly shall elect the new permanent members by a two-thirds majority upon endorsement of the respective region or in the lack thereof from the individual candidatures presented to it. Balloting shall continue until all allocated permanent seats have been filled by the required majority. This will take place subsequent to a decision to be taken by the General Assembly on the framework for the comprehensive reform of the Security Council.'
As the quotations indicate, the three common pillars of both the provisions in CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 are obvious:
- the avoidance of a quick-fix through a carefully balanced increase in the permanent category: three seats for developing countries, two seats for industrialised countries;
- the requirement of a two thirds majority for any new permanent member;
- no pre-fix regarding the members who are to occupy the permanent new seats.
(...) Germany can fully subscribe to all three described pillars. The balance of three permanent seats for developing and two permanent seats for industrialised countries seems to be fair. We have on several occasions underlined that any arbitrary quick-fix solution has never been and will never be an option for us. There is little doubt that in the course of the last four years' discussions names of Member States have emerged which are already largely seen as almost natural candidates for a permanent seat. Germany would hope to be one of them. It is crystal clear: The 185 Member States must have the last say on who should represent them permanently in the Council. All 185 Member States enjoy absolute freedom in deciding this question for themselves. At the same time, no country or group of countries must be prevented from a candidature. Since the final Charter amendment is subject to a two-thirds majority there can be no doubt either, that permanent status is only possible through a two-thirds approval by the General Assembly. Let me add that I would hope for larger majorities.
Against this background and the before-mentioned principles: Are there still shortcomings in the respective provisions contained in CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 ? I see - if at all - two aspects where the suggested solution is not yet fully satisfactory:
First. If a region - for example, the African - prefers a mechanism by which a permanent seat is shared on the basis of rotation it must be allowed to propose such a mechanism to Member States and submit it to a ballot. It is the General Membership that has to decide, whether it agrees to a permanent seat occupied by more than one individual country subsequently. Traditionally, Member States will honour solutions endorsed by regional groups. What internal majority do regions need to endorse regional mechanisms? Consensus? Two thirds? Simple majority? I have no standard answer to that question. In my view the answer must be left entirely to the respective region. In case a region reaches a relatively weak internal endorsement, the overall membership might be willing to take this into consideration at the moment of balloting.
In no case must a Member State wishing to present an individual candidature be prevented from doing so, be it endorsed by its region or not. Individual candidatures and rotation proposals do not exclude each other. Why should they not compete against each other? It is the general membership which decides by a two-thirds-majority which of the solutions offered to it is the best way of assuming the global responsibilities linked with a permanent seat.
Second. The election procedures should foresee a mechanism in case of a stalemate after several rounds of balloting. Sure, it is not very likely that either an individual candidature or a proposed rotation scheme fails to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for a new permanent (or several) seat(s). However, such an outcome cannot be excluded, either. In my view, three principles must govern this situation. a) Countries which fulfil all the democratic requirements and are elected by two-thirds of the membership may not be held hostage by other candidates who fail to do so. Could the overall membership really be forced to elect five countries by force if one of them is not able to make a convincing case?; b) Lowering the quorum is no way out, either. Important decisions like the designation of a permanent seat are hardly conceivable without legitimation of at least a two-thirds-majority; c) Balloting can not be held ad infinitum if no two-thirds majority for specific seats is in sight. It must necessarily be limited. Otherwise any decision could be blocked.
Therefore I would ask the following questions: a) Must we not seriously consider the necessity of limiting the rounds of ballots to a reasonable number?; b) What do we do if after the exhaustion of ballots the general membership still finds itself unable to fill a seat? In my view, any seat formula is incomplete if it does not foresee a way out in case such a situation would occur.
In this context, the Chilean proposal which would allow regions which have been allocated a permanent seat a limited time to discuss possible regional mechanisms before the balloting starts is a constructive idea. At the end of the discussion period, a regionally endorsed individual candidature, a regional endorsed rotation mechanism, or both an individual candidature and a regional endorsed rotation mechanism could emerge. Any of those possible outcomes would allow the Membership an assessment of the regions' own judgement and a concrete option for the following ballots.
Allow me a word regarding the form of ballots to elect permanent members. In my view, the procedure applied to elections for non-permanent members can apply for permanent members as well. This is to say secret ballots for each of the proposed new permanent seats.
(...) the principles I suggest are clear: flexibility, regional autonomy, competition of proposals, no imposed solutions, balloting without pre-fixed results and absolute autonomy for the Membership to express its wishes. Taking these principles into account, a synthesis of the electoral provisions in CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 should be possible. I am looking forward to discussing these ideas. Any improvement is most welcome."413
226. Zum Gebrauch des Veto-Rechts machte der Botschafter folgende Ausführungen:
"(...) the operative points in CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 on which I would like to elaborate today regard the veto right. The veto right is an important issue. It is a complex issue. It is an emotional issue. It is, however, not a new issue. Of course, we will discuss it with zeal and passion. Some of us might even be tempted to revive debates and disputes which took place back in the mid-forties, when the Charter was consented among 51 founding fathers. Too much emotion and too many returns to the past, however, can also be a direct way to make sure that our exercise fails. I firmly believe that none of us is aiming at this outcome.
How could an alternative approach look like? An alternative approach would mean a) to honour treaty and Charter realities, b) to open a dialogue - and not a battle - with permanent members about grievances regarding their use of the veto right; c) to examine the principles that must rule the extension of the veto right to new permanent members, d) to be creative.
(...) the ideas and provisions enshrined in CRP. 1 and more specifically in CRP. 8 try to follow in large parts the alternative approach mentioned above. They deserve therefore our appraisal. I will get into details of both papers in the course of my statement.
1. Charter realities and dialogue
The Charter says in its Art. 27 (3): 'Decisions of the Security Council on all other (not procedural) matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.' Had the 51 founding fathers not conceded this right by treaty to the original permanent members, the Organisation might not exist today. Fortunately, we have the United Nations, may we like some of the treaty provisions or not. In any case, its key provisions are a reality which we are forced to honour, at least by a sense of realism. Ambassador Ka of Senegal, President of the Committee of African Ambassadors in charge of the African participation in the five groups of reform of the United Nations has expressed this in his statement of 28 April 1997 in the following words: 'Nous devrions être réalistes, de ne pas nous voiler la face et accepter qu'il sera difficile de supprimer le droit de veto et même d'en limiter l'usage.'
I have little to add to these words. Germany, which joined the United Nations in 1974, has not and would not have invented the veto right. But we accept it as a reality. Little would be won by discussing the rightfulness or unrightfulness of its historic use. The mere fact that it has been used during more than 45 years and the rest of the Council Members and Member States have accepted its use in the daily life of the Organisation shows that such an endeavour might have academic merits rather than practical ones.
Changes in the use of the veto right will - if at all - only be possible through a constructive dialogue with its present holders, the P5. Why should this dialogue not lead to improvements below the level of formal Charter amendments? CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 have in this respect made some remarkable suggestions. Let me quote three of them for consideration:
- The Brazilian idea of casting a negative veto without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares;
- Establishing a list - positive or negative - of matters which are not subject to the veto (updating Res. 267 (III) of 14 April 1949);
- A recommendation by the General Assembly urging the permanent members to refrain from resorting to the veto and to promote consensus-building in the Council.
Since we have commented on each of these proposals in a previous statement on 2 May 1997, I will limit my comments today to our support of the respective parts in CRP. 1 and CRP. 8.
2. The extension of the veto right to new permanent members
The extension of the veto right to new permanent members is a crucial issue. It is a pertinent and not a theoretical issue, not only since a very large majority of 165 interviewed members support an increase in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership (findings of the Co-Vice-Chairmen, CRP. 6, para. 6). While CRP. 1 still foresees that the new permanent members of the Security Council shall have no provision of the veto power (op. 4), CRP. 8 enshrines the following principle: 'The veto should not perpetuate differences and discrimination among members of the Security Council on the one hand or between present and proposed new permanent members on the other.' (op. 8). I welcome this improvement of the text and I find it fair to say the least.
(...) as we have stated on many occasions, Germany has always held the view that although the veto right per se is not an objective for her, all permanent members should have the same rights and obligations. If new and original permanent members are to pay the same percentage rate of premium surcharge (as foreseen in CRP. 1), the very same principle of non-discrimination should also be applied to the right of veto.
Moreover, if the new permanent members are to play the role in the Council they are supposed to play, they must have at their disposal the same tools as the other permanent members. Let me give you an example. When in the Council my delegation indicated that it had difficulties with a certain proposal, there was kind attention given to that statement, but often, that was it. If the same statement was made by one of the permanent members, everybody knew that that member's view would have to be accomodated. Thus, if a new permanent member is sent into the Council with the mandate to take an influence in the decision-making, then it must be equipped accordingly.
It is our firm belief that an extension of the veto right beyond the present permanent five members will not lead to a proliferation of the veto right, a view that some delegations have expressed in their statements over the past. In our view, an extension of the veto right will rather lead to its dilution. Why? First: A mathematical equation 'more permanent members, more vetoes' does not exist and is, in any case, unproovable. Second: New permanent members have a long experience of membership outside of the Security-Council. They know about the negative and damaging impact of a wrong use of the veto. And they are ready to continue to improve the use of the veto right further in the future.
Let me give an example for the sake of clarity on this last point: I do not see why a potential new permanent member could not inform the membership before its election about the manner it intends to exercise its veto right. CRP. 8 has suggested a unilateral (voluntary or binding) declaration by new permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto. I believe this a good direction to be followed.
(...) in our statement of 7 July 1997 regarding the election procedures of permanent members I have submitted a few ideas for discussion about the way these elections would have to be held. The elections will be linked of course to the obligations and rights of new permanent members. In my view, the following rules must be taken into account:
1. The veto right should be given to identified potential members of the Security Council. Since the veto right can be a sharp tool in the hands of its holder, the general membership must be able to identify potential members. It must know to whom it confers such a tool;
2. The veto right per se must be extended to new permanent members if the new permanent members share the same obligations as the original permanent members;
3. Potential new permanent members could declare before the balloting what kind of use of the veto right they intend to make. This point, in my view, is very much different from the previous point, since nothing prevents a permanent member from not exercising a right which it has been given and to declare this voluntarily and in a binding form."414
227. Schließlich äußerte sich Botschafter Eitel in der Working Group auch zu der Frage des Überprüfungsmechanismus:
"(...) the request for a review mechanism is a popular demand of many Member States and groups of Member States. The most recent proof is op. 5 of the Harare Declaration as contained in CRP.11 on the reform of the UN Security Council which reads:
'5. The need for a periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security.'
Both CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 enshrine as well this important aspect. CRP. 1, op. 8, speaks of a review conference under Art. 109 of the Charter. CRP. 8, op. 11, refers to a periodic review on the basis of automaticity every 10 years.
(...) Germany has been among the first to realise the significance of a review mechanism. We consider the review mechanism as a facilitator in our exercise. New permanent members will be permanent but not eternal.
The details of a possible review mechanism are laid down in the German Working Paper as annex XIV to the addendum of last year's report. In my view, a review should address all aspects of a Security Council reform package. It would be difficult to exclude any specific element contained in clusters I and II from a periodic review.
Today, I would like to focus on four questions in our context which seem to me to be elementary.
1. What is the impact of a review on the concept of permanent and non-permanent membership?
2. How does the review compare to Art. 108 and 109 of the Charter?
3. How can the automaticity of a review be guaranteed?
4. What would be the appropriate time for a review?
(...) my views regarding the four questions I have raised are the following:
1. Impact on the concept of permanent and non-permanent membership
a) Non-permanent members. The review might have an impact on non-permanent members as far as the number of available non-permanent seats is concerned. If Member States during the review process come to the conclusion that the number of non-permanent seats is too high or too limited they might propose an amendment in this sense. Apart from that, the review does not touch upon individual non-permanent members since these are elected for a limited time anyhow every two years.
b) Original permanent members. The review does not regard the original permanent members either. The five seats reserved in the Charter for China, France, Russia, UK and US are not subject to any review since this would mean taking away rights accorded to these members by treaty. It would neither be wise nor realistic in my view to aim at submitting them to a review.
c) New permanent members must be subject of a review mechanism, however. The review strikes a balance: On one hand, it acknowledges the necessity to identify important global players who should permanently be part of the Security Council. At the same time, it allows to adapt the composition of new permanent membership in case of possible changes in international relations or constructive proposals to replace a given permanent member by another one supported by the necessary majority of Member States. This would have to be done, of course, through an amendment to the Charter in accordance with Art. 108.
Let me be very clear on one more aspect: The review does not change the substance of permanent membership. Permanent membership remains permanent. Permanent members under review depend neither on elections every two years like non-permanent members nor are they elected for a limited time.
They remain permanent. What they won't be in the future is eternal. In other words: they have no veto in a review process by which one or more of them would be ousted and another identified Member States would be proposed to occupy that permanent seat.
2. Reform Review and Art. 108 and Art. 10 of the Charter
Art. 108 of the Charter contains the Charter amendment rules. Art. 109 refers to a general Conference of reviewing the Charter. A reform review mechanism does not interfere with any of both general provisions. The review mechanism is to be a specific process which would have to be followed by a formal amendment to the Charter. It does not interfere with the mechanisms as laid down in Art. 108 and 109.
Nothing prevents the General Assembly and the Security Council from agreeing upon a General Conference under Art. 109. It would probably be wise, however, not to mix this question with the specific reform of the Security Council. Since the very beginning of the United Nations, any effort to make Art. 109 effective has failed. It might have become even an obsolete provision by now. Therefore we might better refrain from recurring to it, even more so as the review mechanism can very well work without it.
If it is thought that the effectivity of the review mechanisms need automaticity the Charter could foresee a compulsory review which is automatically put on the agenda of the General Assembly. The review process would have to be decided within two sessions in order to prevent any dilatory handling of the process.
In concrete terms: If the reform is voted during the 52nd GA (1997/98) and ratified before the end of the 54th GA (1999/2000), the first review process would take place, for example, after 15 years during the 69th/70th GA (2014-2016).
It may also be useful to distinguish between the first review which could be automatic and the next one - that might be optional or at longer intervals. More discussion may here be needed.
4. The appropriate time for a review
CRP. 1 and CRP. 8 both mention a review period of ten years. Member States have mentioned periods of 10, 12, 15, 20 or 10-20 years. My strong preference would be a middle ground somewhere between 10 and 20 years. A period not inferior to 15 years would guarantee stability of the Council and allow for a clear differentiation in regard to the limited two-year-terms of non-permanent members. It would also allow possible new candidates for permanent membership to build up a clear case in their favour.
(...) the review is a constructive, simple and helpful mechanism. Let us make use of it. Is it much asking to apply the spirit of compromise the review mechanism symbolises in all other areas of the reform?"415
228. Die Bundesregierung betont, daß nach ihrer Auffassung Glaubwürdigkeit und Effektivität des Sicherheitsrats in hohem Maße von seiner Repräsentativität abhängen:
"Nur wenn die Mitgliedstaaten sich durch den Sicherheitsrat angemessen vertreten fühlen, werden sie anerkennen, daß der Sicherheitsrat bei der Wahrnehmung seiner Pflichten in ihrer aller Namen handelt, wie es Art. 24 der VN-Charta bestimmt. Die Bundesregierung vertritt daher den Standpunkt, daß alle Weltregionen, insbesondere auch Afrika, Asien sowie Lateinamerika und die Karibik im Sicherheitsrat ebenso angemessen vertreten sein müssen, wie Staaten, die globale Verantwortung tragen und einen unverzichtbaren Beitrag zum VN-System leisten. Art. 23 der VN-Charta legt als Kriterien für die Wahl nichtständiger Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrats ausdrücklich ihren Beitrag 'zur Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit und zur Verwirklichung der sonstigen Ziele der Organisation' fest. Diese Kriterien gelten natürlich a fortiori für die Wahl ständiger Mitglieder. Regionalen Zusammenschlüssen ist in Kapitel VIII der VN-Charta eine besondere Rolle zur Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit zugewiesen, die auch in ihrem Verhältnis zum Sicherheitsrat geregelt ist. Insofern stellt sich die Frage nach ihrer Aufnahme in den Sicherheitsrat gegenwärtig nicht. Dies gilt auch für einen Sitz der EU. Die Bundesregierung hat einen solchen Sitz als langfristige Zielvorstellung befürwortet. Es bestehen aber derzeit weder in der VN, noch in der EU Möglichkeiten und Chancen seiner Realisierung.
(...) Die Bundesregierung vertritt die Auffassung, daß die Anzahl sowohl der ständigen als auch der nichtständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrats in einem ausgewogenen Verhältnis erhöht werden muß, um die von der VN-Charta vorgesehene Struktur des Sicherheitsrats zu erhalten. Sie ist grundsätzlich der Meinung, daß die Einführung einer dritten Kategorie von Sicherheitsratsmitgliedern den Sicherheitsrat fraktionieren, die gegenwärtige Bedeutung der fünf ständigen Mitglieder zementieren und die Mehrzahl der VN-Mitgliedstaaten in der 'letzten' Kategorie marginalisieren würde. Sie hält statt dessen die Aufhebung des Wiederwahlverbots für nichtständige Sicherheitsratsmitglieder nach Art. 23 Abs. 2 für eine der Möglichkeiten, ohne Schaffung einer dritten Kategorie für eine längerfristige Mitarbeit solcher Staaten zu sorgen, von denen sich eine Region besonders gut vertreten fühlt. Sie betrachtet eine Reihe von Vorschlägen dritter Staaten mit Interesse, die Modelle sog. 'ständiger rotierender regionaler Sitze' beinhalten und damit das Problem lösen sollen, daß sich einzelne Regionen nicht auf ständige Mitglieder einigen könne.
(...) Mit einer Erweiterung der Mitgliedschaft des Sicherheitsrats müssen auch die Abstimmungsmodalitäten neu geregelt werden. Dies betrifft sowohl die Mindeststimmenzahl, mit der Resolutionen verabschiedet werden können, als auch das Vetorecht. Das Ziel jeder Reform muß es sein, die Legitimität von Entscheidungen des Sicherheitsrats und den Zusammenhalt seiner Mitglieder zu stärken. Das Vetorecht ist für die Bundesregierung kein Ziel an sich. Sie kann jede neue Abstimmungsmodalität mittragen, die eine effiziente Entscheidungsfindung im Sicherheitsrat gewährleistet und die auch die ständigen Mitglieder für sich akzeptieren. Die Bundesregierung lehnt eine Diskriminierung neuer ständiger Mitglieder gegenüber den bisherigen grundsätzlich ab. Eine Reihe von VN-Mitgliedstaaten hat Vorschläge vorgelegt, deren Verwirklichung die Position der nichtständigen Mitglieder gegenüber der der ständigen Mitglieder stärken würde, ohne das Vetorecht in Frage zu stellen. Die Bundesregierung steht einer Diskussion dieser Vorschläge offen gegenüber."416
Weiter führt die Bundesregierung zu diesem Themenpunkt aus:
"In der Arbeitsgruppe der GV zur Reform des Sicherheitsrats bewegen sich die Vorstellungen über die Gesamtzahl der Mitglieder nach der Reform zwischen 20 und 26, um den Forderungen nach größerer Repräsentativität und Effektivität Rechnung zu tragen. Die Vorstellungen der Bundesregierung bewegen sich in diesem Rahmen. Die Bundesregierung hält zusätzlich zur bestehenden Mitgliedschaft die Einrichtung dreier ständiger Sitze für Afrika, Asien sowie Lateinamerika und die Karibik und zweier ständiger Sitze für Deutschland und Japan für eine zweckmäßige Lösung. Dazu sollten je ein nichtständiger Sitz für Afrika, Asien, Lateinamerika und die Karibik sowie Osteuropa kommen. Bei einer Gesamtzahl der Sicherheitsratsmitglieder von 24 bis 25 werden voraussichtlich durch größere Repräsentativität und Effektivität Effizienzgewinne erzielt werden, da viele der erforderlichen Konsultationsprozesse innerhalb der umfassenderen Mitgliedschaft des Sicherheitsrats geführt werden können."417
229. Die Reform der Vereinten Nationen war auch Gegenstand einer parlamentarischen Großen Anfrage. Die Bundesregierung machte hierzu u.a. folgende Ausfürhungen:
"Die VN sind aufgrund ihrer derzeitigen organisatorischen und politischen Struktur der Vielzahl von Aufgaben nicht voll gewachsen. Die von zusammenbrechenden staatlichen Strukturen und humanitären Katastrophen ausgehenden Gefahren für Frieden und Stabilität, die Probleme der Globalisierung der Wirtschaft für Handel und Entwicklung sind neue, von der Charta der VN noch nicht erfaßte Herausforderungen. Fünf Reformgruppen sind von der Generalversammlung (GV) eingesetzt worden: zur Agenda für den Frieden, zur Agenda für Entwicklung, zur Reform des Sicherheitsrats, zur Erörterung der Finanzprobleme sowie die sog. Essy-Gruppe mit einem übergreifenden Mandat. Erste wichtige Reformschritte sind in den letzten Jahren bereits durchgeführt worden. Das VN-Sekretariat wurde gestrafft. Die Abteilung für friedenserhaltende Maßnahmen im VN-Sekretariat wurde reorganisiert und ausgebaut. Ein Amt für interne Kontrolle wurde eingerichtet. Auch im Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereich der VN wurden erste Reformschritte eingeleitet, insbesondere hinsichtlich einer effizienten Umsetzung der Ergebnisse der großen Weltkonferenzen, deren effektiver Koordinierung sowie bei einzelnen Sonderorganisationen. Mit der Einrichtung je eines Strafgerichtshofs für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und Ruanda sowie den anlaufenden Bemühungen um die Einrichtung eines Ständigen Strafgerichtshofs gehen die VN ebenfalls neue Wege. Auch von Fachkonferenzen wie den Konferenzen für Umwelt und Entwicklung in Rio de Janeiro, für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung in Kairo, dem "Sozialgipfel" in Kopenhagen, der Weltfrauenkonferenz in Peking, Habitat in Istanbul und dem Welternährungsgipfel in Rom sind neue Anstöße ausgegangen.
Die klassischen friedenserhaltenden Maßnahmen müssen noch in ein abgestimmtes Instrumentarium zur Konfliktprävention eingebettet werden, zu dem auch vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen sowie zivile Instrumente wie Wahl- und Demokratisierungshilfe, der Aufbau des Rechtssystems und Menschenrechtspolitik gehören. Nachhaltige Entwicklung und die Bewahrung einer intakten Umwelt sind in besonderem Maße Zukunftsaufgaben der VN. Um die VN hierfür organisatorisch zu rüsten, sind eine Straffung und Reorganisation sowie schärfere Definition von Prioritäten und eine klarere Abgrenzung der Mandate der zahlreichen Unter- und Sonderorganisationen ebenso unerläßlich wie verbesserte Koordination, Beseitigung von Doppelarbeit, mehr Managementeffizienz und eine verbesserte Rechenschaftslegung. Die Mitgliedstaaten müssen auf der anderen Seite jedoch ihren Beitragsverpflichtungen pünktlich und vollständig nachkommen.
Die Zusammensetzung des Sicherheitsrates sollte den heutigen politischen Gegebenheiten durch eine Erweiterung sowohl um ständige, wie auch um nichtständige Mitglieder stärker Rechnung tragen. Dazu ist die Aufnahme weiterer Staaten Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas erforderlich. Im Rahmen einer Erhöhung der Zahl der ständigen Sitze im Sicherheitsrat sollten auch Japan und Deutschland angesichts ihrer gewachsenen Rolle berücksichtigt werden."418
230. Zur Möglichkeit einer VN-Eingreiftruppe äußert sich die Bundesregierung wie folgt:
"Auch die Bundesregierung tritt für eine schnellere Reaktionsfähigkeit der VN im Bereich friedenserhaltender Maßnahmen ein, allerdings ohne stehende VN-eigene Truppen. Als erste Schritte haben die VN die Schaffung eines Systems der stand-by-arrangements und einer schnellverlegbaren Hauptquartierkapazität in Angriff genommen. Die Bundesregierung hat hierzu Beiträge angekündigt."419
231. Die in der Studie der "Unabhängigen Arbeitsgruppe zur Zukunft der Vereinten Nationen", die auf Initiative des VN-Generalsekretärs eingesetzt worden war und unter dem mit Vorsitz des ehemaligen Bundespräsidenten von Weizsäcker tagte, gemachten Vorschläge ordnet die Bundesregierung vor allen Dingen als nützliche Denkanstöße ein:
"Die Bundesregierung hofft, daß die Vorschläge zur Reform des Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereichs und zur Bewältigung der Finanzkrise eine vertiefte Diskussion auslösen. Sie hält eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit auch in den Bereichen für nötig, in denen Konflikte ihre Ursachen haben. Der zentrale Vorschlag der 'Weizsäcker-Studie' zur Schaffung eines Systems von drei Räten baut auf früheren Vorschlägen zur Reform der VN auf (Bericht der Commission on Global Governance, Interaction Council), geht allerdings darüber hinaus. Die Chancen für die volle Realisierung eines so umfassenden Ansatzes sind derzeit nicht groß. Die Bundesregierung betrachtet den Vorschlag dennoch als einen nützlichen Denkanstoß."420
232. Auf eine Frage nach Vorschlägen der Bundesregierung für eine Stärkung der Rechte der Generalversammlung trägt die Bundesregierung folgendes vor:
"Die Bundesregierung hat in den entsprechenden Gremien u.a. bislang folgende Vorschläge zur Verbesserung der Arbeit der GV und - damit eng verbunden - zu einer verbesserten Perzeption der VN-Generalversammlung in der internationalen Öffentlichkeit gemacht:
- Straffung der Tagesordnung der GV,
- Überprüfung der bestehenden Praxis der mehrfachen Abstimmung über Resolutionen sowohl in den Hauptausschüssen als auch im Plenum der GV,
- Vermeidung der Überschneidung der Arbeitsbereiche insbesondere vom 2. und 3. Hauptausschuß,
Verbesserung von Haushaltskontrollverfahren.
Diese Vorschläge haben ihren Niederschlag in den entsprechenden EU-Dokumenten gefunden und werden derzeit in der 'hochrangigen Arbeitsgruppe über die Stärkung des VN-Systems' diskutiert. Eine grundlegende rechtliche Stärkung der VN-Generalversammlung ist jedoch nur im Zuge einer Gesamtreform der VN-Charta zu erwarten."421
233. Im Hinblick auf eine Reform des Wirtschafts- und Sozialrates ECOSOC verweist die Bundesregierung auf die Reformbeschlüsse der Generalversammlung der VN422, mit der Ansätze für die weitere Förderung der beiden Grundanliegen, der Stärkung der zentralen Politikformulierung und der effektiven Koordinierung der entwicklungspolitischen Tätigkeiten, geschaffen worden seien. Die Bundesregierung werde sich in der Zukunft wie folgt um die Umsetzung der Reformanliegen bemühen:
"Die Bundesregierung ist sich mit ihren Partnern, vor allem in der EU und in der G7/P8, einig, daß es großer Anstrengungen bedarf, diese Vorstellungen in der Praxis gegen fortdauernde Widerstände durchzusetzen. Die Staaten der G7/P8 haben auf ihren Gipfeltreffen in Lyon 1996 eine Reihe von Vorschlägen verabschiedet, die auf die Verwirklichung der genannten Vorstellungen zielen, darunter die Anregung, die drei mit Entwicklungsfragen befaßten Abteilungen des Generalsekretariats unter der Leitung eines Untergeneralsekretärs zusammenzulegen und diesen Generalsekretär gleichzeitig zum Exekutiv-Sekretär des ECOSOC zu bestimmen. Sie haben außerdem konkrete, an den bestehenden Mandaten und praktischen Möglichkeiten orientierte Vorschläge zur Verbesserung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem System der VN, den internationalen Finanzinstitutionen und der neuen Welthandelsorganisation gemacht. Die Bundesregierung wird diese Vorschläge aktiv verfolgen und sie vor allem in die Positionsbestimmungen der EU, die als der wesentliche Gesprächspartner der G77 in den Verhandlungen über die Reform des VN-Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereichs auftritt, einbringen. Aufgrund der jahrelangen Erfahrung in und mit den Reformdebatten ist dies nach der Überzeugung der Bundesregierung inhaltlich wie prozedural der beste Weg, die VN zu einem effizienten Instrument einer kohärenten, die Interessen aller Beteiligten berücksichtigenden globalen Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Entwicklungspolitik zu machen."423
234. Der Vertreter Luxemburgs nahm im Namen der Europäischen Union vor der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen Stellung zur Finanzkrise der VN. Im Hinblick auf die Zahlungsrückstände der Vereinigten Staaten führt er folgendes aus:
"In this context, the European Union wishes to state that it will agree to a re-opening of the discussions on the scale of assessments only after the United States of America has adopted legislative provisions enabling it to clear its arrears in full and to respect its financial obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The entry into force of any possible revised scale of assessments cannot take the place before monies owed have actually been paid.
The European Union trusts that all member states will fulfil their obligations to the organization on time, in full, without conditions and in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly. No unilateral reduction of the amount owed to the organization by the United States of America can be accepted.
(...) Finally, we wish to recall that the scale of assessments for the regular budget is only one element of the proposal made by the European Union to ensure a sound and predictable financial basis for the United Nations. In any case, we are determined to revisit in due course other important elements of the European Union's proposals, including measures aimed at accelerating the payment of arrears, at stricter enforcement of the system of payment of the contributions through incentives and disincentives and at reforming the scale for the peacekeeping budget."424
235. Hinsichtlich Reformen im Finanzbereich weist die Bundesregierung darauf hin, daß sie an entsprechenden Vorschlägen aktiv mitarbeite, insbesondere an dem von der EU vorgelegten Vorschlag einer neuen Beitragsskala. Zur Verbesserung der Zahlungsmoral schlägt die Bundesregierung folgende Maßnahmen vor:
"Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland befürwortet die Schaffung eines Systems von Sanktionen und Anreizen, um die Zahlungsmoral einzelner Mitgliedstaaten zu heben. Vor allem aber muß die bereits bestehende Sanktionsmöglichkeit des Art. 19 der VN-Charta (Stimmrechtsausschluß) restriktiver interpretiert und konsequenter angewandt werden."425
236. Weiterhin gibt die Bundesregierung in ihrer Antwort Auskunft darüber, an welchen VN-Friedensmissionen sich die Bundesregierung seit 1990 mit zivilem und/oder militärischem Personal beteiligt hat sowie welche informellen Anfragen um Beteiligung nicht positiv beantwortet werden konnten.426
237. Mit Gesetz vom 27. Mai 1997 hat der Bundestag dem Abkommen vom 20. Juni 1996 zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, den Vereinten Nationen und dem Sekretariat des Rahmenübereinkommens der Vereinten Nationen über Klimaänderungen über den Sitz des Sekretariats des Übereinkommens zugestimmt.427
Das Abkommen bestimmt die sinngemäße Anwendung des zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinten Nationen geschlossenen Abkommens über den Sitz des Freiwilligenprogramms der VN auf das Sekretariat der Klimarahmenkonvention. Mit der Übereinkunft wird auch der rechtliche Rahmen für die Tätigkeit des Sekretariats an seinem Sitz in Bonn festgelegt.
238. Mit einem Notenwechsel vom 10./23. September 1997 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinten Nationen wurde eine Vereinbarung abgeschlossen über die Geltung des Abkommens vom 10. November 1995 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinten Nationen über den Sitz des Freiwilligenprogramms der Vereinten Nationen für das Informationszentrum der Vereinten Nationen in Bonn. In dem Notenwechsel wird festgelegt, daß die Errichtung des Informationszentrums der Vereinten Nationen in Bonn mit dem Eintreffen des Direktors des Informationszentrums im Frühjahr 1996 abgeschlossen wurde sowie, daß das Abkommen vom 10. November 1995 über den Sitz des Freiwilligenprogramms der Vereinten Nationen sinngemäß für das Informationszentrum der Vereinten Nationen in Bonn und seine Bediensteten Anwendung findet. Der Notenwechsel bildet die endgültige Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Vereinten Nationen über den Abschluß der Errichtung des Informationszentrums der Vereinten Nationen.428
239. Zu weiteren Verhandlungen über die Ansiedlung von VN-Einrichtungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland äußerte sich die Bundesregierung in einer Antwort auf eine parlamentarische Kleine Anfrage. Sie berate gegenwärtig den Abschluß eines neuen Sitzabkommens zugunsten des Sekretariats des Übereinkommens zur Erhaltung wandernder, wildlebender Tierarten (Bonner Konvention). Weiterhin werden Verhandlungen über den Abschluß eines Sitzabkommens mit dem Internationalen Seegerichtshof aufgenommen.429
397 SR 3743 27.2.1997, 24.
398 SR 3769 16.4.1997, 11.
399 SR 3745 6.3.1997, 19 f.
400 SR 3757 27.3.1997, 4.
401 SR 3765 15.4.1997, 2.
402 SR 3765 15.4.1997, 10.
403 SR 3770 23.4.1997, 16.
404 SR 3778 21.5.1997, 17 f.
405 SR 3778 21.5.1997, 19.
406 SR 3839 4.12.1997, 3 f.
407 SR 3842 19.12.1997, 11 f.
408 SR 3842 19.12.1997, 15.
409 General Assembly 52nd Session, 66 Plenary Meeting, 8.12.1997, 5.
410 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of
the German Delegation, New York, 4.8.1997.
411 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of
the German Delegation, New York, 8.8.1997.
412 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Statement by Ambassador Tono Eitel,
Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the United Nations' 52nd General
Assembly, Agenda Item 59: Question of Equitable Representation on an Increase in the Membership
of the Security Council and Related Matters, New York, 4.12.1997.
413 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Talking points of Ambassador Tono
Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany before the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question
of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and
Other Matters Related to the Security Council, 8.7.1997, Part Two - Election Procedures.
414 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Talking points of Ambassador Tono
Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany before the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question
of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and
Other Matters Related to the Security Council, 9/11.7.1997, Part Three - The Use of the Veto Right.
415 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Talking points of Ambassador Tono
Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany before the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question
of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and
Other Matters Related to the Security Council, 9.7.1997, Part Four - The Review Mechanism.
416 Ibid., 10 ff.
417 Ibid., 13.
418 BT-Drs. 13/6773 vom 15.1.1997, 2 f.
419 Ibid., 4.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid., 7 f.
422 Resolution der GV Nr. 50/227 vom 24.5.1996.
423 BT-Drs. 13/6773 vom 15.1.1997, 9.
424 UN General Assembly, 52nd Session, 79th Plenary Meeting, 22.12.1997, 6.
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid., 27 f. Vgl. auch die Aufstellung in der Anlage, ibid., 45-47.
427 BGBl. 1997 II, 1054; das Abkommen ist am 23.8.1997 in Kraft getreten, BGBl. 1998 II, 301.
428 BGBl. 1998 II, 761.
429 BT-Drs. 13/6674 vom 6.1.1997.
